LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFCR?;:; 
RIVERSIDE 


Some  Personal  Impressions 


From  a  photograph  by   Yevondc 


SOME  PERSONAL 
IMPRESSIONS 


BY 

TAKE  ftONESCU)  ZTo  >7£.5£  4. 

FORMER  PRIME  MINISTER   OF  ROtTMANIA 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION    BY 

VISCOUNT  BRYCE,  O.M. 


NEW  YORK 
FREDERICK  A.  STOKES  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
FBEDERICK  A.  STOKES  COMPANY 


Att  rights  reserved 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION    .......  vii 

I    MONSIEUR  POINCARE 3 

II    PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY 11 

III  COUNT  BERCHTOLD 25 

IV  THE  MARQUIS  PALLAVICINI      ...  33 
V    COUNT  GOLUCHOWSKY 43 

VI    AUGUST  2,  1914  .......  51 

VII    KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 61 

VIII    COUNT  AEHRENTHAL 79 

IX    COUNT  CZERNIN 91 

X    COUNT  MENSDORFF 105 

XI    ENGLAND'S  ANTIPATHY  TO  WAR     .     .  113 

XII    THE  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR    .  119 

XIII    KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA  .     .     .  125 

XIV    HERR  RIEDL 141 

XV    COUNT  SZECZEN 151 

XVI    SIR  DONALD  MACKENZIE  WALLACE     .  157 

XVII    BARON  BANFFY 163 

XVIII    ROUMANIAN  POLICY 171 

XIX    TRAGEDY '  .     .  177 

XX    COUNT  TISZA 183 

XXI    TALAAT  PASHA 189 

V 


VI 

PAGE 

XXII  PRINCE  VON  BULOW 203 

XXIII  TATICHEFF 215 

XXIV  FRANCE  AND  THE  TEUTON  ....  223 
XXV  A  COUSIN  OF  TISZA .231 

XXVI  NEW  ITALY 237 

XXVII  MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS   ....  243 

XXVIII  ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS    ....  263 

XXIX  THE  KAISER  .                     ....  281 


INTRODUCTION 

BY  VISCOUNT  BEYCE 

THIS  book  should  need  no  introduction,  for  all 
who  have  tried  to  follow  the  course  of  events 
in  the  Danubian  States  and  Balkan  States 
during  the  last  few  years  cannot  but  know  the 
name  and  fame  of  Mr.  Take  Jonescu,  one  of 
the  most  active  and  gifted,  as  well  as  one  of 
the  most  highly  cultivated  statesmen  in  East- 
ern Europe.  However,  at  the  request  of  its 
author,  whose  acquaintance  I  had  the  good 
fortune  to  make  when  traveling  in  Roumania 
fourteen  years  ago,  I  willingly  write  a  few 
sentences  of  Preface  to  this  English  transla- 
tion. The  French  original  (for  Mr.  Jonescu 
writes  French  with  singular  facility,  clearness, 
and  grace)  has  already  found  many  readers, 
and  this  version  deserves  to  win  for  it  a  still 
larger  circle  here  and  in  America. 

Those  of  us  who  in  France  and  the  English- 
speaking  countries  have  grown  familiar  with 
the  names  of  the  more  prominent  actors  in  the 


viii  INTRODUCTION 

great  and  gloomy  drama  of  the  last  ten  or 
twelve  years,  must  have  often  wished  to  know 
something  of  the  personalities  that  lay  behind 
the  names.  What  were  their  talents,  their 
characters,  their  manners?  What  were  the 
ideas  and  motives  which  prompted  either  their 
avowed  purposes  or  their  secret  aims?  In 
some  cases  these  motives  may  long  remain  ob- 
scure, but  in  others  the  recorded  words  and 
acts  are  sufficient  to  enable  those  who  were  in 
close  touch  with  them  to  form  a  just  estimate 
and  present  to  us  true  portraits,  provided  al- 
ways that  such  observers  bring  discernment 
and  impartiality  to  the  task.  The  book  is 
modestly  entitled  "Some  Personal  Impres- 
sions" ;  and  the  descriptions  it  contains  are  for 
the  most  part  vigorous  sketches  rather  than 
portraits.  Some,  however,  may  be  called  vig- 
nettes, more  or  less  finished  drawings,  each 
consisting  of  few  lines,  but  those  lines  sharply 
and  firmly  drawn.  Intermingled  with  this 
score  of  personal  sketches  there  are  also  a  few 
brief  essays  or  articles  which  set  before  us 
particular  scenes,  little  fragments  of  history 
in  which  the  author  bore  a  part,  all  relating  to 
the  persons  who  either  figured  in  the  war,  or 
were  concerned  with  the  intrigues  from  which 
it  sprang.  Among  these  we  find  several  Ger- 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

man  statesmen — Kiderlin-Waechter,  Prince 
Biilow,  and  Prince  Lichnowsky,  a  large  num- 
ber of  Austrians,  among  whom  Counts  Berch- 
told,  Aehrenthal,  Goluchowsky,  Czernin  and 
Mensdorff ,  are  the  best  known ;  the  late  King 
Charles  of  Roumania,  the  German  Emperor, 
Eleutherios  Venizelos,  and  lastly  the  most 
ruthless  and  unscrupulous  ruffian  (with  the 
possible  exception  of  Trotsky)  whom  the  war 
has  brought  to  light,  the  Turkish  Talaat 
Pasha. 

These,  with  some  minor  personages,  make 
an  interesting  gallery,  for  though  most  of 
them  are  dealt  with  very  briefly — sometimes 
merely  by  telling  an  anecdote  or  reporting  a 
single  conversation — still  in  every  case  a  dis- 
tinct impression  is  conveyed.  We  feel  that 
the  man  described  is  no  longer  a  name  but  a 
creature  of  flesh  and  blood,  with  something  by 
which  we  can  recognize  him  and  remember 
him  for  future  use.  National  characteristics 
are  lightly  but  brightly  touched.  Among  the 
Germans,  Kiderlin-Waechter  stands  out  as  in 
Mr.  Jonescu's  judgment  the  ablest,  and  Biilow 
the  cleverest.  If  the  Austrian  statesmen  are, 
or  were,  what  he  paints  them  (and  there  seems 
no  reason  to  doubt  the  general  justice  of  his 
observations),  the  hideous  failure  of  their  di- 


x  INTRODUCTION 

plomacy  becomes  comprehensible.  A  dynasty 
guided  by  such  servants  was  fated  to  perish  in 
the  storm  its  folly  had  raised.  Aehrenthal  and 
Tisza  were  at  least  men  of  force  and  ability, 
but  an  ability  which  did  not  exclude  bad  prin- 
ciples and  rash  unwisdom.  The  rest  were 
mostly  ciphers;  while  of  Count  Berchtold,  the 
description  given  by  Mr.  Jonescu  successfully 
conveys  to  the  reader  that  there  was  nothing 
to  describe,  at  least  on  the  intellectual  side. 
One  may  pity  the  people  which  was  guided  by 
such  statesmen,  for  they  were  not  its  choice, 
but  one  cannot  pity  the  dynasty  which  did 
choose  them.  It  well  deserved  to  perish,  after 
three  centuries  of  pernicious  power. 

Besides  the  illuminative  glimpses  of  curious 
scenes,  and  the  vivacious  sketches  of  notable 
personages,  which  these  pages  contain,  the 
reader  will  find  in  them  some  contributions  to 
history  of  permanent  interest.  We  are  helped 
to  apprehend  the  views,  and  comprehend  what 
is  now  called  the  "mentality"  with  which  the 
ruling  caste  in  Germany  entered  the  war.  It 
has  been  often  said  of  late  that  the  men  in 
whose  hands  great  decisions  lay  were  not  great 
enough  for  the  fateful  issues  they  had  to  decide. 
Quantula  sapientia  regitur  mundus  seems  even 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

truer  now  than  it  did  in  the  days  of  Oxen- 
stierna.  Among  all  the  "Impressions"  this 
book  records,  that  is  the  one  which  stands  out 
conspicuous. 


Monsieur  Poincare 


MONSIEUR  POINCARE 

ON  New  Year's  Eve,  1913,  I  arrived  in  Paris. 
I  was  on  my  way  to  London,  where  the 
Balkan  Conference  was  then  sitting.  Negotia- 
tions between  the  Turks  and  the  Balkan 
States  had  come  to  a  deadlock,  and  I  hoped 
to  profit  by  this  to  the  extent  of  coming  to 
some  pacific  settlement  of  our  territorial  dif- 
ferences with  Bulgaria.  It  was  my  intention 
to  offer  the  support  of  Roumania  to  Bulgaria, 
which  at  that  date  meant  the  Balkan  league, 
and  if  necessary  to  promise  military  assistance 
in  order  to  force  the  Turk  to  give  up  Adrian- 
ople. 

The  Powers  had  no  notion  what  to  do.  It 
was  felt  that  there  was  little  chance  of  mere 
collective  notes  having  any  success,  and  as  for 
a  naval  demonstration,  which  alone  could  have 
saved  the  face  of  Kiamil's  government,  the 
Powers  were  too  jealous  and  distrustful  of 
each  other  to  act  together  in  this  way.  On 
the  other  hand  it  was  certain  that  the  armed 

3 


4          SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

resistance  of  Turkey  was  shattered  and  that  to 
force  her  hand  would  really  be  doing  her  a 
kindness.  If  only  it  had  been  done  then, 
Turkey  would  have  escaped  Enver  and  her 
present  misfortunes. 

It  is  useless  to  repeat  what  I  have  so  often 
said,  that  the  idea  of  a  war  with  Bulgaria,  and 
possibly  with  all  the  Balkan  States — our  tradi- 
tional friends — was  utterly  repugnant  to  me. 
It  was  even  possible  that  such  a  war  might 
bring  about  the  expected  European  con- 
flagration, in  which  we  should  find  ourselves 
on  the  side  of  Austria- Hungary,  a  prospect 
that  was  altogether  odious  to  me,  for  in  it  I 
saw  the  grave  of  our  future  and  of  our 
national  ideal. 

I  hoped  the  Bulgars  would  appreciate  the 
situation  and  would  hasten  to  accept  my  sug- 
gestions. If  only  they  had  done  so,  peace  with 
Turkey  would  have  been  signed  in  the  first 
week  of  January,  1913,  the  second  Balkan 
war  would  probably  not  have  taken  place,  and 
the  European  war  would  have  been  averted 
for  an  indefinite  number  of  years. 

Although  my  hopes  of  arriving  at  an  under- 
standing with  Bulgaria  were  high,  I  took  the 
possibility  of  failure  into  consideration  and 


MONSIEUR  POINCARE  5 

realized  that  I  might  want  the  friendly  sup- 
port of  the  Great  Powers.  This  was  why, 
before  leaving  Bucharest,  I  intimated  to  Mon- 
sieur Poincare,  then  Prime  Minister  of 
France,  that  I  was  about  to  visit  him. 

ii 

M.  Poincare  received  me  on  the  1st  of 
January,  1913,  at  half -past  eight  in  the  morn- 
ing, an  hour  that  in  Paris  is  certainly  an 
absurd  time  for  an  appointment;  but  I  had  to 
go  to  London  in  the  afternoon,  and  on  ac- 
count of  its  being  New  Year's  Day,  Monsieur 
Poincare  was  due  at  the  £lysee  at  ten  o'clock 
for  the  official  ceremonies. 

I  asked  Monsieur  Poincare  for  the  support 
of  France  in  our  difficulties  with  Bulgaria. 
He  made  the  warmest  declarations  of  friend- 
ship for  Roumania;  promised  me  his  own  per- 
sonal cooperation,  but  said,  "My  action  is 
naturally  limited  by  the  fact  that  relations 
with  our  ally  are  most  cordial  while,  owing  to 
your  military  convention  with  Austria  and 
Germany,  you  will  be  in  the  enemy's  camp  if 
war  breaks  out.  You  know  well,"  and  he 
could  not  have  spoken  with  greater  sincerity, 
"that  we  do  not  want  war,  and  are  doing 


6          SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

everything  to  avoid  it.    But  if  our  adversaries 
force  us  to  go  to  war  the  fact  that  your  300,- 

000  rifles  are  on  their  side  cannot  be  a  matter 
of  indifference  to  us." 

As  the  Treaty  between  Roumania  and  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  supposed  to  be  kept  secret 

1  had  to  pretend  that  I  knew  nothing  about 
the  obligation  he  was  alluding  to. 

The  French  Prime  Minister,  who  knew  the 
situation  precisely,  then  asked  me  if  I  could 
assure  him  that  in  the  event  of  war — a  war 
that  France  would  never  provoke — he  could 
hope  that  France  and  her  allies  would  not 
find  the  Roumanian  army  against  them. 

Personally  I  had  not  believed  for  many 
years  that  the  Roumanians  and  Magyars 
would  ever  fight  side  by  side,  but  on  the  1st 
of  January,  1913,  it  was  impossible  for  me 
to  make  any  valid  promise  in  Roumania's 
name. 

I  could  only  tell  Monsieur  Poincare  that  I 
could  not  give  him  an  answer,  but  that  if  I 
were  in  his  place  I  should  grant  Roumania 
as  much  help  as  was  compatible  with  my  al- 
liances and  my  obligations,  and  leave  it  to  the 
future  to  prove  whether  I  had  acted  wisely 
or  not. 


Ill 

The  events  of  1913  confirmed  my  beliefs. 
With  great  clearness  I  saw  that  the  idea  of 
shedding  Roumanian  blood  to  glorify  Magyar- 
ism  was  such  an  absurdity  that  no  one  on 
earth  could  give  effect  to  it. 

On  the  9th  of  September,  1913,  I  paid 
Monsieur  Poincare  another  visit.  He  was 
then  President  of  the  Republic.  He  con- 
gratulated me  on  the  success  of  Roumania, 
and  I  took  occasion  to  say:  "On  New 
Year's  Day  you  asked  me  a  question  which 
I  could  not  then  answer;  I  will  give  you  your 
answer  to-day.  If  war  does  break  out — and 
I  devoutly  hope  humanity  may  be  spared 
such  a  calamity — you  will  not  find  the  Rou- 
manian army  in  your  enemies'  camp." 

"Have  you  cancelled  the  treaty  of  al- 
liance?" he  asked. 

"I  know  nothing  about  any  treaty.  All  I 
know  is  that  the  Roumanian  army  will  not 
be  in  your  enemies'  camp.  I  am  quite  certain 
about  it,  and  if  I  did  not  know  that  we  are 
both  believers  in  peace  and  are  doing  all  we 
can  to  preserve  it,  I  should  say  that  events 
will  prove  me  right.  Let  us  hope  that  they 
may  never  have  occasion  to  do  so." 


8          SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

"But  are  you  sure  to  remain  long  in 
power?"  he  asked. 

"Far  from  it,  I  shall  be  out  of  office  in  two 
months,  but  that  doesn't  matter.  What  I  am 
telling  you  is  true  irrespective  of  what  min- 
isters comprise  the  government.  After  what 
has  happened  this  summer  no  one  will  be  able 
to  make  Roumanians  fight  against  their  will 
or  against  the  dictates  of  national  honor  and 
interest:" 


Prince  Lie  know  sky 


II 

PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY 

TWENTY  years  ago  Prince  Lichnowsky  was 
Secretary  to  the  German  Legation  in  Bucha- 
rest. 

I  knew  him  in  those  days  as  an  intelligent 
young  man, .  gay,  witty  and  a  real  grand 
seigneur.  Though  a  German  diplomat  he 
was  Polish  by  origin  and  had  all  the  adapta- 
bility, vivacity  and  brilliance  of  his  race.  We 
got  on  admirably. 

I  did  not  see  him  again  until  early  in 
January,  1913,  when  I  went  to  London  to  try 
and  come  to  an  understanding  with  Monsieur 
Danef  over  Bulgar-Roumanian  difficulties. 

Prince  Lichnowsky  had  come  back  into  the 
Diplomatic  Service  after  a  very  long  absence. 
He  had  only  done  so  at  the  reiterated  request 
of  the  Kaiser,  who  believed  him  to  be  the  only 
man  capable  of  succeeding  Baron  Marschall 
in  London,  Baron  Marschall  at  that  time  hav- 
ing the  reputation  of  being  the  ablest  diplo- 
mat in  the  German  service.  I  may  as  well  say 

11 


12        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Jiere  that  in  spite  of  his  ability  Marschall  had 
not  been  much  of  a  success  in  England.  He 
had  lived  too  long  in  Constantinople  to  make 
a  good  Ambassador  at  St.  James's. 

Prince  Lichnowsky  took  his  task  seriously. 
He  spared  himself  no  trouble  to  win  people's 
confidence,  and  in  a  short  time  had  accom- 
plished marvels  in  this  direction.  He  was 
extremely  frank,  and  his  clear  picturesque 
way  of  talking  impressed  people.'  It  was  he 
who,  in  speaking  to  me  of  the  two  little  bits 
of  Bulgar  territory  that  jutted  out  into  our 
Dobrudja,  which  Danef  was  at  the  time  of- 
fering me  as  a  complete  satisfaction  for  our 
claims,  contemptuously  described  them  as 
"the  two  dugs  of  the  bitch." 

I  will  not  now  describe  my  interviews  with 
Lichnowsky  in  1913.  I  must  admit,  however, 
he  was  more  than  friendly  and  Tdnd,  and  did 
me  real  services.  He  went  so  far  even  with- 
out waiting  for  the  sanction  of  his  Govern- 
ment as  to  make  a  proposal  favorable  to  us 
at  the  Balkan  Conference  then  sitting  in  Lon- 
don. I  shall  have  something  to  say  of  all  this 
another  time. 

I  must,  however,  mention  two  points  relat- 
ing to  that  moment.  One  day  Lichnowsky 
assured  me  that  the  relations  between  Eng- 


PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY  13 

land  and  Germany  were  excellent.  The  next 
day  Sir  E.  Grey  said  to  me,  "If  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  makes  the  proposal  you  speak  of  I 
shall  receive  it  most  favorably,  as  I  do  every- 
thing that  comes  from  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor. We  are  on  excellent  terms." 

This  was  really  remarkable  when  one  thinks 
of  the  then  recent  Agadir  crisis.  I  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  there  was  no  danger  of 
European  war,  and  on  the  7th  of  January, 
1913,  I  wrote  to  King  Charles  that  I  was 
positive  the  great  war  would  not  break  out 
yet  awhile. 

At  that  same  time  Lichnowsky  said  to  me, 
"We  will  do  what  we  can  for  you,  but  our 
means  are  limited.  You  should  really  apply 
to  Vienna,  as  Austria  can  do  a  good  deal  at 
Sofia  if  she  wishes  to.  I  am  sure  there  is 
something  brewing  between  Austria  and  Bul- 
garia. I  don't  know  exactly  what  it  is,  but 
something  is  going  on." 

In  the  spring  of  1914  I  was  again  in  Lon- 
don for  six  days.  Prince  Lichnowsky  gave  a 
luncheon  in  my  honor.  All  the  Embassy  staff 
were  there,  including  the  notorious  Kuhlman, 
then  Councilor  of  the  Embassy,  now  Min- 
ister at  the  Hague,  who  at  that  time  was  un- 
fortunately corresponding  with  the  Kaiser  over 


14        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

the  head  of  Lichnowsky  and  was  giving  false 
information  to  Berlin  as  to  the  state  of  affairs 
in  England. 

I  asked  Lichnowsky  how  matters  stood  be- 
tween England  and  Germany,  and  if  he  was 
as  pleased  with  things  as  he  had  been  in 
January,  1913.  He  replied  that  he  had  suc- 
ceeded in  his  efforts,  and  that  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  were  on  the  best  of  terms. 

"I  told  the  Kaiser,"  he  said,  "that  nothing 
could  be  easier  for  us  than  to  keep  up  good 
relations  with  England — because  England 
genuinely  cares  for  peace.  But  in  order  to 
do  this  we  should  never  attack  or  annoy 
France,  because  in  that  case  England  would 
back  her  to  the  last  man  and  the  last  shilling, 
and  as  it  is  not  to  our  interest  to  irritate 
France,  you  see  that  our  relations  with  Eng- 
land will  remain  of  the  best." 

My  impressions  accorded  with  those  of  the 
German  Ambassador.  I  felt  that  England 
would  not  tolerate  an  attack  on  France,  but 
putting  that  aside  it  was  certain  that  in  Lon- 
don the  desire  was  to  be  on  good  terms  with 
Germany.  In  that  one  saw  the  guarantee  of 
peace. 

On  July  the  12th,  1914,  I  again  arrived  in 
London.  I  saw  Lichnowsky  and  discussed  the 


PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY  15 

Albanian  question  with  him,  which  had  by 
then  become  disquieting,  and  also  the  silence 
of  Austria  as  to  what  line  she  was  going  to 
take  over  the  Serajevo  drama.  Lichnowsky 
felt  that  Austria  had  something  up  her  sleeve. 
His  Austrian  colleague  Count  Mensdorff  was 
uncommunicative.  Lichnowsky  had  been  in 
Berlin  since  the  Serajevo  assassination,  and  he 
was  not  pleased  with  what  he  had  seen  in  the 
Wilhelmstrasse.  "They  are  giving  Austria  a 
free  hand,"  he  said,  "without  thinking  where 
it  may  lead  us.  I  warned  them,  but  I  am  not 
happy  about  it,  and  am  beginning  to  regret 
that  I  did  not  stay  in  Berlin."  Lichnowsky 
did  not  conceal  the  fact  that  Tchirsky,  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  was  encour- 
aging the  bellicose  tendency  of  Austria. 

Lichnowsky's  apprehensions  were  well 
grounded.  The  German  Chancellor,  Beth- 
man-Hollweg,  had  never  been  well  up  in  ques- 
tions of  foreign  politics — far  from  it.  As  for 
Von  Jagow,  I  knew  that  at  the  time  he  was  in 
Rome  he  had  told  one  of  his  colleagues  that  in 
the  Balkan  incidents  he  saw  the  proof  of  the 
approaching  disintegration  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  that  it  was  a  disturbing  problem. 
With  a  fixed  idea  like  that  in  his  head  it  would 
be  easy  to  make  mistakes. 


16        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

On  Wednesday,  July  the  22d,  I  dined  with 
Baroness  Deichman,  sister  of  Sir  Maurice  de 
Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  in  Vienna.  The 
house  was  one  of  the  social  centers  of  London 
and  lent  itself  most  favorably  to  an  Anglo- 
German  understanding.  I  knew  that  I  was  to 
meet  Lichnowsky,  who  had  expressed  a  wish 
to  talk  to  me  that  very  day. 

After  dinner  I  went  with  Lichnowsky  into 
a  sitting-room  in  which  there  hung  a  fine 
portrait  of  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  painted, 
if  I  am  not  mistaken,  by  the  great  English 
artist,  Herkomer. 

Lichnowsky  was  in  Court  dress;  he  was  to 
see  the  King  that  evening.  I  do  not  know 
what  the  occasion  was.  He  told  me  he  had 
not  yet  succeeded  in  finding  out  the  text  of 
the  demands  Austria  was  making  of  Serbia, 
but  that  he  had  learned  enough  to  know  that 
they  would  be  very,  very  harsh.  He  knew  that 
amongst  other  things  Austria  had  asked  for 
the  suppression  of  a  nationalist  society  in 
Serbia,  and  that  alone  seemed  to  him  to  be 
going  pretty  far.  He  earnestly  begged  me  to 
suggest  to  the  Roumanian  Government  that 
they  should  use  any  influence  they  had  at 
Belgrade  to  get  the  Austrian  note,  no  matter 
what  it  was,  accepted  by  Serbia.  "I  promise 


PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY  17 

you,"  he  said,  "that  in  the  carrying  of  it  out, 
the  Serbs  can  whittle  it  down  or  evade  the 
conditions,  and  we  can  see  to  it  that  nothing 
is  said.  I  take  that  on  myself.  We  must  get 
round  this  crisis  somehow.  For  instance,  the 
order  to  suppress  a  patriotic  society  need 
not  really  mean  anything.  In  a  few  months 
they  could  resurrect  it  under  another  name." 

I  promised  him  to  do  what  I  could.  That 
very  night  I  telegraphed  what  the  German 
Ambassador  had  communicated  to  me  to  Mon- 
sieur Bratiano,  the  then  President  of  the 
Roumanian  Council. 

ii 

On  Friday,  July  the  24th,  the  Austrian 
Ultimatum  was  published.  In  reading  the 
Times  I  said  to  my  wife,  "This  means  Eu- 
ropean war;  we  must  get  back  to  Roumania." 

I  went  to  see  Lichnowsky  in  the  morning. 
He  was  at  the  Foreign  Office.  I  went  to 
his  house  later  and  found  him  very  much 
upset.  Obviously  the  Austrian  note  had  ex- 
ceeded his  expectations.  He  was,  however, 
firmly  convinced  that  there  was  no  danger  of 
war.  He  was  sure  that  some  way  of  preserv- 
ing peace  would  be  found.  He  told  me  with 
an  ironic  smile  that  he  had  been  instructed  to 


18        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

advocate  to  the  English  Cabinet  the  "localiza- 
tion" of  the  question  at  issue  between  Serbia 
and  Austria.  He  did  not  express  his  opinion 
of  this  folly,  but  it  was  evident  that  he  thought 
it  ridiculous.  He  was  so  certain  of  peace  that 
he  asked  me  if  I  were  going  direct  to  Aix-les- 
Bains  from  Brighton  or  whether  I  should  re- 
turn to  London  for  one  night.  When  I  an- 
swered that  it  would  depend  on  the  political 
situation  he  said  good-by,  being  certain  that 
I  should  go  straight  on  to  Aix  from  Brighton. 
He  was  so  assured  in  bearing  that  I  tele- 
graphed to  Paris  and  Aix  to  announce  my 
arrival. 

At  Brighton  in  the  afternoon  of  Saturday 
and  again  on  Sunday  I  received  communica- 
tions from  London  that  showed  me  that  Lich- 
nowsky  was  deceiving  himself  and  that  Tchir- 
sky,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  was 
pushing  Austria  on  to  take  up  an  overbear- 
ing attitude.  I  telegraphed  to  my  friend 
Mishu,  Roumanian  Minister  in  London,  ask- 
ing him  to  book  places  for  me  in  the  Ostend 
Express  for  Tuesday  morning,  the  28th  of 
July,  and  I  informed  my  brother  at  Aix-les- 
Bains  that  I  had  given  up  my  journey  thither. 

I  returned  to  London  on  Monday  morning 
the  27th  of  July.  From  the  station  where  my 


PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY  19 

friend  Mishu  met  me  I  went  straight  to  Prince 
Lichnowsky  and  told  him  of  my  agitation  and 
of  my  decision  to  go  back  to  Roumania.  He 
told  me  I  was  wrong,  that  there  was  no  possi- 
bility of  war,  not  a  hundred  to  one  chance  of 
it ;  that  in  my  place  he  would  stay  on  in  Lon- 
don because  it  would  be  so  tiresome  to  go  from 
London  to  Aix-les-Bains  via  Bucharest.  In- 
sisting on  the  danger  of  war,  I  said,  "It  is 
all  the  more  serious — because  we  must  not 
delude  ourselves  as  to  the  attitude  of  Eng- 
land. In  spite  of  the  pacifism  of  its  Gov- 
ernment, England  will  certainly  come  in." 

Lichnowsky,  forgetting  what  he  had  said  to 
me  in  the  spring,  said,  "Of  that  I  am  not  so 
sure  as  you  are."  "You  are  wrong,"  I  said. 
"I  know  the  English.  No  one  in  the  world 
will  be  able  to  prevent  them  mixing  them- 
selves up  in  a  war  provoked  with  so  much 
injustice.  If  you  believe  the  contrary  you 
are  profoundly  mistaken." 

He  went  on  repeating  that  it  might  be 
possible,  but  that  he  was  not  so  sure  of  Eng- 
land's coming  in  as  I  was.  That  is  the  one 
weakness  that  I  found  in  Lichnowsky 's  judg- 
ment at  that  time.  Of  course  like  a  great 
many  other  people  he  had  been  blinded  by  the 
Irish  question. 


20        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

I  followed  Lichnowsky's  advice.  I  gave  up 
my  tickets  for  Tuesday  the  28th,  but  being 
more  distrustful  than  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor I  took  places  on  the  express  for  the  fol- 
lowing day,  Wednesday  the  29th.  It  turned 
out  to  be  the  last  through  train. 

On  the  morning  of  Tuesday  the  28th,  when 
I  saw  Lichnowsky,  he  was  a  changed  man.  He 
had  begun  to  lose  confidence.  He  only  saw  a 
seven  to  three  chance  of  peace,  and  although 
he  assured  me  of  his  hope  that  humanity  would 
be  spared  such  a  nameless  folly,  he  said,  "Go 
back  to  Roumania.  There  are  none  too  many 
good  brains  about;  don't  deprive  your  coun- 
try of  yours.  I  hope  you  will  soon  come  back, 
but  I  understand  your  going." 

I  saw  him  for  the  last  time  in  the  afternoon 
of  Tuesday  the  28th.  He  was  pale — a  man 
undone.  He  told  me  the  peace  of  the  world 
hung  by  a  thread.  I  have  seldom  seen  any- 
one so  overcome. 

I  had  a  profound  conviction  that  this  man 
was  sincere,  that  he  had  genuinely  worked 
for  peace,  that  he  had  served  his  country  with 
all  his  strength,  and  that  for  all  the  calamities 
unchained  by  the  black  executioner  of  Buda- 
pesth  and  the  criminals  of  Berlin  he  deserves 
no  blame. 


PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY  21 

I  hope  Prince  Lichnowsky,  for  whose  con- 
fidence and  friendship  I  am  grateful,  will 
forgive  me  for  witnessing  to  history  in  such 
detail.  The  day  will  come  when  the  German 
people — once  more  sober — will  remember  that 
their  true  servants  are  those  who  did  their 
best  to  save  their  country  from  the  torrent  of 
universal  hate  unloosed  against  it  by  this  war 
— a  war  naked  of  all  excuse. 


Count  Berchtold 


Ill 

COUNT  BERCHTOLD 

I  HAVE  only  had  two  political  conversations 
with  Count  Berchtold  during  my  life,  but  they 
were  enough  to  enable  me  to  take  the  measure 
of  the  man.  After  each  of  them  I  wondered 
to  myself  how  it  was  possible  that  such  a  per- 
son could  be  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  a 
Great  Power.  The  phenomenon  was  ex- 
plained to  me  by  a  Viennese  journalist.  "In 
our  country  it  is  necessary  for  a  Count  to  suc- 
ceed a  Count."  I  state  this  for  what  it  is 
worth,  but  I  have  never  succeeded  in  finding 
a  better  reason. 

Count  Berchtold  is  a  fine-looking  man,  if 
one  admires  that  type  of  person.  Gentle- 
manly, extremely  gentlemanly,  with  good 
manners — and  that  is  all  there  is  to  him.  I 
should  have  nothing  to  add  if  I  wanted  to 
paint  his  portrait. 

I  was  motoring  in  Northern  Italy  when 
Count  Berchtold  went  to  Sinaia  in  Septem- 
ber, 1912,  to  pay  a  visit  to  King  Charles.  A 

25 


26        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

telegram  from  Sinaia  caught  me  at  Venice. 
In  it  a  friend  informed  me  that  it  was  con- 
sidered advisable  that  I  should  stop  at  Vienna 
on  my  way  home  and  see  Count  Berchtold. 
I  understood  this  to  mean  that  King  Charles 
thought  a  change  in  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment imminent  and  that  he  wished  me  to  be  in 
personal  touch  with  the  new  director  of  Aus- 
trian policy.  I  acquainted  Count  Berchtold 
with  my  wish  to  visit  him,  and  he  came  in 
from  the  country  to  Vienna  in  order  to  re- 
ceive me. 

We  chatted  for  an  hour.  He  tried  to  ex- 
plain to  me  his  notorious  circular  on  the 
decentralization  of  the  Ottoman  Empire — the 
circular  that  precipitated  the  outbreak  of  the 
Balkan  War.  I  could  make  nothing  of  it. 
He  complained  that  his  intentions  had  been 
misunderstood  everywhere.  He  laid  himself 
out  to  reveal  them  to  me,  but  again  I  did  not 
understand  him  any  the  better.  Was  the 
business  too  intricate,  or  was  I  too  limited? 
I  don't  really  know. 

Speaking  to  him  of  the  ticklish  condition 
of  Balkan  affairs,  I  said,  "If  you  can  keep 
the  peace  for  another  couple  of  months  the 
situation  will  be  saved.  Mountain  wars  are 
not  undertaken  after  November."  "Why 


COUNT  BERCHTOLD  27 

should  the  peace  be  kept  for  two  months 
only?  I  am  sure  that  peace  is  in  no  way 
threatened  in  the  Balkans.  You  can  be  cer- 
tain of  that,"  he  replied  confidently.  Did 
he  want  to  mystify  me  or  did  he  not  know 
the  real  situation? 

In  the  course  of  conversation  I  spoke  of  the 
folly  of  competitive  naval  armaments  and 
asked  why  Austria  too  should  be  travelling 
down  the  same  road.  "Why,"  I  asked,  "do 
you  want  a  big  fleet?  You  have  no  Colonies; 
you  never  will  have  any  Colonies,  and  your 
oversea  trade  will  never  be  of  much  impor- 
tance. What  good  is  a  fleet  to  you?  If  you 
are  seeking  security  against  Italy  you  are 
committing  a  fundamental  error.  You  will 
never  be  able  to  fight  Italy  on  the  sea,  not 
only  because  she  will  always  be  your  superior, 
but  also  because,  in  the  event  of  such  a  con- 
flict, she  would  be  the  ally  of  France  and  Eng- 
land, and  your  Dreadnoughts  would  never 
even  put  to  sea.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you 
expect  to  be  on  Italy's  side  she  will  not  need 
your  fleet.  She  would  prefer  to  increase  her 
own.  Besides,"  I  added,  "I  don't  understand 
what  Germany  is  up  to  either";  and  there- 
upon I  repeated  to  him  what  I  had  said  to 


28        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Kiderlen-Waechter  in  Berlin  some  ten  months 
previously. 

In  reply  Count  Berchtold  explained  to 
me  what  I  had  already  suspected — that  the 
increase  of  the  Austrian  Navy  had  been 
demanded  by  Germany,  and  that  the  day 
was  coming  when  the  Austro-German  fleets 
would  have  a  real  superiority  over  the  Eng- 
lish fleet.  He  recognized  that  England 
could  always  build  more  ships  than  the  two 
Teutonic  Empires,  but  he  was  sure  that  she 
would  soon  be  short  of  crews.  "With  their 
system  of  voluntary  enlistment  the  supply  of 
recruits  will  soon  fail,  whereas  we  with  our 
compulsory  service  can  always  get  as  many 
men  as  we  want.  Then  we  could  attack  and 
destroy  England." 

I  listened  with  amazement  to  this  Minister 
of  a  Great  Power.  He  did  not  seem  to 
realize  that  the  day  England  found  she  could 
not  get  enough  volunteers  for  her  Navy,  that 
day  she  would  introduce  compulsory  service, 
but  that  she  never  could  allow  herself  to  be 
outclassed  by  Germany  at  sea. 

H 

The  second  time  I  saw  Count  Berchtold 
was  on  the  llth  or  12th  of  September,  1913. 


COUNT  BERCHTOLD  29 

I  am  not  quite  sure  of  the  day.  I  rather 
think,  however,  it  was  the  llth.  He  began 
by  making  most  ample  apologies  both  on 
his  own  account  and  on  that  of  Count  Tisza 
for  an  incident  th'at  had  recently  occurred  at 
Deva,  when  the  small  Roumanian  flags  on  my 
wife's  motor  had  been  torn  off  by  Hungarian 
police.  We  then  spoke  of  the  great  political 
crisis  we  had  just  been  through.  He  told  me 
he  had  been  much  criticized  and  had  been  ac- 
cused of  not  having  protected  the  rights  and 
position  of  Austria-Hungary.  I  replied — in 
accordance  with  my  genuine  conviction — that 
even  if  it  were  really  true  that  the  designs  on 
Salonika  attributed  to  Austria  were  but  a 
calumny,  Austria  had  lost  nothing  through 
the  Balkan  crisis,  that  even  her  caprices  had 
been  satisfied,  and  that  therefore  she  had 
absolutely  no  cause  for  grievance.  I  added 
that  he  could,  if  he  would,  establish  good 
relations  with  Serbia,  more  especially  as  for 
at  least  fifteen  or  twenty  years  to  come  the 
Serbians  would  be  more  than  busy  with  their 
newly  acquired  territory.  I  assured  him  that 
this  was  the  genuine  belief  of  Monsieur 
Pasitch,  and  that  if  Austria  would  but  show 
herself  a  little  less  hostile  everything  would 
once  more  go  smoothly. 


SO        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

We  talked,  too,  of  Albania,  which  he  looked 
upon  as  his  own  creation,  and  seemed  sur- 
prised that  I  knew  the  Albanians  and  Al- 
banian affairs  as  well  as  I  did.  I  must  own 
that  on  this  subject  he  was  very  well  in- 
formed, but  all  the  same  he  seemed  to  me  com- 
pletely deluded.  For  example,  he  told  me 
that  at  that  moment  law  and  order  in  Albania 
was  better  assured  than  in  any  other  country 
in  Europe! 

This  second  conversation  did  not  make  me 
change  my  opinion  of  Count  Berchtold.  I  am 
quite  persuaded  that  since  the  death  of  Fran- 
cis Ferdinand  it  was  Tisza  and  not  Berchtold 
who  directed  Austrian  policy.  He  has  been 
the  plaything  of  the  really  strong  man.  Far 
from  this  being  an  excuse  for  him,  it  means 
that  he  is  doubly  guilty,  for  no  one  has  the 
right  to  accept  a  position  that  is  above  his 
capacity. 

I  am  sure  we  shall  never  hear  of  Count 
Berchtold  in  European  politics  again.  That 
episode  is  ended. 


The  Marquis  Pallavicini 


IV 
THE  MARQUIS  PALLAVICINI 

A  PURE  Magyar  answers  to  this  Italian  name. 
In  his  youth  the  Marquis  Pallavicini  must 
have  been  an  Imperialist,  like  so  many  other 
Hungarian  aristocrats ;  but  at  the  time  I  knew 
him  he  was  already  a  Magyar  in  the  full  ac- 
ceptance of  the  word.  This  is  all  the  more 
remarkable  as  it  seems  the  Marquis  speaks 
pretty  indifferent  Magyar.  He  has  made  up 
for  this  by  bringing  up  his  sons,  the  children 
of  a  charming  English  woman,  to  be  such 
chauvinists  that  they  would  never  even  learn 
their  mother's  tongue. 

Like  all  good  Hungarians,  the  Marquis 
Pallavicini  has  always  been  an  ultra-Ser- 
bophobe.  It  gave  him  great  pleasure  to 
describe  to  me  how,  when  he  was  Minister  at 
Belgrade,  whenever  the  poor  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment resisted  any  demand  of  Austria,  he 
would  discover  that  all  the  Serbian  pigs  were 
stricken  with  sudden  illness,  and  how  directly 
the  Serbian  Government  gave  in,  the  pigs 

33 


34        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

were  instantly  and  miraculously  cured,  so  that 
their  export  might  be  resumed. 

No  mere  words  can  do  justice  to  the 
physiognomy  of  the  Marquis  Pallavicini,  when 
he  was  explaining  these  incidents  in  Austro- 
Serbian  relations  or  rather  in  the  martyrdom 
of  Serbia.  A  smile  which  was  almost  a  grin 
pervaded  his  face,  his  short-sighted  eyes  closed 
till  they  became  invisible,  and  his  piping  voice 
took  on  a  Mephistophelian  tone.  The  very 
wagging  of  his  head,  his  short  awkward 
gestures,  all  seemed  to  diffuse  a  smell  of 
sulphur ! 

The  Marquis  Pallavicini  is  the  antithesis  of 
the  traditional  Austrian  diplomat.  Usually 
such  people  are  good  to  look  at,  they  have  a 
presence  which  impresses  the  unwary,  and 
one  must  see  a  good  deal  of  them  to  under- 
stand their  remarkable  emptiness.  To  put  it 
shortly,  they  look  more  intelligent  than  they 
really  are. 

In  the  case  of  Pallavicini  it  is  just  the 
opposite.  His  face  is  not  his  fortune.  He 
looks  rather  a  simpleton,  and  yet  one  would 
be  wrong  to  trust  in  his  case  to  appearances. 
Pallavicini  may  not  be  a  great  mind,  but  at 
any  rate  he  is  a  very  observing,  very  well- 
informed,  and  a  very  subtle  person.  In  a 


THE  MARQUIS  PALLAVICINI  35 

word,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  to 
Constantinople  is  a  much  abler  man  than  he 
looks,  and  one  would  make  a  blunder  if  in 
dealing  with  him  one  judged  by  appearances. 

ii 

I  have  had  relations  with  the  Marquis 
Pallavicini  for  years.  We  have  talked  to- 
gether for  hours.  Of  all  these  conversations 
three  only  present  themselves  to  my  mind 
when  I  recall  the  past. 

The  first  concerned  the  domestic  politics  of 
Hungary.  It  was  a  few  weeks  prior  to  the 
well-remembered  general  election  when  the 
Tisza  Government  was  beaten  by  the  coalition. 
We  were  both  lunching  with  Count  Larisch 
at  Bucharest.  Pallavicini  believed  that  Tisza 
would  be  successful.  I  made  a  bet  with  him 
that  the  coalition  would  triumph  and  win 
easily,  and  he  never  understood  how  it  was 
that  I  guessed  correctly.  Pallavicini  was  com- 
pletely unable  to  understand  the  compelling 
force  of  parliamentary  freedom  for  which  the 
coalition  fought,  and  that  is  why  he  was  at 
that  time  an  Imperialist. 

Our  second  talk  took  place  at  Constanti- 
nople on  my  return  from  Athens  in  Novem- 
ber, 1913.  The  occasion  was  a  reception  at 


36        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

the  Roumanian  Legation.  Pallavicini  wanted 
a  tete-a-tete  with  me  which  I  could  not  refuse 
him.  In  this  interview,  which  followed  one 
that  I  had  had  with  Monsieur  de  Giers,  the 
Russian  representative,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  to  Turkey  strongly  advised  me  to 
try  and  improve  our  relations  with  Bulgaria. 
I  replied  that  I  asked  nothing  better,  but  that 
as  the  Bulgarians  were  discontented  and  we 
were  satisfied,  an  understanding  between  us 
was  unthinkable,  unless  it  were  motived  by 
an  attack  on  some  third  party;  and  I  con- 
cluded by  saying,  "An  understanding  with 
Bulgaria  is  all  very  well,  but  at  whose  expense 
is  it  to  be?"  "At  that  of  Serbia,  of  course," 
he  replied.  This  was  early  in  November, 
1913! 

At  the  third  and  last  conversation  I  had 
with  the  Marquis  Pallavicini — which  will  with- 
out doubt  forever  be  the  last — I  spoke  so  much 
that  I  feel  awkward  about  referring  to  it. 

It  was  the  spring  of  1914.  Ever  since  our 
military  promenade  into  Bulgaria  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  press  had  been  irrepressible.  At 
Budapesth  two  things  had  been  noted,  both 
equally  disagreeable  to  the  Magyar  oligarchy. 
One  was  that  the  Roumanian  expedition 
across  the  Danube  indicated  the  first  step  in 


THE  MARQUIS  PALLAVICINI  87 

our  emancipation  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
yoke;  the  other  that  nothing  had  done  more 
for  the  greater  Roumania  idea  than  the  new 
prestige  which  free  Roumania  had  just  ac- 
quired. Our  soldiers'  phrase  in  the  summer 
of  1913  was,  "We  pass  through  Bulgaria  in 
order  to  get  to  Transylvania."  This  phrase 
expressed  a  profound  truth  which  even  Buda- 
pesth  could  not  but  realize.  The  Austrian 
press  opened  a  most  comic  campaign  on  the 
question  of  Austro-Roumanian  relations. 
Were  they  the  same?  And  if  they  were 
chilled,  how  far  would  the  congealing  process 
go?  And  what  ought  to  be  done  to  make 
relations  once  more  idyllic?  An  enormous 
amount  of  ink  was  wasted  in  Vienna  and 
Budapesth.  At  Bucharest  they  were  regarded 
as  unwholesome,  people  had  had  enough  of 
these  false  declarations  of  love,  which  after 
all  were  none  too  decent,  as  they  presupposed 
an  unnatural  attachment  on  our  part. 

The  Austrians  decided  to  send  Pallavicini 
to  Bucharest.  He  had  once  lived  five  years 
amongst  us,  and  had  the  reputation  of  being 
a  convinced  anti-Roumanian.  They  said  we 
could  not  deceive  a  man  like  him  as  they 
alleged  we  had  done  in  the  case  of  so  many 
others. 


38        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Pallavicini  arrived  at  Bucharest  in  the 
spring  of  1914.  He  stayed  there  three  days; 
visited  King  Charles  and  our  politicians,  and 
went  away  annoyed.  Naturally  he  came  to 
see  me.  He  stayed  more  than  an  hour,  and 
frankly  told  me  that  he  wanted  to  know 
whether  our  alliance  with  Austria  still  held 
good,  because  if  not  the  Austrians  would 
have  to  apply  elsewhere — to  Bulgaria,  in  short. 
He  told  me  he  had  not  taken  this  step  yet, 
which  was  a  lie,  but  that  he  would  be  obliged 
to  do  it  if  he  could  not  count  on  us.  I  an- 
swered him  with  diplomatic  politeness,  which 
meant  nothing.  When  he  returned  to  the 
charge  I  said  nothing  was  more  intolerable 
than  to  be  asked  every  moment,  "Do  you  love 
me?"  and  that  that  was  what  the  Austrian 
press  was  doing  all  the  time.  I  did  not  con- 
ceal from  him  that  this  error  in  taste  had 
ended  by  really  annoying  us. 

"You  have  seen  the  King,"  I  said,  "and 
you  know  what  his  power  is.  You  must  at 
any  rate  be  pleased  with  the  King."  He  said 
"No,"  that  the  King  had  declared  to  him  that 
Roumania  would  range  herself  against  those 
who  provoked  war,  and  that  that  was  not  good 
enough  for  him. 

And  when  I  put  it  to  him  that  I  no  longer 


THE  MARQUIS  PALLAVICINI  39 

understood  the  hang  of  things,  as  for  thirty 
years  it  had  been  dinned  into  us  that  it  was 
Russia  who  wished  to  provoke  war  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary that  desired  nothing  but  peace, 
he  dished  up  to  me  the  old  theme  of  preven- 
tive war.  He  explained  to  me  that  it  was  im- 
possible for  Austria-Hungary  to  remain  in 
the  position  in  which  Balkan  events  had  placed 
her,  that  Serbia  was  a  menace  to  her,  and  that 
sooner  or  later  war  must  break  out.  Austria 
might  500/1  be  led  to  provoke  it  herself. 

It  was  all  very  well  for  me  to  marshal  my 
arguments  against  the  folly  of  preventive  war 
and  to  try  and  prove  the  absurdity  of  talk- 
ing of  the  Serbian  danger  to  the  Dual  Empire ; 
nothing  was  of  any  avail.  The  Marquis  in- 
sisted at  length  that  it  was  necessary  for 
Austria  to  bring  about  a  European  war.  I 
have  already  said  that  he  repeated  the  word 
"war"  five  times  during  our  interview.  I  made 
a  pencil  mark  each  time  he  said  it. 

This  conversation  with  the  Marquis  Palla- 
vicini  was  one  of  the  gleams  that  lit  up  my 
mind  on  the  European  situation.  Through- 
out the  Balkan  crisis  I  had  many  proofs  that 
Austria-Hungary  was  trying  to  provoke  war 
at  any  cost,  but  since  the  treaty  of  Bucharest 
I  had  hoped  that  the  storm  was  overpast.  The 


40        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Marquis  made  me  realize,  however,  that  I  was 
mistaken. 

Magyar  policy  was  so  well  served  by  the 
assassin  Princip  that  if  I  had  the  same  men- 
tality as  the  politicians  of  Budapesth  I  should 
say  that  they  had  suggested  to  him  his  useless 
crime. 

It  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  suggest  that 
the  Marquis  Pallavicini  was  one  of  the  au- 
thors of  the  world  war,  but  he  was  one  of  the 
most  active  and  adroit  of  the  auxiliaries.  On 
this  account  he  may  find  a  place  in  history. 


Count  Goluchowsky 


COUNT  GOLUCHOWSKY 

I  HAVE  very  agreeable  memories  of  my  inter- 
course with  Count  Goluchowsky.  He  is  a 
great  gentleman  and  his  manners  are  perfect. 
Moreover,  during  his  long  stay  in  Roumania 
he  did  his  best  to  minimize  the  painful  side 
of  the  inevitable  clash  between  Roumanian 
and  Magyar  interests.  I  only  had  one  dis- 
cussion with  him  that  was  really  disagreeable, 
and  then  he  forgot  himself  so  far  as  to  tell  me 
straight  out  that  the  capitulations  were  still 
in  force  in  Roumania.  The  discussion  became 
so  desperately  animated  that  I  thought  per- 
sonal communication  would  be  impossible  in 
the  future.  Count  Goluchowsky  quite  under- 
stood the  mistake  he  had  made,  just  as  on 
another  occasion  he  understood  a  still  greater 
blunder  he  made  in  the  case  of  the  late 
Alexander  Lahovary.  The  papers  dealing 
with  this  incident  should  be  in  the  possession 
of  Madame  Lahovary. 

Everyone  was  grateful  to  Count  Goluchow- 

43 


44        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

sky  for  the  really  pacific  orientation  he  had 
given  to  Austrian  policy  during  his  long 
tenure  of  office.  He  pushed  his  pacifism  to 
the  point  of  inventing  a  kind  of  entente  of 
European  Powers  to  resist  the  American 
danger,  a  clumsy  scheme  that  made  people 
laugh  at  his  expense,  but  which  at  any  rate 
showed  that  he  wished  to  preserve  peace 
amongst  the  nations  of  Europe. 

It  is  true  that  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph, 
who  was  then  full  of  vigor,  had  made  the  ap- 
pointment of  Count  Goluchowsky  to  the  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs  conditional  on  his 
not  making  trouble  for  him,  and  allowing  him 
to  finish  his  long  reign  in  peace. 

The  only  weakness  Count  Goluchowsky 
gave  way  to  at  the  Ballplatz  was  his  exagger- 
ated hatred  of  Serbia.  He  utterly  despised 
the  Serbs.  His  aristocratic  prejudices  had 
something  to  say  to  this ;  the  Serbs  were  after 
all  to  him  a  nation  of  uncouth  peasants.  Many 
times  did  King  Charles  point  out  to  Count 
Goluchowsky  that  he  was  making  a  great  mis- 
take in  refusing  consideration  to  the  Serbs, 
and  many  times  did  the  Count  say  that  it 
would  only  require  two  monitors  at  Belgrade 
to  bring  "the  worthy  Serbs"  to  reason. 

In  spite  of  this  it  would  be  extremely  un- 


COUNT  GOLUCHOWSKY  45 

just  not  to  recognize  that  Count  Goluchowsky, 
who  had  never  posed  as  a  star  of  the  first 
magnitude,  filled  his  post  of  Foreign  Minister 
with  distinction.  He  was  not  as  provocative 
as  Count  Aehrenthal,  who,  though  a  man  of 
clearly  superior  capacity,  was  also  liable  to 
make  big  mistakes. 

Count  Goluchowsky  inspired  me  with  the 
sort  of  esteem  that  one  has  for  a  man  who 
has  played  an  important  role  well  and  who 
can  bear  disgrace  with  dignity. 

II 

I  had  not  seen  Count  Goluchowsky  for 
many  years  when  I  ran  into  him  in  the  dining- 
room  of  the  Hotel  Bristol  at  Vienna  at  eight 
o'clock  on  Thursday,  the  30th  of  July,  1914. 
I  was  on  my  way  from  London  to  Bucharest, 
and  was  agonized  by  the  thought  of  the  great 
disaster  which  might  at  any  moment  over- 
whelm humanity. 

Count  Goluchowsky  was  sitting  with  a 
young  Austrian  whom  I  had  met  before.  He 
wore  a  miniature  of  the  Order  of  the  Golden 
Fleece  in  the  button-hole  of  his  short  dinner 
jacket.  This  was  a  characteristic  detail.  If 
one  happens  to  be  one  of  the  twenty  or  thirty 
persons  who  have  been  honored  with  this  deco- 


46        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

ration,  it  would  seem  to  me  a  dreadful  error 
in  taste  to  wear  it  in  miniature  on  a  dinner 
jacket,  and  it  surprised  me  that  a  man  who 
represented  the  last  word  in  breeding  could 
do  such  a  thing. 

I  went  up  to  the  Count,  and  we  naturally 
talked  of  the  great  evil  that  was  menacing  the 
world.  He  answered  with  a  smile  that  was 
almost  jovial  that  the  worthy  Serbs  would 
now  be  brought  to  their  senses  and  that  this 
affair  concerned  Austria  and  nobody  else. 
When  I  told  him  that  it  was  no  longer  a  Serb- 
ian question  and  that  if  Austria  did  not  act 
reasonably  Russia  and  France  would  be  forced 
to  intervene,  and  that  that  would  mean  a  Euro- 
pean war,  he  replied  with  the  same  smile,  the 
same  gay  light-heartedness — and  his  gayety 
was  of  a  kind  I  had  seldom  seen  in  him — "So 
much  the  worse  for  the  worthy  Russians  and 
the  worthy  French."  I  went  on  to  say  that 
that  was  not  all;  that  I  had  just  come  from 
London,  and  could  assure  him  that,  although 
the  English  Government  was  the  most  pacific 
in  history,  the  logic  of  events  would  prove 
stronger  than  the  will  of  Governments,  and 
that  if  Austria  persisted  in  its  overbearing 
attitude,  England  would  fight  to  her  last  man 
and  her  last  shilling. 


COUNT  GOLUCHOWSKY  47 

The  smile  on  Count  Goluchowsky's  face 
expanded,  and  he  said,  "So  much  the  worse 
for  the  worthy  English." 

At  that  moment  my  last  meeting  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey  on  July  21,  1914,  passed  like 
a  vision  before  my  eyes.  On  that  occasion  he 
had  spoken  to  me  with  austere  gravity,  saying 
that  the  situation  gave  cause  for  deep  anxiety, 
but  that  in  spite  of  it  he  hoped  for  peace; 
because  for  his  part  he  could  not  imagine  that 
the  man  existed  who  could  shoulder  the  re- 
sponsibility of  provoking  a  calamity  which 
would  spell  the  bankruptcy  of  civilization,  and 
of  which  no  one  in  the  world  could  foresee  the 
consequences.  There  came  another  vision — 
that  of  Monsieur  Poincare,  who,  on  the  1st 
of  January,  1913,  spoke  to  me  with  most 
poignant  emotion  of  the  terrible  eventuality 
of  a  European  war,  a  war  in  which  he  refused 
to  believe  and  against  which  he  was  working 
with  all  his  strength. 

In  memory  I  re-read  Kiderlen-Waechter's 
last  letter  to  me,  written  in  November,  1912, 
a  few  months  before  his  death,  the  letter  of  a 
man  who,  most  unfortunately  for  Germany 
and  for  the  world,  was  no  longer  with  us,  a 
letter  which  stated  that  he  was  convinced  that 
peace  would  be  maintained  because  at  the  last 


48       SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

moment  the  whole  world  would  hesitate  to  em- 
bark on  a  venture  which  this  time  was  a  ques- 
tion of  life  or  death  for  all. 

With  the  eyes  of  my  soul  I  saw  Grey,  Poin- 
care,  Kiderlen;  with  my  physical  eyes  I  saw 
the  broad  smile  and  the  indescribable  levity  of 
Count  Goluchowsky.  And  I  became  more 
than  ever  confirmed  in  my  belief  that  Vienna, 
now  a  mere  suburb  of  Budapesth,  was  the 
criminal,  the  great  criminal,  in  that  it  was 
ready  to  plunge  humanity  at  any  moment  into 
the  unspeakable  horror  of  war. 


VI 

AUGUST  2,  1914 

I  AERIVED  back  at  Sinaia  from  London  at 
11:30  A.M.  on  Sunday,  the  2d  of  August. 
Germany  had  declared  war  on  Russia  the 
previous  evening,  so  the  horrible  slaughter  was 
about  to  begin.  On  the  Saturday  evening  in 
Bucharest  I  had  already  heard  (in  a  way  that 
I  shall  divulge  one  day)  that  a  Privy  Council 
was  to  be  held  at  Sinaia  on  Monday,  the  3rd 
of  August,  that  this  Privy  Council  had  been 
postponed  for  forty-eight  hours  in  order  that 
I  might  be  present  at  it,  and  that  King 
Charles  was  insisting  that  Roumania  should 
go  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  Austria  and 
Germany. 

I  am  keeping  back  for  a  future  occasion  my 
account  of  the  conversations  I  had  on  the  eve- 
ning of  Saturday,  the  1st  of  August,  at 
Bucharest,  on  Sunday,  the  2nd  of  August,  at 
the  Sinaia  station  on  my  arrival,  and  still 
more  important,  those  of  Sunday  afternoon. 
As  I  was  leaving  the  station  an  invitation 

51 


52       SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

reached  me  to  go  and  lunch  at  the  Royal 
Palace  at  one  o'clock.  There  was  barely  time 
to  go  to  my  villa  and  dress — my  poor  villa  that 
no  longer  exists. 

I  realized  that  in  order  to  convert  me  to 
his  ideas  the  King  was  about  to  make  an 
onslaught  on  me.  Less  than  a  month  ago  in 
that  same  Palace  the  King  had  confided  to 
me  the  great  secret — to  wit,  that  the  Emperor 
William  had  decided  to  bring  about  a  Eu- 
ropean war,  which  would  not  take  place,  how- 
ever, for  three  or  four  years.  On  that  oc- 
casion the  King  had  gone  so  far  as  to  explain 
to  me  that  this  breathing  space  of  three  years 
would  suffice  to  complete  both  our  constitu- 
tional reforms  and  our  military  preparations. 

As  I  had  made  up  my  mind  to  face  him 
with  an  absolute  non  possumus  attitude  at  the 
Privy  Council  the  following  day,  I  was 
anxious  to  avoid  argument,  which  must  al- 
ways be  a  painful  business  with  an  elderly 
monarch,  and  I  made  up  my  mind  that  dur- 
ing luncheon  I  would  give  the  talk  a  turn 
that  would  leave  him  no  ray  of  hope. 

Hardly  had  I  sat  down  next  to  Queen 
Elizabeth  at  the  luncheon  table  than  I  found 
I  was  in  a  house  divided  against  itselT.  It  was 
obvious  that  the  King  was  more  than  worried, 


AUGUST  2,  1914  53 

that  the  Queen  was  more  bellicose  than  the 
King,  and  that  the  Crown  Princess,  now 
the  reigning  Queen  Marie,  was  dead  against 
the  policy  of  her  uncle  and  aunt,  and  did  not 
conceal  it  from  them.  It  even  seemed  to  me 
that  tears  had  recently  been  shed  in  that 
Royal  Palace. 

It  was  the  Queen  who  first  began  to  speak 
on  the  burning  question  of  war.  I  told  her 
that  I  was  sure  that  war  had  been  inevitable 
since  the  day  Austria  had  addressed  her  in- 
famous ultimatum  to  Serbia,  and  that  I  knew 
the  ultimatum  was  the  work  of  the  Magyars, 
of  Tisza,  Forgasch,  Berchtold,  who  had  the 
support  and  collaboration  of  Tchirsky,  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Vienna.  I  added  as 
a  self-evident  truth  that  a  German  victory 
meant  a  Hungarian  victory,  and  therefore  was 
not  compatible  with  maintaining  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Kingdom  of  Roumania.  The 
King,  who  sat  opposite,  and  was  listening  with 
fixed  attention,  understood  me,  and  that  is 
why,  as  I  shall  explain  presently,  he  spared 
me  from  the  onslaught  I  wished  to  avoid. 

Intelligent  as  she  was,  and  though  really  a 
woman  above  the  average,  the  Queen  was  not 
sufficiently  versed  in  politics  to  understand  a 
word  of  this.  She  was  all  for  explaining  that 


54       SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

a  Magyar  victory  would  mean  nothing  for  a 
very  long  time  to  come,  etc.  .  .  .  When  I  told 
her  again  of  my  extreme  anxiety  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  Germany  had  such  a  formidable 
force  at  her  disposal  and  that  if  she  were  suc- 
cessful it  would  be  the  end  of  Roumania,  she 
passed  on  to  another  subject. 

She  asked  me  what  I  thought  would  be  the 
probable  consequences  of  such  a  war.  I  an- 
swered— with  all  eyes  upon  me — that  no 
human  being  would  be  presumptuous  enough 
to  say  he  knew  or  could  even  guess  what  all 
the  consequences  of  such  a  war  might  be.  "I 
know,  however,"  I  added,  "what  four  of  them 
will  be,  and  these  four  I  will  explain  to  you 
in  a  few  words.  The  first  consequence  will 
be  a  revival  of  international  hatreds  on  such 
a  scale  as  Europe  has  not  seen  for  centuries. 
This  is  as  sure  as  that  the  night  follows  the 
day. 

"The  second  consequence  will  be  a  sudden 
veering  of  opinion  towards  the  ideas  of  the 
Extreme  Left,  what  we  call  socialist  ideas. 

"Of  course  in  the  long  run  nothing  that  is 
inherently  absurd  can  triumph,  but  there  is 
bound  in  all  countries  to  be  a  trend  to  the  Ex- 
treme Left,  once  the  unloosing  of  this  appall- 
ing catastrophe  has  made  the  governing  classes 


AUGUST  2,  1914  55 

appear  more  incapable  in  the  eyes  of  the 
masses  than  they  have  hitherto  believed  them 
to  be. 

"In  the  third  place,  Madam,  there  will  be 
what  I  can  only  describe  as  a  cataract  of 
crowns.  Your  Majesty  has  so  often  told  me 
you  are  a  Republican  that  you  will  hardly  be 
surprised  at  this  prophecy.  Only  those  mon- 
archies which  are  in  truth  hereditary  presi- 
dencies of  republics,  like  the  British  Royal 
House,  have  any  chance  of  escaping  this 
dreadful  flood,  the  flood  that  must  inevitably 
rise  out  of  a  war  engineered  by  absolute  mon- 
archs." 

I  also  explained  to  the  Queen  that  as  yet 
another  result  of  the  war,  the  revolutionary 
movement,  which  for  several  decades  had 
ceased  to  be  political  and  had  become  economic, 
would  inevitably  become  political  once  more. 

"And  lastly,"  I  added,  "this  war  will  pre- 
cipitate by  at  least  half  a  century  the  estab- 
lishment of  America  in  the  moral  hegemony 
of  the  white  race,  an  achievement  inevitable 
in  any  case,  but  which  the  war  will  hasten." 

My  fourth  statement  provoked  animated 
discussion.  I  said  I  saw  nothing  in  this  event 
to  object  to,  as  the  most  interesting  experience 
humanity  had  as  yet  seriously  embarked  on 


56        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

was  this  new  effort  in  civilization  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States;  since  it  would  mean  a 
civilization  without  prejudices,  without  castes, 
without  monarchial  or  aristocratic  institutions, 
and  without  historic  quarrels. 

A  few  days  later  I  published  four  articles 
developing  these  ideas  with  the  titles  "The 
Hatreds,"  "The  Movement  to  the  Left,"  "The 
Cataract  of  Crowns,"  and  "The  Coming  of 
America." 

When  I  think  of  this  date,  the  2nd  of 
August,  1914,  already  so  remote,  I  wonder 
how  it  is  that  these  conclusions,  which  at  the 
time  appeared  to  me  self-evident,  were  not  so 
to  the  world  in  general,  and  I  reflect  once 
again  how  tenacious  on  most  of  us  is  the  grip 
of  the  ideas  of  the  past. 

After  luncheon  we  took  coffee  in  the  great 
hall,  and  I  noticed  that  the  King  was  hesitat- 
ing between  his  wish  to  talk  to  me  and  his  fear 
of  hearing  too  soon  the  refusal  for  which  my 
animated  and  provocative  conversation  at 
luncheon  had  prepared  him. 

Before  the  King  spoke  to  me  the  Crown 
Princess,  now  the  reigning  Queen,  came  up 
to  me  with  Queen  Elizabeth  and  asked  me 
whether  or  no  England  would  remain  neutral 
in  the  war.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that 


AUGUST  2,  1914  57 

this  was  Sunday,  and  that  it  was  on  the  pre- 
vious Wednesday  I  had  left  London.  As  the 
Princess  spoke  to  me  in  English  I  replied  in 
English,  saying  that  her  question  surprised 
me,  as  she  must  know  as  well  as  I  did  that 
England,  as  in  Napoleon's  day,  would  go  into 
the  war  with  her  last  man  and  her  last  shill- 
ing. In  a  nervous  voice  she  then  said,  "You 
hear  what  he  says,  aunt,"  and  turning  to  me, 
"That  is  what  I  tell  them  all  the  time,  and 
they  refuse  to  understand  it.  They  under- 
stand nothing  in  this  house."  She  then  went 
away  with  the  Queen. 

A  few  minutes  later  the  King  addressed 
me:  "You  know  you  must  bring  two  of  your 
friends  to  the  Privy  Council  to-morrow. 
Whom  have  you  selected?" 

"I  have  asked  several  to  come  to  Sinaia, 
Sir,"  I  replied,  "and  I  will  make  my  choice 
to-morrow  morning." 

"Oh,  well,"  said  the  King,  "the  selection 
doesn't  really  matter,  for  your  party  at  any 
rate  is  disciplined."  As  I  still  did  not  appear 
to  understand,  the  King  added,  "You  have  al- 
ways said  that  if  ever  we  went  to  war  we 
should  have  to  begin  by  publishing  all  our 
treaties  of  alliance."  "Yes,  Sir,"  I  replied, 
"and  if  because  of  a  treaty  honestly  inter- 


preted  we  were  genuinely  forced  to  go  to  war, 
they  must  be  published,  because  before  every- 
thing a  nation  must  honor  its  signature." 

This  time  the  King  understood  and  re- 
signed himself  to  the  inevitable.  He  knew 
that  as  Germany  had  provoked  war  we  were 
bound  neither  by  the  letter  nor  the  spirit  of 
the  treaties. 

The  next  day  at  the  Crown  Council  he 
tried  to  put  another  interpretation  on  the  text 
of  the  treaties,  but  on  this  Sunday,  the  2nd 
of  August,  he  attempted  nothing  of  the  kind. 

Many  of  my  recollections  of  the  four  ter- 
rible years  are  as  sharp  and  clear  as  at  the 
moment  the  events  happened.  There  are  few 
that  have  remained  in  my  memory  so  dis- 
tinctly as  this  luncheon  of  the  2nd  of  August, 
1914,  in  the  Royal  Palace  at  Sinaia. 


Kiderlen-W  aechter 


VII 

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 

FOR  more  than  ten  years  I  was  very  intimate 
with  the  late  Kiderlen- Waechter.  That  is  to 
say,  I  had  opportunities  of  seeing  him  exactly 
as  he  was  and  to  know  both  his  good  and  his 
bad  qualities.  Above  all  Kiderlen  was  a  great 
intellectual  force.  There  was  no  doubt  about 
it.  One  could  not  be  often  in  his  company 
without  realizing  that  one  had  to  do  with  the 
kind  of  mind  which  is  an  ornament  to  the 
human  race.  Kiderlen  was  nearly  all  mind. 
Not  that  he  was  lacking  in  heart,  for  during 
his  life  he  gave  undoubted  proofs  of  deep  and 
unchanging  attachment  towards  certain  peo- 
ple. He  loved  quietude  and  adored  animals. 
But  taking  him  all  in  all,  one  can  without 
doing  him  an  injustice  say  that  Kiderlen  was 
neither  a  sentimentalist  nor  an  idealist,  but 
that  he  was  in  the  last  resort  a  sound  working 
mind,  though  naturally  a  mind  which  was  rep- 
resentative of  his  country  and  his  time. 
He  had  been  under  the  influence  of  Bis- 

61 


62        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

marck  as  well  as  under  that  of  Holstein,  who, 
like  Richelieu's  Pere  Joseph,  played  a  part 
behind  the  scenes  out  of  all  proportion  to  his 
nominal  position.  From  those  early  associates 
Kiderlen  derived  a  certain  vein  of  brutality, 
the  mention  of  which  cannot  be  omitted. 
Moreover,  he  lent  himself  readily  to  advertise- 
ment, because  he  believed  it  to  be  the  indis- 
pensable adjunct  of  all  political  action.  It 
was  he  and  he  alone  who  framed  the  famous 
ultimatum  to  Russia  during  the  Bosnian  crisis, 
although  he  was  at  the  time  only  Minister  at 
Bucharest  on  leave  at  Berlin.  "I  knew  the 
Russians  were  not  ready  for  war,  that  they 
could  not  go  to  war  in  any  case,  and  I  wanted 
to  make  what  capital  I  could  out  of  this 
knowledge.  I  wished  to  show  them  that  Ger- 
many, which  had  been  in  Russian  leading 
strings  since  1815,  was  now  free  of  them. 
Never  would  Schoen  and  Co.  have  ventured 
to  do  what  I  did  on  my  own  responsibility." 
It  was  in  this  way  that  he  explained  to  me  his 
overemphasis  of  Germany's  action  in  this 
case,  an  emphasis  that  contributed  appreciably 
to  the  unrest  of  Europe. 

Kiderlen  never  wanted  to  go  to  the  Foreign 
Office.  "The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  in 
our  Government,"  he  said,  "is  the  worst  of  all 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  63 

posts.  If  a  thing  succeeds  the  Chancellor 
takes  the  credit,  if  it  fails  the  blame  lies  on 
the  Secretary  of  State."  What  he  would 
have  really  liked  was  the  Embassy  at  Con- 
stantinople. By  a  whim  of  the  Emperor  it 
was  snatched  from  under  his  nose  and  given 
to'  Wangenheim,  whom  the  Kaiser  often  met 
at  Corfu. 

Few  people  know  of  the  way  in  which  Ki- 
derlen  was  appointed  to  the  Ministry  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  The  story  is  worth  telling. 
When  Bethmann-Hollweg,  by  the  pure  ca- 
price of  the  Kaiser,  was  appointed  Chancellor 
of  the  Empire  he  knew  nothing  at  all  about 
foreign  politics.  Naturally  he  looked  out  for 
someone  who  did,  and  hoping  to  find  the  right 
man  in  Kiderlen  he  asked  him  for  a  report  on 
the  political  world  situation.  Kiderlen  at  the 
time  was  Minister  at  Bucharest,  but  doing 
duty  at  Berlin.  I  never  saw  the  report  he 
produced  at  that  time,  though  I  knew  of  its 
existence.  Since  then  I  have  been  told  that 
it  was  copied  by  Herr  von  Busche,  who  was 
at  the  time  German  Minister  in  Roumania. 
Bethmann-Hollweg  read  the  report,  and 
promptly  told  the  Emperor  that  he  would 
only  consent  to  remain  Chancellor  if  Kiderlen 
was  appointed  Foreign  Minister. 


64        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

The  Emperor  had  to  give  in.  I  say  "give 
in,"  because  it  was  some  years  since  Kiderlen 
had  been  in  the  Kaiser's  good  graces.  Once 
he  had  been  greatly  appreciated  in  that  quar- 
ter on  account  of  his  clear  thinking  and 
vivacity.  No  one  knew  better  than  he  how 
to  tell  spicy  stories,  and  the  Emperor,  who  is 
very  fond  of  them,  never  got  tired  of  listen- 
ing to  them.  But  one  day  the  Kaiser  chaffed 
Kiderlen  on  some  private  matter.  Kiderlen 
showed  himself  offended,  and  his  reply  was 
such  that  he  at  once  fell  from  royal  favor. 

One  must  remember  that  Kiderlen  was  ex- 
ceedingly free  in  manner  with  the  Kaiser.  He 
was  no  courtier  and  never  flattered  anyone, 
and  to  him  appreciation  and  friendship  of  his 
Sovereign  seemed  to  be  essentially  the  same 
as  the  friendship  of  other  people.  Kiderlen 
was  perfectly  direct  with  the  Kaiser,  so  direct 
that  he  flatly  refused  to  submit  to  certain  con- 
ditions that  the  Kaiser  wished  to  impose  on 
him  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  to  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  "I  shall  go  to 
the  Foreign  Office  to  do  as  I  think  right  in 
that  post  or  I  shall  not  go  there  at  all,"  was 
his  proud  reply,  and  he  had  his  way. 

In  the  course  of  a  conversation  in  1911, 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  65 

which  I  will  speak  of  again  later  on,  he  said 
to  me,  "If  I  am  alive  and  in  office  there  will 
be  no  war  between  us  and  England.  If  ever 
he  decides  differently  he  will  have  to  find  an- 
other man.  I  allow  no  one  to  domineer  over 
my  conscience." 

This  sense  of  dignity  was  one  of  the  finest 
traits  in  Kiderlen's  nature.  The  former  presi- 
dent of  the  Roumanian  Council,  Monsieur 
Maioresco,  knows  something  about  it,  for  dur- 
ing the  summer  of  1912  he  thought  he  under- 
stood that  Kiderlen  had  expressed  a  wish  to 
be  asked  to  stay  with  the  King  at  Sinaia, 
and  he  made  the  mistake  of  asking  the  Ger- 
man Minister  whether  Kiderlen's  position 
with  the  Emperor  was  sufficiently  good  to 
warrant  such  an  invitation. 

Kiderlen  heard  about  it,  was  furiously 
angry,  and  wrote  a  crushing  letter  saying  he 
should  like  it  known  that  he  never  had  asked 
and  never  would  ask  for  an  invitation  from 
anyone,  no  matter  whom. 

And  yet  he  had  a  great  admiration  for  King 
Charles,  and  kept  him  informed  of  everything 
from  Berlin.  In  the  Spring  of  1912,  he  told 
him  for  his  private  information  only  the  great 
news  of  the  Balkan  alliance.  He  added  that 
he  had  learned  it  from  a  most  exceptional 


66        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

source,  which  would  dry  up  forever  if  the 
King  was  in  the  least  indiscreet  with  the 
news.  I  was  never  able  to  discover  who  this 
mysterious  informant  was. 

Another  of  Kiderlen's  characteristics  was 
his  wit.  For  example,  one  day  the  Roumanian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  General  La- 
hovary,  said  to  him  at  a  diplomatic  reception, 
"I  do  not  understand  what  you  are  after  in 
Morocco.  France  alone  has  rights  in  Mo- 
rocco." Kiderlen  replied,  "I  don't  know 
either.  You  see  my  Government  only  keeps 
me  informed  of  questions  that  are  supposed 
to  affect  Roumania.  They  did  not  look  upon 
Morocco  in  this  light;  but  since  you  have 
pointed  out  to  me  that  they  are  wrong,  I  will 
ask  Berlin  for  a  special  explanation  for  your 
Excellency." 

I  don't  pretend  here  to  draw  Kiderlen's 
portrait.  I  shall  try  to  do  so  one  day.  These 
few  words  of  introduction  are,  however,  in- 
dispensable to  the  story  which  follows  of  the 
statements  made  to  me  by  Kiderlen  at  the 
time  of  the  Morocco  crisis. 

n 

When  Kiderlen  was  made  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  he  had  to  leave  Roumania.  A 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  67 

few  days  before  his  departure  we  were  out 
walking,  as  was  our  habit,  and  he  began  to 
sketch  out  his  program  in  so  far  as  it  con- 
cerned German  relations  with  France. 

"I  have  told  them,"  he  said,  "that  every 
effort  at  an  alliance  with  France  is  doomed 
to  failure.  It  is  simply  impossible  for  us  to 
win  her  friendship.  I  know  better  than  any- 
one that  France  wants  peace  and  that  she  will 
never  attack  us.  I  am  perfectly  sure  about 
this,  but  I  also  know  that  if  we  were  attacked 
by  any  other  Power  no  Government  would  be 
strong  enough  to  prevent  France  attacking  us 
at  the  same  time.  Therefore  all  we  can  do  is 
to  maintain  good  peaceable  relations  with 
France  and  not  try  for  anything  more  am- 
bitious. For  this  reason  I  advised  them"  (and 
by  them  he  meant  the  Kaiser)  "to  give  up  all 
designs  on  Morocco,  and  I  explained  to  them 
that  so  long  as  the  Morocco  question  was  open 
England  would  side  with  France  all  over  the 
world  and  on  all  questions  at  issue  between  us. 
Now  that  would  not  suit  us  one  little  bit. 
England,  of  course,  cannot  abandon  France 
on  the  Morocco  question.  She  knows  well 
enough  that  in  exchange  for  something  she 
did  not  possess  in  Morocco  she  received  from 
the  French  their  positive  rights  in  Egypt. 


68        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

England  owes  a  debt  of  honor  to  France.  If 
we  want  to  get  rid  of  all  the  disadvantages 
which  Anglo-French  diplomatic  cooperation 
connotes  for  us  we  must  give  the  French  a 
free  hand  in  Morocco  and  so  help  England  to 
pay  her  debt  to  France.  And  we  shall  be 
sacrificing  nothing,  for  we  cannot  set  ourselves 
down  in  Morocco  in  face  of  English  opposi- 
tion. Then  why  maintain  this  useless  ten- 
sion? If  we  can  get  something  for  ourselves 
on  this  occasion  so  much  the  better,  but  we 
must  not  make  that  a  condition  of  the  settle- 
ment." 

"And  do  you  believe  that  this  policy  will  be 
adopted?"  I  asked. 

"Of  course,  as  they  have  appointed  me  to 
the  Foreign  Office,  for  you  know  perfectly 
well  that  I  am  not  the  kind  of  man  who  carries 
out  any  policy  but  my  own." 

"Then,"  I  said,  "we  need  not  worry  our- 
selves over  the  Morocco  question.  Peace  will 
not  be  threatened  in  that  quarter." 

"Certainly  not,  and  besides  you  know  how 
truly  I  long  for  peace.  We  have  nothing  to 
gain  from  victory,  and  in  the  case  of  defeat 
we  have  only  too  much  to  lose.  Time  is  in 
our  favor.  Every  decade  we  become  stronger 
than  our  enemies.  You  have  no  conception  of 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  69 

the  prodigious  strides  made  in  our  national 
economy.  And  what  good  would  a  war  be? 
Admitting  that  we  are  victorious;  if  we  take 
new  territory  we  only  increase  our  difficulties. 
Then  there  is  another  thing  you  may  not  have 
considered.  Every  big  victory  is  the  work  of 
the  people,  and  the  people  have  to  be  paid  for 
it.  We  had  to  pay  for  the  victory  of  1870 
with  that  pestilential  thing,  universal  suffrage. 
After  another  victory  we  should  have  the 
parliamentary  system — and  you  know  what  I 
think  about  that  for  us  Germans.  It  would 
be  an  irreparable  evil.  No  German  would  ever 
submit  to  party  discipline.  Every  German, 
every  German  deputy  wants  to  form  his  own 
party,  or  at  least  his  own  group.  We  have  no 
need  of  war.  If  we  don't  bring  it  on,  nobody 
will.  The  Republican  regime  in  France  is  es- 
sentially pacific.  The  English  don't  want  war, 
and  will  never  provoke  it  in  spite  of  what  the 
newspapers  say.  As  for  Russia,  she  knows 
that  she  cannot  make  war  on  us  with  any 
chance  of  success.  Of  course  there  will  always 
be  delicate  questions,  and  of  course  there  will 
be  anxious  moments,  but  war  will  not  come. 
You  may  make  your  mind  easy  about  Mo- 


rocco." 


Kiderlen  went  on  in  this  strain.     He  ex- 


70        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

plained  his  whole  policy  to  me,  and  I  believed 
his  declarations  to  be  sincere,  for  he  had  never 
given  me  any  reason  to  doubt  him;  but  after 
this  talk  I  was  naturally  astonished  when  the 
Agadir  incident  occurred. 

At  the  time  of  the  incident  I  was  in  Lon- 
don, and  on  the  evening  Lloyd  George  made 
his  famous  speech  at  the  Mansion  House  I 
had  some  people  dining  with  me  at  the  Carl- 
ton.  After  dinner  a  friend  who  had  heard  the 
speech  came  in  and  repeated  the  gist  of  it, 
and  when  he  told  me  that  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer,  who  was  well  known  to  be 
most  peacefully  inclined,  had  read  the  pas- 
sage relating  to  Foreign  Affairs  from  a  slip 
of  paper,  I  realized  how  grave  the  situation 
was,  and  shivered  at  the  idea  of  European 
war. 

Calm  soon  reigned  again,  for  Germany 
wisely  withdrew.  I  breathed  freely,  but  from 
that  moment  German  policy  became  for  me  an 
enigma. 

in 

In  the  autumn  of  1911  I  went  to  Brussels 
for  a  family  gathering.  On  my  way  home  I 
stopped  at  Berlin  to  pay  my  friend  Kiderlen  a 
long-promised  visit.  I  stayed  three  days  and 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  71 

met  him  continually,  but  the  conversation  on 
the  first  day  was  the  most  interesting.  Kider- 
len  had  invited  me  to  lunch  with  him  alone. 
He  was  late  in  arriving,  because  he  had  been 
detained  at  the  Reichstag,  where  he  had  been 
heckled  over  what  was  called  his  Moroccan 
defeat.  There  was  one  man  in  particular,  the 
socialist  deputy  Ledebour,  who  was  a  perfect 
nightmare  to  Kiderlen. 

Before  he  arrived  I  looked  round  his  study, 
which  was  littered  with  papers  and  maps. 
There  were  a  few  photographs,  of  course — 
mostly  of  kings.  As  for  photographs  of  ordi- 
nary human  beings  I  only  saw  three,  that  of 
an  Austrian  whose  name  I  forget,  that  of 
Monsieur  Cambon,  with  an  autograph  and 
dedication,  and  my  own.  Cambon  and  I  were 
often  said  by  Kiderlen  to  be  alike,  and  he  used 
to  say  that  we  were  the  only  foreigners  he 
talked  frankly  to,  because  we  had  never  told 
him  anything  but  the  truth. 

Kiderlen  was  very  tired,  and  we  sat  down  to 
luncheon  at  once.  The  wonderful  Sevres 
given  him  by  the  President  of  the  French  Re- 
public in  memory  of  the  agreement  of  1909, 
was  on  the  table.  "That  is  the  price  of  trea- 
son," he  said  jokingly. 

During  luncheon  and  afterwards  until  four 


o'clock  we  had  leisure  to  discuss  every  ques- 
tion that  interested  us.  Of  course  I  did  not 
conceal  my  astonishment  over  his  Moroccan 
policy,  which  had  nearly  brought  on  a  war 
with  England,  a  war  which  he  had  always 
characterized  as  absurd.  He  explained  that 
he  never  meant  actually  to  go  to  war,  but  that 
his  only  object  was  that  of  settling  the  Mo- 
rocco question  once  and  for  all. 

He  alleged  that  France  was  not  carrying 
out  the  agreement  reached  in  1909,  and  that 
he  had  to  deal  her  a  blow  to  make  her  see  that 
things  were  serious.  He  maintained  that  the 
blow  had  done  its  work,  because  they  had  sub- 
sequently arrived  at  an  understanding,  and 
that  in  future  relations  with  France  would  be 
normal  and  relations  with  England  might  be- 
come friendly.  He  did  not  admit  to  me  what 
I  well  knew  to  be  his  real  object — namely, 
to  test  the  solidity  of  the  Anglo-French  un- 
derstanding and  if  possible  to  smash  it.  He 
complained  that  he  was  growing  more  and 
more  unpopular  owing  to  his  wish  to  avoid 
war,  and  he  assured  me  in  the  most  categorical 
manner  that  the  Emperor  was  at  one  with  him 
in  keeping  the  peace,  and  this  in  spite  of  the 
frankly  bellicose  attitude  of  the  whole  im- 
perial family,  including  those  who  had  never 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  73 

before  mixed  themselves  up  in  politics.  He 
told  me  at  some  length  of  a  conversation  he 
had  had  with  the  Crown  Prince  in  that  same 
room  in  the  chair  I  was  then  occupying,  a  con- 
versation which  was  entirely  to  Kiderlen's 
credit.  He  told  me  that  the  Crown  Prince  was 
worse  than  a  ninny,  and  that  he  had  said  to 
him  that  it  was  not  in  the  society  of  little  officer 
boys  that  politics  could  be  learned,  and  that 
he  ought  not  to  meddle  with  matters  which  he 
did  not  understand. 

Referring  once  more  to  Anglo-German  re- 
lations, he  again  told  me  of  his  wish  to  reach 
an  understanding  with  England.  He  did  not 
conceal  from  me  what  I  already  knew  so  well 
that,  like  Bismarck,  he  detested  England  prin- 
cipally on  account  of  her  parliamentary  insti- 
tutions, but  he  told  me  that  he  believed  what 
Bismarck  had  once  written  to  Holstein  was 
true,  that  England  was  one  of  the  great  con- 
servative factors  of  the  world,  and  it  was  not 
in  anyone's  interest  to  destroy  it.  In  this  let- 
ter Bismarck  added  that  the  day  England  be- 
came revolutionary  the  whole  world  would 
become  revolutionary  too. 

"But  if  you  are  so  anxious  to  come  to  an 
understanding  with  England,"  I  said,  "why 
don't  you  do  the  one  thing  to  ensure  it?  Why 


74        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

do  you  refuse  to  compromise  on  the  question 
of  naval  armament?  What  is  your  object  in 
pushing  to  its  limit  the  competitive  policy?  I 
understood  your  attitude  when  it  was  still  a 
question  of  your  becoming  the  second  great 
sea-power  of  the  world.  That  you  already 
are,  and  what  more  do  you  want?  Do  you 
aspire  to  be  not  only  the  greatest  military 
power  in  the  world,  but  also  the  greatest  naval 
power?  That  would  mean  universal  domina- 
tion, and  it  is  not  realizable.  Others  have  tried 
it,  Spain  and  France,  for  example,  but  they 
went  under.  You  are  too  intelligent  not  to 
understand  that  until  she  has  been  utterly 
crushed  it  is  impossible  for  England  to  let 
herself  be  outbuilt  on  the  sea.  You  may  build 
five  dreadnoughts,  she  will  build  thirteen. 
Where  are  you  going  to  stop?  You  are  head- 
ing straight  for  a  war  with  England,  and  that, 
you  know,  will  be  no  joke.  Admitting  for  a 
moment  that  you  gain  the  victory.  How  long 
will  that  last?  You  would  raise  against  your- 
self a  world  coalition.  So  hated  would  you 
be  that  the  very  rabbits  would  enroll  them- 
selves against  you.  Don't  follow  dreams — and 
what  you  are  after  now  is  a  dream." 

Kiderlen  replied  rather  bitterly,  "I  wanted 
to  have  an  understanding  over  the  limitation 


KIDERLEN-WAECHTER  75 

of  armaments,  but  I  couldn't  manage  it.  I 
have  said  everything  you  have  said  to  me, 
though  perhaps  I  have  not  put  it  so  well.  I 
have  said  it  to  Tirpitz,  who  was  sitting  in  this 
armchair  of  mine.  I  was  sitting  in  yours." 

"And?" 

"I  did  not  succeed  in  convincing  him,"  he 
answered. 

"But  the  Emperor?"  I  asked. 

"He  sided  with  Tirpitz." 

And  then  he  went  on  to  asseverate  that  in 
spite  of  this  he  would  do  all  he  possibly  could 
to  come  to  an  agreement  with  England.  He 
suggested  even  that  I  should  tell  my  friends 
in  London  to  send  him  as  Ambassador  some- 
one who  had  a  great  position  in  England,  so 
that  the  work  would  not  have  to  be  done  twice 
over,  in  London  and  Berlin.  We  then  went 
on  to  talk  about  the  agreement  he  had  just 
concluded  with  France.  He  assured  me  that 
if  by  accident  the  French  Parliament  rejected 
the  agreement  it  would  mean  war.  The  agree- 
ment represented  the  maximum  concession 
that  the  people  of  Germany  would  stand. 

That  very  day  I  took  pains  to  write  my 
impressions  to  a  friend  in  Paris.  My  friend 
showed  my  letter  to  M.  Caillaux,  then  Prime 


76        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Minister,  who  read  it  to  the  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  of  the  Senate. 

This  was  the  last  occasion  on  which  I  had 
any  prolonged  talk  with  Kiderlen.  From  this 
time  on  we  simply  wrote  to  each  other. 

On  the  evening  of  the  30th  of  December, 
1912,  I  was  due  to  meet  him  at  Stuttgart, 
where  he  had  been  spending  the  Christmas 
holidays,  and  where  he  remained.  At  the  rail- 
way station  at  Salzbourg  I  heard  of  his  most 
unexpected  death,  and  the  next  day  at  Stutt- 
gart they  told  me  that  my  name  was  one  of 
the  last  words  he  had  spoken. 

Perhaps  it  was  only  an  illusion  of  friend- 
ship, but  I  cannot  help  believing  that  in  Kid- 
erlen we  lost  one  of  the  mainstays  of  peace. 
Not  that  my  friend  was  a  sentimentalist,  far 
from  it;  but  he  was  a  man  of  genuinely  well- 
set  mind,  and  his  real  intellect  kept  him  to  the 
last  of  the  opinion  that  a  war  of  Germany 
against  the  world  was  altogether  a  bad  busi- 
ness. 


Count  Aehrenthal 


VIII 
COUNT  AEHRENTHAL 

COUNT  AEHRENTHAL  was  the  most  bril- 
liant Austrian  Foreign  Minister  since  the  days 
of  Beust.  His  capacity  is  the  measure  of  his 
blunders.  Without  exaggerating,  one  may 
say  that  he  was.  to  a  great  extent  the  author 
of  the  war.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  from  1866 
down  to  this  day  the  Hapsburgs  have  main- 
tained a  prudent  political  reserve,  and  though 
Count  Andrassy  gave  himself  airs  at  the  time 
of  the  Berlin  Congress  everyone  knew  that  it 
was  nothing  but  showing  off.  Aehrenthal 
alone  took  the  idea  seriously  that  Austria- 
Hungary  was  still  a  great  power  and  destined 
to  act  an  important  part  in  the  world's  af- 
fairs. On  several  occasions  he  tried  to  play 
first  fiddle  in  the  European  orchestra,  to  the 
great  disgust  of  Berlin,  which  could  not  bear 
that  Austria  should  even  pretend  to  emanci- 
pate herself  from  its  yoke. 

The  key  to  Count  Aehrenthal's  active  and 
dangerous  policy  must  be  sought  in  a  personal 

79 


80        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

matter.  He  was  extraordinarily  intelligent 
for  an  Austrian,  and  his  quickness  of  under- 
standing, his  faculty  for  adaptation,  his  charm- 
ing vivacity  can  only  be  explained  by  the  drop 
of  Jewish  blood  that  ran  in  his  veins. 

Count  Aehrenthal  knew  his  own  value,  es- 
pecially when  he  compared  himself  with  other 
Austrian  diplomats.  He  was  very  ambitious 
and  believed  he  was  destined  for  great  things, 
and  he  intended  to  use  the  power  of  the  mon- 
archy for  his  own  aggrandizement  and  per- 
sonal fame. 

He  was  a  Bohemian  and  detested  Slavs.  I 
remember  a  day  when  he  received  news  of 
anti-German  excesses  in  Prague.  "Czechs," 
he  said,  "have  such  hard  heads  that  they  have 
to  be  broken  in  order  to  make  them  under- 
stand anything." 

He  had  been  in  Russia  for  a  long  time,  and 
knew  all  the  weaknesses  of  that  colossus.  In 
his  thirst  for  success  he  exaggerated  them  and 
underestimated  the  infinite  resources  of  her 
clumsy  organism. 

I  saw  a  great  deal  of  Count  Aehrenthal  dur- 
ing his  long  stay  in  Roumania,  and  have  many 
letters  from  him.  One  day  he  tried  to  do  me 
an  irreparable  injury  in  making  use  of  some 
information  he  had  dragged  out  of  me  at  my 


COUNT  AEHRENTHAL  81 

own  luncheon  table.  I  naturally  resented  this 
very  much,  and  though,  luckily  for  me,  I  was 
able  to  counter  his  maneuver  in  time,  our  re- 
lations after  this  became  purely  official. 

On  the  eve  of  his  final  departure  from  Rou- 
mania,  he  let  me  know  that  he  wished  to  do 
more  than  leave  a  p.p.c.  card  on  me,  and  that 
he  would  like  to  see  me.  In  this  last  interview 
he  told  me  that  we  should  probably  both  serve 
our  countries  for  some  time  to  come,  that  we 
should  therefore  have  to  meet  each  other,  and 
that  it  would  be  better  to  forget  the  past.  I 
told  him  that  as  he  had  not  succeeded  in  in- 
juring me  and  as  he  believed  he  was  serving 
his  country  in  trying  to  do  so,  I  was  quite 
willing  to  resume  our  old  footing. 

Later  on  when  he  was  transferred  from  the 
Embassy  at  Petrograd  to  the  Foreign  Office  I 
used  to  go  and  see  him.  I  am  now  going  to 
tell  of  two  of  those  interviews. 

The  first  took  place  on  a  September  day  in 
1909  or  1910.  I  don't  know  which,  I  only 
know  that  it  was  after  Tangier  and  before 
Agadir. 

He  asked  me  what  impressions  I  brought 
back  from  my  three  months'  tour  in  France 
and  England. 

"I  brought  back  two  impressions,"  I  said. 


82        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

"The  first  is  that  the  alliance  between  Eng- 
land and  France  cannot  be  broken — at  any 
rate  in  this  generation.  It  is  firmer  even  than 
your  alliance  with  Germany." 

"But,"  he  objected,  "there  is  no  treaty  of 
alliance." 

"Of  course  there  is  no  treaty,  but  there  is 
something  better.  Don't  forget  that  those  two 
nations  are  free  nations  governing  themselves. 
Well,  they  are  firmly  convinced  that  their  in- 
terests are  the  same,  and  they  have  decided  to 
act  together.  No  government  could  break 
such  an  agreement  which  springs  from  the 
mind  of  the  two  peoples." 

"But  such  an  alliance  is  ridiculous!"  he  ex- 
claimed. "France  stands  to  gain  nothing  from 
England,  whereas  from  Germany  she  could 
have  anything  she  wanted." 

"France  realizes,"  I  answered,  "that  in  ally- 
ing herself  with  Germany  she  would  be  ally- 
ing herself  against  England.  If  England 
were  overcome  France  would  be  nothing  but 
the  vassal  of  Germany.  That  is  a  position  you 
have  accepted  for  yourselves.  France  has  too 
glorious  a  history  behind  her  to  accept  a  simi- 
lar position  without  being  crushed  first." 

"What!"  said  he  briskly.  "Austria  is  Ger- 
many's vassal?" 


COUNT  AEHRENTHAL  83 

"Yes,  just  as  Roumania  is  the  vassal  of 
Austria."  I  said  this  to  coat  the  bitter  pill. 

"And  what  was  your  second  impression?" 

"I  will  tell  you  in  a  few  words.  France  is 
no  longer  afraid.  She  desires  peace  passion- 
ately; she  will  never  provoke  war;  but  she  is 
no  longer  afraid.  Henceforth  if  you  bully 
her  realize  that  it  means  war.  The  time  for 
bluffing  is  gone  by.  If  you  want  war  that  is 
another  thing,  but  intimidation  and  bluff  will 
no  longer  work." 

"But  it  is  mad,"  he  said.  "The  French 
army,  far  from  being  stronger  than  it  was  a 
few  years  ago,  is  much  weaker." 

"Fear,"  I  said,  "is  a  physical  question.  One 
may  be  weak  and  yet  not  be  afraid.  For  one 
reason  and  another,  because  perhaps  she  has 
been  too  much  bullied  in  the  past,  France,  who 
was  afraid  at  the  Tangier  crisis,  is  now  no 
longer  afraid;  of  that  I  am  profoundly  con- 
vinced." 

"It  is  very  odd,"  said  Aehrenthal  in  ending 
the  conversation;  "our  ambassadors  have  not 
formed  the  same  conclusions  as  you  have." 

"I  can  only  give  you  my  own,"  I  replied, 
and  we  passed  on  to  talk  of  other  things. 


84        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

II 

The  last  time  I  saw  Count  Aehrenthal  was 
during  the  autumn  of  1911,  a  few  months  be- 
fore his  death. 

His  illness  had  marked  him  heavily.  He 
had  been  spending  a  few  weeks  in  the  beauti- 
ful surroundings  of  Mendel — henceforward  I 
hope  to  be  Mendola — but  he  was  not  much 
better  for  it.  There  was  something  very  pe- 
culiar about  his  condition,  something  I  had 
never  seen  before.  He  had  kept  his  clearness 
of  mind  intact,  but  he  found  great  difficulty 
in  expressing  himself — he  stammered.  He 
only  did  this  for  the  first  few  words  of  a  sen- 
tence. Once  he  had  got  a  phrase  out  the  rest 
went  easily.  And  this  took  place  each  time 
that  he  began  to  speak.  I  must  leave  the  ex- 
planation of  this  symptom  to  the  doctors. 

Count  Aehrenthal  was  embittered,  very 
much  embittered,  by  his  struggles  with  the 
Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  protege, 
Conrad  von  Hoetzendorf,  whom  he  had  just 
triumphed  over.  He  did  not  explain  things 
straight  out  to  me,  but  he  let  me  understand. 

"There  are  people  who  think  I  was  wrong 
in  preventing  war  with  Italy,"  he  said.  "They 
say  that  Italy  would  never  in  any  case  fight 


COUNT  AEHRENTHAL  85 

on  our  side  and  that  it  would  have  been  better 
to  square  accounts  now.  But  I  think  I  was 
right.  Even  if  Italy  never  fights  on  our  side 
we  should  be  quite  wrong  to  attack  an  ally 
when  she  was  engaged  elsewhere." 

Naturally  I  agreed  with  him. 

And  then  forthwith  we  returned  to  the  sub- 
ject that  we  had  so  often  discussed  at  Bucha- 
rest. 

I  had  always  maintained  that  monarchies 
were  doomed  and  that  only  those  monarchies 
which  were  literally  and  really  constitutional 
had  any  chance  of  surviving;  the  rest  seemed 
to  me  to  be  nearer  their  end  than  anyone  be- 
lieved. Aehrenthal,  absolutist  and  reaction- 
ary as  he  always  was,  fought  this  opinion  of 
mine  bitterly.  Imagine  my  surprise  at  find- 
ing Count  Aehrenthal  almost  converted  to  re- 
publicanism. 

He  told  me  that  on  reflection  he  had 
changed  his  mind,  and  was  no  longer  preju- 
diced against  the  republican  system.  He  also 
explained  that  it  was  chiefly  on  account  of 
foreign  policy  that  he  had  once  believed  so 
firmly  in  the  monarchical  system. 

"But  now,"  he  said,  "France  gives  the  lie  to 
all  my  theories.  The  foreign  policy  of  the 
French  Republic  is  skillfully  conducted  and 


86        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

undoubtedly  successful.  Although  France, 
thanks  to  her  political  institutions,  uses  up 
more  men  than  any  other  country,  she  has  a 
constant  supply  of  first-rate  men  at  her  helm. 
Look  at  her  diplomacy.  The  whole  German 
and  Austrian  Diplomatic  Corps  together  are 
not  worth  the  brothers  Cambon  and  Barrere, 
to  mention  only  these  three." 

"What,"  I  said  laughingly,  "and  it  is  you, 
Count  Aehrenthal — here  in  the  Ballplatz,  fac- 
ing the  portraits  of  Metternich  and  Kaunitz 
— who  tell  me  that!" 

"Yes,  I  do.  Life  teaches  us  many  things," 
he  replied. 

I  understood  more  clearly  than  ever  how 
greatly  Aehrenthal  must  have  suffered  re- 
cently from  the  interference  of  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand in  his  policy.  He  who  had  been  so  sure 
of  his  mastery  over  the  world  of  archdukes 
had  himself  experienced  the  bitterness,  the  in- 
dignity of  despotic  government.  And  before 
his  death  he  had  a  revulsion  of  feeling  that 
gave  him  a  vision  of  certain  truths,  a  vision 
that  men  who  pass  their  lives  as  slaves  never 
attain  to.  Once  again  I  recognized  the  signs 
of  Jewish  blood ;  without  it  no  Austrian  Count 
and  Foreign  Minister  of  his  Apostolic  Maj- 
esty could  have  spoken  in  such  a  fashion. 


COUNT  AEHRENTHAL  87 

None  the  less,  Aehrenthal  bears  his  share 
of  the  responsibility  for  the  war.  He  wished 
to  live  in  history,  he  seriously  wished  to  ex- 
pand Austria-Hungary.  But  all  the  same  in 
pressing  this  policy  he  had  his  tongue  in  his 
cheek.  The  Magyar  party  adopted  his  policy 
as  its  own,  and  the  result  is  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary has  perished. 

It  is  the  strongest  men  who  are  liable  to 
commit  the  worst  mistakes. 


Count  Czernin 


IX 

COUNT  CZERNIN 

THE  last  time  I  talked  politics  with  Count 
Czernin,  a  conversation  to  which  I  shall  have 
occasion  to  refer  again,  the  Austrian  minister 
began  by  saying  that  he  had  a  great  favor  to 
ask  me. 

It  was  a  few  days  after  the  fall  of  Lemberg 
in  1914.  "We  shall  soon  be  at  war  with  each 
other,"  he  said.  "But  after  the  war  we  shall 
have  peace.  Promise  me  that  when  once  the 
war  is  over  and  I  have  the  pleasure  of  meet- 
ing you  again,  we  shall  be  the  same  friends 
as  ever."  He  punctuated  his  request  with 
compliments  which  it  is  not  for  me  to  repeat. 

As  he  was  in  my  house  I  had  to  make  a 
civil  answer.  I  hunted  about  for  something  to 
say,  and  then  with  a  certain  measure  of  em- 
barrassment I  said  something  of  this  kind:  "I 
don't  know  whether  we  are  going  to  be  at  war 
or  not.  But  if  we  were  it  would  only  be  be- 
cause our  respective  nations  believed  that  it 
was  their  interest  or  their  duty  to  fight  one 

91 


92       SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

another.  We  are  both  of  us  civilized  men. 
There  is  no  earthly  reason  why  after  the  war 
we  should  not  in  our  individual  capacity  be 
friends  again." 

At  that  time  I  did  not  believe  Count  Czer- 
nin  was  capable  of  doing  what  he  did  later  on, 
when  he  cancelled  my  Austrian  decoration 
and,  denying  his  own  words,  deliberately  lied 
to  me. 

If  I  had  known  him  better  my  answer  would 
have  been  quite  different,  but  Count  Czernin 
is  really  a  most  accomplished  type  of  Aus- 
trian. 

We  all  know,  and  we  all  say,  that  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  an  Austrian  nation.  .  It  is 
true  in  the  real  sense  of  the  word.  An  Aus- 
trian people  in  the  sense  of  a  collection  of  men 
having  a  collective  conscience  does  not  exist 
and  could  not  exist.  But  Austrians  do  exist. 
They  are  members  of  a  clique  recruited  from 
among  the  nations  of  the  earth,  serving  the 
Hapsburgs  from  father  to  son,  living  on  the 
Imperial  favor  and  forming  a  sort  of  civilian 
general  staff  to  that  family — which  is  the  only 
link  existing  amongst  the  nations  composing 
the  Empire.1  Amongst  themselves  these  peo- 
ple talk  German,  but  intellectually  they  are 

'This  was  written  before  the  flight  of  the  Austrian  Emperor. 


COUNT  CZERNIN  93 

not  Germans.  Though  by  origin  they  may  be 
Czech,  Polish,  Italian,  Croatian,  German,  yet 
they  are  not  Czechs  or  Poles  or  Italians  or 
Croats  or  Germans.  Until  quite  recently  they 
could  even  be  of  Magyar  origin  without,  how- 
ever, being  really  Magyars.  All  these  people, 
all  the  members  of  this  little  clique,  are  Aus- 
trians.  They  are,  in  fact,  the  only  Austrians 
in  the  world.  Their  essential  characteristic  is 
the  absence  of  real  intelligence,  yet  they  are 
not  quite  as  innocent  as  they  look,  for  they 
have  bureaucratic  traditions  and  a  guile  that 
stands  them  in  lieu  of  intelligence. 

When  one  first  sees  them  one  is  charmed  by 
their  beautiful  manners  and  what  I  can  only 
describe  as  their  encyclopedic  polish.  This 
prevents  one  realizing  their  hopeless  nonen- 
tity. Then  one  is  liable  to  err  in  the  other 
direction.  From  astonishment  at  their  igno- 
rance and  want  of  brain  one  comes  to  believe 
them  to  be  harmless.  It  is  only  after  a  time 
that  one  learns  the  real  truth.  Then  one  per- 
ceives that  at  bottom  these  people  are  rogues, 
and  that  one  should  not  reckon  too  much  on 
their  intellectual  nonentity. 

Count  Czernin  is  a  most  typical  Austrian, 
and  intercourse  with  him  is  most  agreeable, 
as  his  manners,  at  any  rate  in  appearance,  are 


94        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

perfectly  charming.  He  has  a  rudimentary 
intelligence,  but  it  is  amply  supplemented  by 
guile.  He  has,  too,  a  fund  of  humor  which 
sometimes  might  almost  be  regarded  as  wit. 
Thus  one  day  he  said  to  Radef,  a  former  Bul- 
garian comitadji,  "Neither  you  nor  I  will  ever 
make  good  diplomats,  because  I  never  lie  and 
you  never  speak  the  truth."  And  again,  to  his 
colleague  Busche,  who  was  always  boasting 
about  the  superiority  of  Germany  to  poor 
Austria,  he  said,  "But  at  least  there  is  one 
point  on  which  you  will  have  to  admit  that 
Austria  is  superior  to  Germany."  And  when 
Busche,  who  was  intelligent  but  rather  un- 
couth, persisted  that  this  was  impossible,  Czer- 
nin  said  slyly,  "We  have  a  better  ally  than 
Germany  has!" 

Count  Czernin  was  in  retirement  in  1913 
when  Vienna  thought  fit  to  replace  Count 
Fiirstenberg,  the  then  minister  to  Roumania, 
because  he  had  failed  to  prevent  Roumania's 
making  war  on  Bulgaria,  the  Peace  of  Bu- 
charest as  the  consequence. 

The  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  picked 
out  Czernin  for  the  post.  He  had  always  in- 
tended one  day  to  make  him  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  In  the  meantime  he  sent  him  to 
Bucharest  with  the  definite  mission  of  patch- 


COUNT  CZERNIN  95 

ing  up  Austro-Roumanian  relations  at  the 
price  of  serious  concessions  in  Transylvania 
which  he  meant  the  Maygars  to  make  to  the 
Roumanians.  I  met  Count  Czernin  for  the 
first  time  immediately  after  his  arrival  at  the 
opening  of  an  industrial  museum. 

In  spite  of  the  crowd  all  around  us  Count 
Czernin  took  me  into  a  corner  and  explained 
that  he  had  only  come  to  Bucharest  with  a 
view  to  consolidating  our  relations  by  con- 
cessions which  the  Magyars  were  to  make  to 
us.  He  assured  me  that  these  concessions 
would  be  made  whether  Budapesth  liked  it  or 
not.  In  the  long  run  it  was  certain  that  Buda- 
pesth would  see  reason,  because  not  only  was  it 
a  matter  of  justice,  but  it  was  absolutely  nec- 
essary. And  in  conclusion  he  said,  "Unless 
the  Magyars  make  large  concessions  the  Aus- 
tro-Roumanian alliance  cannot  go  on." 

In  speaking  like  this  he  showed  true  cour- 
age, and  I  have  no  doubt  that  he  was  himself 
deluded  as  to  the  possibility  of  serious  conces- 
sions. It  was  distinctly  honorable  on  the  part 
of  an  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  to  admit 
that  he  regarded  them  as  absolutely  necessary. 
At  the  same  time  for  him  to  tell  me  so  bluntly 
in  the  middle  of  a  crowd  at  our  first  meeting 
seemed  to  me  a  very  singular  proceeding,  but 


96        SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

it  only  strengthened  my  opinion  of  Austrian 
diplomats. 

Later  on  it  became  evident  even  to  Count 
Czernin  that  the  tale  of  Magyar  concessions 
to  Roumania  was  nothing  but  an  Arabian 
Nights'  romance,  and  each  time  I  saw  him  he 
referred  to  it  less  explicitly.  It  was  easy  to 
see  that  he  felt  awkward  and  knew  that  he  had 
gone  too  far,  and  that  he  was  looking  out  for 
an  honorable  way  of  retreat. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  world  war  our  rela- 
tions were  most  correct,  but  our  political  con- 
versations were  confined  to  the  ordinary  gos- 
sip of  society. 

When  I  returned  from  England  in  the  early 
days  of  the  war  on  the  eve  of  the  Privy  Coun- 
cil of  August  3rd  at  Sinaia  I  often  met  Count 
Czernin,  who  like  me  had  his  headquarters  at 
Sinaia.  He  was  trying  like  so  many  others  to 
defend  Austria  against  the  accusation  of  hav- 
ing unchained  the  war.  I  protested  vigor- 
ously, and  he  thereupon  asked  me  to  explain 
to  him  unreservedly  what  made  me  affirm  the 
contrary.  At  that  time  Waldhausen,  the  Ger- 
man Minister,  Czernin  and  I  had  a  talk  at  the 
Palace  Hotel  at  Sinaia  which  lasted  nearly 
three  hours.  Having  obtained  permission  to 
speak  freely,  and  taking  no  notice  of  their  na- 


COUNT  CZERNIN  97 

tionality,  I  made  out  a  regular  indictment  of 
Germany,  and  of  Austria  in  particular.  I 
produced  so  many  proofs,  quoted  so  many 
facts  of  which  the  public  was  still  ignorant, 
and  used  such  crude  language  that  of  necessity 
my  relations  with  Count  Czernin  were  af- 
fected. He  naturally  pretended  that  I  was 
mistaken,  but  congratulated  me  on  my  frank- 
ness and  courage,  at  the  same  time  stating 
that  he  should  look  upon  me  as  one  of  the 
most  implacable  enemies  of  his  country. 

If  I  repeated  this  conversation  it  would  con- 
sist chiefly  in  a  monologue,  and  it  would  only 
mean  reiterating  all  I  have  said  and  written  on 
the  origin  of  the  war,  and  just  a  few  other 
things  that  I  have  not  yet  made  public.  It 
would  have  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  Count 
Czernin. 

From  that  day  we  ceased  to  call  on  each 
other,  but  this  did  not  prevent  our  talking  if 
we  happened  to  meet.  It  was  not  till  some 
weeks  later,  when  I  had  proof  of  his  having 
taken  part  in  the  hateful  work  of  political 
corruption,  that  we  ceased  to  bow  to  each 
other. 

One  day  on  the  boulevard  at  Sinaia  he 
stopped  and  asked  me  if  it  were  true  that 
Talaat  and  Zaimis  were  coming  to  Roumania 


in  order  to  try  and  come  to  an  arrangement 
over  the  Turco- Greek  difficulty  about  the  Is- 
lands. 

When  I  answered  that  it  was  true,  he  asked 
me  with  a  malicious  smile  if  I  believed  Talaat 
was  really  coming  for  that  purpose. 

I  straightway  said  "No,"  and  added  that 
Talaat  had  stayed  at  Sofia  on  his  way  and 
that  it  was  obvious  that  he  was  coming  to 
Roumania  to  try  and  arrange  a  Turco-Bul- 
gar-Roumanian  alliance  against  Russia. 

"Well,"  said  Czernin,  "and  if  they  make  a 
proposition  of  the  kind  what  are  you  going  to 
say?" 

"I  am  not  the  Government,"  I  said,  "but  if 
I  were  and  a  proposition  of  this  kind  were  put 
forward,  I  should  tell  them  quite  straight  out 
that  if  I  wanted  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  Aus- 
tria I  should  discuss  the  matter  with  her  and 
not  with  her  household  servants." 

Czernin  thought  my  language  rather  pic- 
turesque and  dropped  the  subject. 

A  few  days  after  Lemberg  had  fallen  Count 
Czernin  telephoned  to  know  whether  I  could 
see  him.  He  said  he  wanted  to  bring  me  back 
some  books  I  had  lent  him.  I  naturally  said 
"Yes,"  all  the  more  willingly  as  it  was  several 
weeks  since  he  had  been  to  see  me.  I  was  curi- 


COUNT  CZERNIN  99 

ous  to  know  why  he  was  coming;  the  books 
were  too  transparent  an  excuse.  I  received 
him  in  my  study;  it  was  our  last  conversation, 
and  it  is  so  strange  as  to  be  worth  recording. 
Count  Czernin  began  by  referring  to  a  mat- 
ter I  have  already  mentioned,  the  question  of 
our  private  friendship  after  the  war.  Just  as 
I  was  saying  that  neither  war  nor  peace  de- 
pended on  me,  he  said,  "You  are  going  to 
make  war  on  us.  That  is  self-evident.  It  is 
your  interest  and  your  duty  to  do  so.  If  I 
were  a  Roumanian  I  would  attack  Austria, 
and  I  cannot  see  why  you  should  not  do  what 
I  should  do  in  your  place.  Of  course  it  is  not 
very  pretty  to  go  for  an  ally,  but  history  is 
made  up  of  such  rascalities,  Austrian  history 
as  much  as  that  of  any  other  state,  and  I  don't 
see  why  Roumania  should  be  the  only  excep- 
tion;" and  then,  as  I  told  him  he  was  making 
me  feel  perfectly  at  home,  he  went  on:  "All  the 
same  I  must  ask  one  thing  of  you.  Just  wait 
for  a  fortnight.  In  a  fortnight  the  whole  mili- 
tary situation  will  have  changed  in  our  favor, 
and  whatever  your  present  interest  may  be  in 
making  war  on  us  you  will  then  see  that  it 
would  be  a  mistake."  I  smiled,  and  Czernin 
went  on,  "No,  not  a  fortnight,  let  us  say  three 
weeks;  that  is  all  I  ask  of  you.  If  the  situa- 


100      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

tion  has  not  changed  in  three  weeks,  attack 
us.  I  should  do  so  in  your  place.  I  insist, 
however,  on  the  three  weeks,  for,  mark  you, 
this  will  be  a  war  of  extermination.  If  we 
are  victorious  we  shall  suppress  Roumania. 
If  we  are  beaten  Austria-Hungary  will  cease 
to  exist." 

I  again  said  that  the  war  did  not  depend  on 
me,  and  that  judging  from  what  I  saw  he 
might  count,  not  on  three  weeks,  but  a  far 
longer  time,  even  if  war  were  eventually  to 
break  out  between  us.  I  added  that  it  seemed 
an  exaggeration  to  talk  of  extermination,  and 
went  on  to  say,  "Our  circumstances  are  in  no 
way  parallel.  For  example,  if  Roumania  were 
suppressed  I  should  lose  everything,  and 
should  be  but  a  pariah  wandering  through  the 
world,  while  you,  who  are  by  way  of  being  a 
good  German,  stand  to  lose  nothing  when 
Austria  disappears.  You  may  even  be  a 
gainer  by  it,  as  Germany  can  never  be  sup- 
pressed." 

On  this  we  parted.  It  was  in  the  after- 
noon, and  in  the  evening  I  heard  from  Fili- 
pesco  that  Czernin  had  that  very  day  said 
precisely  the  same  things  to  him. 

This  last  talk  with  Count  Czernin  is  per- 
haps the  strangest  I  ever  had  with  any  diplo- 


COUNT  CZERNIN  101 

mat.  For  the  representative  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary to  say  that  if  he  were  a  Roumanian  he 
would  make  war  on  Austria  because  it  was  the 
interest  and  duty  of  Roumania  so  to  do  would 
have  been  extraordinary  and  utterly  incredible 
if  I  had  not  myself  heard  it. 

It  seems  to  me  that  after  this  talk  it  was 
not  becoming  in  Count  Czernin  to  bring  him- 
self to  treat  the  King  of  Roumania  and  our 
statesmen  in  the  way  he  did.  He  had  no  right 
to  ask  us  to  be  blinder  than  he  was  himself 
to  the  interest  and  duty  of  Roumania. 


Count  Mensdorff 


X 

COUNT  MENSDORFF 

I  ARRIVED  in  London  on  the  12th  of  July, 
1914,  in  the  evening.  I  was  much  worried, 
although  on  the  9th  of  July,  only  three  days 
earlier,  King  Charles  had  positively  assured 
me  that  peace  would  be  preserved  for  at  least 
three  years  longer.  It  was  quite  impossible 
for  me  to  forget  the  horrible  way  in  which 
the  Marquis  Pallavicini  had  spoken  to  me  in 
the  spring  of  1914,  and  from  my  own  observa- 
tion during  the  whole  of  the  Balkan  crisis  I 
knew  that  Austria  really  wanted  war. 

So  when  the  Serajevo  outrage  occurred  it 
was  easy  for  me  to  appraise  the  full  gravity 
of  the  situation.  And  when  I  saw  Austria — 
in  other  words,  Count  Tisza,  who  since  the 
death  of  Francis  Ferdinand  was  virtually  dic- 
tator of  the  Empire — preserve  an  inscrutable 
attitude  while  preparing  a  so-called  case,  but 
giving  no  indication  of  her  intentions,  my 
anxiety  deepened  still  further. 

105 


106      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

It  was  in  this  state  of  mind  that  I  arrived 
in  London. 

There  I  found  a  very  strange  situation.  A 
large  section  of  the  Press  was  in  all  good  faith 
friendly  to  Austria.  In  England  the  old  no- 
tion of  a  pacific  Austria  necessary  to  the  bal- 
ance of  power  in  Europe  still  obtained.  I 
must  admit  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador, 
Count  Mensdorff,  and  his  friends  had  done 
their  work  well.  It  is  well  known  that  the 
English  Press  is  immune  against  any  form  of 
corruption,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  personal 
relations  and  friendships  play  a  great  part  in 
this  journalistic  world,  where  people  are  in- 
clined to  be  over-confiding  because  they  are 
fundamentally  honest.  The  soil,  too,  was  fa- 
vorable. England  had  not  yet  forgotten  the 
horror  felt  over  the  assassination  of  King 
Alexander  and  Queen  Draga. 

Count  Mensdorff  was  the  embodiment  of 
the  best  type  of  Austrian  diplomat.  He  was 
a  true  aristocrat  and  a  fine-looking  man,  but 
he  was  not  well  educated  and  not  at  all  in- 
telligent, though  perhaps  on  this  account  all 
the  more  plausible  and  untrustworthy. 

During  the  preceding  weeks  he  had  been 
assiduously  making  up  to  journalists.  As 
Prince  Lichnowsky  said  to  me  at  the  time, 


COUNT  MENSDORFF  107 

"He  is  concocting  something  or  other."  This 
"something"  obviously  was  to  launch  English 
public  opinion  on  the  wrong  scent — in  other 
words,  to  spread  the  suspicion  that  Serbia  was 
particularly  responsible  for  the  assassination 
of  the  Archduke,  since  she  had  been  over- 
tolerant  of  revolutionary  movements.  Count 
Mensdorff's  agents  had  had  recourse  to  an  old 
device  of  Austrian  diplomacy,  a  forgery. 
Some  rascal  had  given  John  Bull  a  document 
purporting  to  have  emanated  from  the  Ser- 
bian Legation  in  London  which  proved  that 
the  assassination  of  the  Archduke  was  the 
work  of  the  Government  of  Belgrade.  When 
I  met  the  Serbian  Minister,  M.  Boscovitch,  at 
St.  Ann's  Hill,  the  house  of  my  friend,  Sir 
Albert  Rollit,  he  asked  me  as  to  the  propriety 
of  bringing  a  libel  action  against  John  Bull. 
The  document  seemed  to  me  such  an  obvious 
fabrication  that  I  said  it  was  unnecessary. 
War  settled  the  question  of  this  new  Austrian 
forgery. 

The  English  Press  was  on  the  wrong  tack. 
It  honestly  believed  that  Austria  was  out  for 
the  punishment  of  the  assassins,  and  never  for 
a  moment  suspected  the  criminal  designs  of 
the  Hapsburgs. 

I  realized  at  once  that  this  attitude  of  the 


108      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

English  Press  might  well  constitute  a  real 
danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  I  was  posi- 
tive that  the  Government  of  Vienna,  which 
was  totally  incapable  of  believing  in  disinter- 
ested motives  or  in  frank  dealing,  would  read 
heaven  knows  what  ultra-pacific  tendencies 
into  the  English  papers  and  that  it  would  en- 
courage them  to  make  most  unreasonable  de- 
mands on  Serbia.  And  I  feared  this  all  the 
more,  as  I  found  out  that  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  completely  failed  in  obtaining  any  light 
as  to  the  intended  demands  of  Austria. 

I  made  up  my  mind  to  do  the  best  I  could 
in  my  own  modest  capacity,  and  in  the  after- 
noon in  my  own  room  at  the  Ritz  I  saw  Mr. 
Steed,  then  foreign  editor  of  the  Times,  and 
author  of  the  well-known  book  on  the  Haps- 
burg  Monarchy;  Mr.  Gwynne,  editor  of  the 
Morning  Post,  a  friend  of  twenty-five  years' 
standing;  and  Professor  Gerothwohl,  who 
wrote  for  the  Standard. 

My  friends  knew  Vienna  too  well  to  be 
taken  in,  but  all  around  them  were  the  many 
victims  of  Count  Mensdorff's  honeyed  tongue. 

I  explained  to  them  that,  knowing  as  I  did 
the  bellicose  disposition  of  Austria,  they  were 
endangering  the  peace  of  Europe  in  encour- 
aging her.  I  begged  them  in  the  interests  of 


COUNT  MENSDORFF  109 

peace  to  warn  Austria,  and  to  do  it  in  a  pretty 
stiff  tone,  the  only  tone  understood  in  Vienna 
and  Budapesth.  I  added  that  I  took  upon  my- 
self full  responsibility  for  this  Press  campaign, 
which  I  believed  to  be  useful,  not  only  in  the 
interests  of  peace,  but  of  the  wretched  Haps- 
burg  Monarchy  itself. 

On  the  following  morning,  both  the  Times 
and  the  Morning  Post  published  vehement 
leaders  denouncing  the  Austrian  plot  and  giv- 
ing the  Hapsburgs  a  warning  which  should 
have  prevented  them  from  taking  the  plunge 
if  the  Tisza-Forgasch-Berchtold  trio  had  not 
been  completely  demented.  At  any  rate  Eng- 
lish public  opinion  was  awakened.  Most  of 
the  Press  followed  the  example  given  by  the 
Times  and  Morning  Post.  The  alarm  signal 
had  been  given. 

When,  a  few  days  later,  on  the  morning  of 
the  24th,  Austria's  monstrous  ultimatum  ap- 
peared, everything  was  made  clear  even  to  the 
most  unbelieving.  At  any  rate  in  England 
prejudice  in  favor  of  Austria  was  dead  for- 
ever. 

We  who  had  given  the  alarm  signal  were 
right.  How  happy  we  should  have  been  to 
have  been  wrong! 


England's  Antipathy  to  War 


XI 

ENGLAND'S  ANTIPATHY  TO  WAR 

DURING  my  long  official  life  I  have  made  and 
received  too  many  confidences  not  to  know  the 
obligations  attaching  to  my  position.  It  is 
only  the  insistence  with  which  Germany  dis- 
seminates the  false  legend  that  the  war  is  the 
work  of  the  British  Empire  that  forces  me  to 
depart  from  my  usual  discretion,  which  I  be- 
lieve up  till  now  has  been  faultless. 

I  am  going  to  tell  of  two  personal  matters, 
the  first  of  which  dates  from  January,  1913. 

I  was  then  in  London,  and  through  conver- 
sation with  the  British  Foreign  Minister  and 
other  authoritative  representatives  of  English 
thought  I  had  acquired  a  deep  conviction  that 
England  passionately  longed  for  peace.  For 
this  reason  I  believed  her  relations  with  Ger- 
many— who  at  the  moment  was  usefully  em- 
ployed in  muzzling  the  warlike  proclivities  of 
her  ally,  Austria-Hungary — were  becoming 
closer  and  more  cordial.  Thus  on  the  7th  of 
January,  1913,  I  allowed  myself  to  write  to 

113 


114      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

the  late  King  Charles  telling  him  that  given 
the  unshakable  determination  of  England  and 
Germany  to  prevent  European  war,  I  was 
certain  it  would  never  break  out.  But  that, 
as  people  will  say,  is  ancient  history. 

Well,  on  Tuesday,  the  21st  of  July,  1914, 
two  days  before  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was 
presented  to  Serbia,  I  had  the  honor  of  being 
received  in  a  long  audience  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey,1  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the 
British  Empire. 

I  wanted  to  get  him  to  assist  the  State  of 
Albania  to  get  out  of  the  impasse  it  was  in. 
And  I  tried  to  convince  him  of  the  necessity 
of  sending  an  international  contingent  to  Al- 
bania and  of  putting  a  little  more  money  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Prince  of  Wied. 

After  explaining  to  him  the  European  as- 
pect of  Albanian  difficulties,  I  pointed  out  that 
Albania  was  liable  to  reduce  Austria  to  the 
state  of  nerves  she  had  been  in  during  the 
Balkan  war.  This  is  literally  what  I  said:  "I 
know  that  there  are  people  who  imagine  that 
a  war  between  Austria  and  Italy  may  be  the 
result  of  tolerating  the  present  mix-up  in  Al- 
bania and  that  it  is  a  way  of  detaching  Italy 

*  Now  Viscount  Grey. 


ENGLAND'S  ANTIPATHY  TO  WAR    115 

from  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  this  would  be  a 
short-sighted,  dangerous  policy." 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  a  tone  of  real  sin- 
cerity— that  particular  sincerity  of  English 
statesmen  which  imposes  respect  and  confi- 
dence in  the  world — interrupted  me  with  a 
display  of  emotion  rare  in  such  a  collected 
person,  saying,  "But  I  do  not  want  to  detach 
Italy  from  the  Triple  Alliance  and  I  have 
never  tried  to  do  so.  I  have  always  realized 
that  if  Italy  left  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
joined  France  and  Russia  the  combination 
against  Germany  and  Austria  would  become 
so  powerful  that  the  peace  of  Europe,  which 
rests  on  the  balance  of  power,  would  be  en- 
dangered. I  want  nothing  but  peace,  I  work 
for  nothing  but  peace."  And  in  order  that  we 
may  fully  realize  the  importance  of  this  com- 
munication, I  must  add  that  a  few  minutes 
later  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke  to  me  of  the  ex- 
treme gravity  of  the  political  situation  owing 
to  the  Austro-Serbian  quarrel.  He  was  fully 
aware  of  the  possibilities  inherent  in  the  situa- 
tion, and  was  all  the  more  acutely  anxious,  as 
it  had  been  impossible  for  him  to  discover 
what  Austria's  terms  to  Serbia  were. 

This  happened  forty-eight  hours  before  the 
fatal  ultimatum  which  was,  and  will  remain, 


116      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

one  of  the  most  tragic  blots  on  the  escutcheon 
of  European  history.  The  ultimatum  will 
also  be  remembered  as  the  most  formidable 
blow  ever  delivered  at  small  nations  whose  ex- 
istence, compared  with  that  of  the  large  na- 
tions, is  so  difficult,  so  anxious,  and  so  painful. 


The  Responsibility  for  the  War 


XII 

THE  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

THE  true  history  of  the  responsibility  for  the 
war  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

Austria,  who  had  never  given  up  the  idea 
of  obtaining  compensation  in  the  Balkan  Pen- 
insula for  her  losses  in  Italy,  allowed  the 
Turco-Balkan  war  of  1912  to  take  place,  be- 
cause she,  like  Germany,  was  convinced  that 
the  Turks  would  win.  Was  there  not  in  Tur- 
key a  Military  Mission,  and  was  it  possible 
to  think  that  the  pupils  of  the  Germans  could 
be  beaten?  Was  it  thinkable  that  wretched 
serfs  could  be  of  serious  military  value? 

The  defeat  of  the  Turks  falsified  all  the  cal- 
culations of  Austria,  and  from  that  moment 
she  lost  her  head  and  conceived  the  project 
of  plunging  Europe  into  blood  and  fire  in  or- 
der to  regain  for  herself  the  prestige  which 
she  thought  had  passed  away  from  her. 

I  repeat  the  charge  that  during  the  whole 
period  between  the  battle  of  Lule-Burgas  un- 

119 


120      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

til  the  Peace  of  London,  Austria  wished  to 
provoke  a  European  war. 

The  Anglo-German  entente  for  preserving 
the  benefits  of  peace  for  Europe,  an  entente 
that  at  the  time  was  genuine,  proved  an  in- 
superable barrier  to  the  prospects  of  Austria. 
Nevertheless  she  did  not  give  up  her  inten- 
tions. With  remarkable  intuition  as  to  hu- 
man weakness  she  scented  the  possibility  of 
war  amongst  the  victors,  and  she  encouraged 
Bulgaria  to  commit  the  fatal  act  which 
brought  it  about. 

When  she  found  herself  once  more  mistaken 
in  her  calculations  and  Bulgaria  beaten  by 
the  hated  Serbs,  Austria  decided  herself  to 
fall  upon  Serbia — M.  Giolitti  has  given  us 
irrefutable  proofs  of  this.  And  now  we  are 
going  to  allow  ourselves  to  imitate  M.  Giolitti 
and  produce  another  proof  which  hitherto  has 
remained  unknown. 

In  May,  1913,  Count  Berchtold  charged 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  in  Bucharest 
to  make  a  communication  to  the  Roumanian 
Government  (to  whom  both  the  Serbs  and  the 
Greeks  had  appealed  in  view  of  the  possibility 
of  attack  by  Bulgaria),  and  the  communica- 
tion was  this:  "Austria  will  defend  Bulgaria 
by  force  of  arms."  In  other  words,  Rou- 


THE  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

mania,  although  the  ally  of  Austria,  would  be 
attacked  by  Austria  if  she  opposed  the  crush- 
ing of  Serbia! 

Count  Andrassy  can  put  his  hands  on  this 
document  in  the  Ballplatz,  but  our  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  will  find  no  copy  of  it  in  our 
archives,  because  Count  Berchtold's  note  was 
only  read  to  a  single  minister — myself.  Though 
I  was  not  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Prince  Fiirstenberg  read  it  aloud  to  me,  and 
my  reply  was  such  that  he  refrained  from 
delivering  it  to  the  person  for  whom  it  was 
really  intended. 

Events  gradually  became  as  clear  as  the 
day.  On  two  different  occasions  in  1913  Aus- 
tria-Hungary tried  to  make  war  on  Serbia. 
She  was  prevented  from  doing  so  by  Ger- 
many, Italy  and  Roumania,  but  she  did  not 
give  up  the  idea. 

In  April,  1914,  at  Bucharest  she  put  for- 
ward the  idea  of  a  preventive  war  very  seri- 
ously. When  the  crime  of  Serajevo  took  place 
she  was  on  the  alert,  we  know  with  what  re- 
sult. 

It  is  now  quite  certain  that  the  tragedy  of 
Serajevo  was  a  pretext  and  not  a  cause  of  the 
war.  It  is  known  that  the  person  guilty  of 
provoking  this  monstrous  conflict  was  Count 


SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Tisza  who,  because  of  his  great  ability,  was  in 
charge  of  Austrian  policy  during  the  months 
that  led  up  to  the  war. 

It  is  no  use  to  argue  that,  in  the  days  im- 
mediately preceding  the  declaration  of  war, 
Count  Tisza  and  Berchtold,  realizing  that 
their  game  was  turning  into  a  tragedy,  took 
fright  and  wished  to  retreat,  but  were  pre- 
vented from  doing  so  by  the  impatience  of  the 
German  Emperor. 

Count  Tisza,  who  had  been  miraculously 
delivered  from  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand— whose  anti-Magyarism  was  an  open  se- 
cret— saw  in  this  very  incident  an  unique  op- 
portunity of  consolidating  the  dominion  of  the 
Magyars  in  Hungary  and  the  domination  of 
Hungary  in  the  Empire.  He  hurled  himself 
into  the  adventure  with  his  overbearing  en- 
ergy, that  brutal  energy  which  had  so  often 
been  exercised  in  the  Parliament  at  Buda- 
pesth. 

Tisza  took  the  risk  of  Europe  being 
drenched  in  blood  in  order  that  Magyarism 
might  triumph.  He  succeeded,  but  it  is  only 
just  that  among  those  things  which  have  been 
struck  down  by  the  eternal  Nemesis,  the  crime 
of  Magyarism  should  be  the  most  heavily  pun- 
ished. 


King  Charles  of  Roumania 


Kill 
KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA 

I  DO  not  propose  here  to  draw  a  portrait  or 
even  a  sketch  of  King  Charles.  One  day  it  is 
my  intention  to  outline  in  detail  the  features 
of  this  King  I  knew  so  well,  who  without  be- 
ing a  great  man  was  undeniably  a  personality. 
I  will  do  it  with  complete  impartiality,  for  I 
have  never  been — and  it  is  not  in  me  to  be— r- 
a  courtier,  but  at  the  same  time  with  the  sym- 
pathy I  naturally  feel  for  a  sovereign  whose 
adviser  I  was  during  so  many  years.  For  the 
moment  I  only  wish  to  say  enough  to  render 
intelligible  his  attitude  during  the  war. 

King  Charles  was  one  of  those  spirits,  cast 
in  a  narrow  circumscribed  mold,  which  are 
just  as  incapable  of  a  folly  as  of  action  on  a 
great  scale.  He  had  impeccable  tact,  a  mar- 
velous capacity  for  seeing  both  sides  of  every 
question,  tireless  industry,  a  sound  sense  which 
could  easily  be  mistaken  for  genuine  intelli- 
gence, a  deep  sense  of  duty,  cultivation  un- 
usual in  a  monarch,  perfect  manners,  a  pa- 

125 


126     SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

tience  which  sometimes  seemed,  quite  wrongly, 
like  indifference,  and  with  all  this  a  great  and 
quite  legitimate  regard  for  what  history  would 
say  of  him  in  the  future.  For  normal  times, 
therefore,  King  Charles  was  remarkably  well 
equipped.  But  for  moments  of  crisis  the 
characteristics  I  have  enumerated  are  inade- 
quate and  almost  tiresome.  With  all  his  pow- 
ers, King  Carl,  whose  physical  courage  was  as- 
suredly beyond  question,  was  lacking  in  moral 
courage,  and  the  very  idea  of  initiative  was 
foreign  to  him.  It  is  this  combination  of 
qualities  and  defects,  emphasized  by  age, 
which  explains  the  part  played  by  the  King 
during  the  world  war.  So  far  as  it  specially 
relates  to  Roumanian  policy  I  do  not  propose 
to  describe  his  attitude.  The  whole  situation 
will  be  dealt  with  fully  in  my  coming  Me- 
moirs on  the  origin  of  the  war  and  the  share 
taken  in  it  by  Roumania. 

To  tell  all  I  know  about  those  who  have 
played  any  part  in  these  unprecedented  cir- 
cumstances is  a  debt  I  owe  to  history,  and  per- 
haps, when  everything  that  took  place  behind 
the  scenes  is  known,  some  moments  of  deplor- 
able hesitation  and  moral  weakness,  otherwise 
inexplicable,  will  be  understood.  Inevitably  I 
shall  have  to  concern  myself  from  the  outset 


KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA       127 

with  the  position  of  King  Charles,  not  only 
for  what  he  did  himself,  but  above  all  for  what 
others  did  in  their  eagerness  to  anticipate  his 
thoughts  and  his  wishes.  I  desire  now  only 
to  relate  his  opinions  on  the  world  war  and  its 
consequences. 

King  Charles,  it  is  only  fair  to  say,  was  no 
admirer  of  the  Emperor  William.  The  Kai- 
ser's stormy  and  ill-regulated  activity  was  ut- 
terly distasteful  to  him;  in  addition  he  cher- 
ished a  genuine  love  of  peace.  He  had  too 
much  sense  to  overlook  the  peril  and  misery 
involved  in  a  general  war  or  to  face  it  with 
a  light  heart.  Again,  in  justice  to  the  King, 
let  me  add  that  within  his  limits  he  really 
worked  for  peace.  I  shall  never  forget  that 
in  February  and  March,  1913,  King  Charles 
was  the  one  convinced  champion  of  my  policy, 
the  object  of  which  was  to  prevent  a  san- 
guinary conflict  between  Bulgaria  and  our- 
selves, a  conflict  which  would  at  that  time 
have  inevitably  resulted  in  universal  war.  It 
is  true  that  at  a  certain  moment  he  deserted 
me,  but  when  I  none  the  less  maintained  an 
absolute  non  possumus,  the  King  frankly  con- 
fessed to  me  that  he  would  never  have  given 
way  to  the  war  party  if  he  had  not  been  cer- 
tain that  I  would  stand  my  ground.  Mon- 


128      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

archs  sometimes  make  us  unexpected  confi- 
dences. Did  not  King  Charles  one  day  ex- 
plain to  me  for  a  full  half-hour  the  reasons 
which  made  him  fundamentally  ungrateful? 

Until  1912  the  King  had  lived  in  the  con- 
viction that  the  general  war  would  not  break 
out  during  his  lifetime.  In  the  autumn  of 
1912  he  sent  his  nephew — now  King  Ferdi- 
nand of  Roumania — to  Berlin  to  learn  the  in- 
tentions of  the  Emperor  William.  The  Crown 
Prince  brought  back  the  answer  that  the  Em- 
peror believed  a  conflict  between  pan- German- 
ism and  pan-Slavism  to  be  inevitable,  but  that 
he  hoped  it  would  not  take  place  while  he  lived. 
King  Carl  for  his  part  was  so  convinced  of  the 
stability  of  peace  that  he  ventured  in  the 
spring  of  1914  to  receive  a  visit  from  the 
Czar  at  Constanza,  which  he  would  never  have 
done  had  he  thought  that  a  few  months  after- 
wards he  might  have  to  consider  the  possibil- 
ity of  declaring  war  on  him.  Even  on  July  5, 
1914,  when  King  Charles  confided  to  me 
at  Sinaia  the  Kaiser's  great  secret — namely, 
that  he  had  decided  to  bring  about  the  Euro- 
pean war — he  added  that  this  would  not  take 
place  for  three  or  four  years.  That  the  old 
King  was  quite  honest  in  saying  so  I  am  ab- 
solutely convinced  for  a  thousand  reasons,  the 


KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA       129 

strongest  of  which,  based  on  his  own  tempera- 
ment, is  that  had  King  Charles  imagined  that 
the  world  war  on  which  the  Kaiser  had  deter- 
mined would  break  out  twenty-two  days  later, 
he  would  have  begun  at  once  to  take  steps  to 
ensure  that  his  personal  policy  should  at  least 
have  every  possible  chance  of  success.  In 
point  of  fact,  he  took  no  such  step  until  the 
days  just  preceding  the  declaration  of  war. 
Now  during  the  whole  of  his  reign  he  had  sub- 
ordinated everything  to  the  single  idea  of 
making  himself  the  autocrat  of  Roumania's 
foreign  policy.  He  would  not  have  left  him- 
self completely  unarmed  on  the  day  of  the 
crisis  had  he  known  beforehand  the  date  on 
which  that  crisis  would  occur. 

Before  the  meeting  of  the  Crown  Council 
on  August  3,  1914,  King  Charles  had  con- 
fined any  action  on  his  own  part  solely  to  con- 
versations with  his  Ministers.  Of  these  conver- 
sations history  will  have  more  to  say.  The 
cardinal  point,  which  is  within  my  personal 
knowledge,  is  that  the  King  always  contended 
that  England  would  remain  neutral.  Like 
nearly  all  Germans,  King  Charles  was  not 
merely  ignorant  of  England,  but  totally  in- 
capable of  understanding  her.  The  Anglo- 
Saxon  world  is  always  surprised  that  Ger- 


130      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

mans  are  as  blind  as  they  are  where  England 
is  concerned:  the  truth  is  that,  apart  from  very 
rare  and  partial  exceptions,  the  German  is 
organically  unable  to  appreciate  the  English 
spirit.  England  was  simply  excluded  from 
the  old  King's  calculations,  and  with  the  tone 
of  authority  which  monarchs  are  accustomed  to 
use,  especially  on  subjects  which  they  know 
nothing  about,  he  pronounced  his  opinion  as 
if  it  were  gospel. 

King  Charles  was  equally  ignorant  of  the 
workings  of  the  Italian  mind.  He  could  not 
believe  that  Italy  would  dare  to  detach  her- 
self from  Germany,  and  the  attitude  she  ac- 
tually adopted  disconcerted  no  less  than  it 
surprised  him.  So  convinced  was  he  that  Italy 
would  not  venture  to  separate  herself  from 
her  all-powerful  allies,  that  when  the  Italian 
Minister  came  to  inform  him  confidentially  of 
the  intentions  of  his  Government,  in  event  of 
war  resulting  from  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia, 
and  emphasized  the  fact  that  he  was  only  au- 
thorized to  communicate  this  to  the  King  on 
the  understanding  that  His  Majesty  pledged 
himself  to  repeat  no  word  of  it  to  anyone, 
King  Charles  naively  asked  him  if  he  must 
keep  it  a  secret  even  from  Berlin.  The  Min- 
ister's answer  was  that  this  went  without  say- 


KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA      131 

ing,  since  when  the  Italian  Government  wished 
to  make  a  communication  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, it  would  take  particular  care  to  do 
so  at  Berlin  and  not  at  Sinaia.  It  should  be 
added  that  there  was  no  love  lost  between 
these  two.  The  King  disliked  the  Italian 
Minister  and  the  latter  reciprocated  his  senti- 
ments with  interest. 

Given  these  views  on  England  and  Italy, 
together  with  his  profound  admiration  for  the 
German  military  organization  and  the  opin- 
ions which  were  so  widely  entertained  in  half- 
informed  circles  on  the  military  deficiencies  of 
France,  it  is  far  from  surprising  that  King 
Charles  allowed  himself  to  be  convinced,  not 
only  that  Germany  would  win,  but  that  she 
would  do  so  very  rapidly.  When  one  con- 
siders his  conduct  during  the  Summer  and 
Autumn  of  1914,  which  accorded  so  ill  with 
the  higher  interests  of  the  country  he  had 
made  his  own,  one  must  take  into  account  the 
extenuating  circumstances  that,  with  the  best 
will  in  the  world,  a  Roumanian  by  adoption 
could  not  be  conscious  of  the  problem  of  our 
national  unity  in  the  same  sense  as  a  Rou- 
manian by  birth,  and  that  the  King  was  more 
than  sincere  in  his  belief  that  Germany  could 
not  be  beaten. 


132      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

When  at  the  Crown  Council  of  August  3, 
1914,  the  King  told  us  that  by  our  refusal  to 
allow  him  to  enter  the  war  at  the  side  of  the 
Central  Empires  we  had  destroyed  the  whole 
great  work  of  the  Roumanian  renaissance,  that 
we  had  ruined  our  country  forever,  and  that 
the  immediate  future  would  show  us  how  right 
he  was,  he  was  perfectly  sincere.  He  was  sure 
of  a  German  victory,  and  King  Charles  was 
never  one  of  those  who  can  rise  to  the  level  of 
understanding  that  it  is  better  to  be  beaten 
in  the  defense  of  right  than  to  follow  the  call 
of  triumphant  wrong. 

So  little  did  King  Charles  believe  in  the 
possibility  of  resisting  Germany,  that  some 
days  after  the  famous  Crown  Council  he  was 
at  pains  to  inform  me  exactly  how  the  war 
would  develop.  According  to  him,  it  was  to 
last,  at  the  most,  until  December,  and  in  Jan- 
uary, if  not  sooner,  the  Peace  Conference, 
which  would  change  the  organization  of  the 
world  from  top  to  bottom,  would  be  called  to- 
gether. Before  the  15th  of  September  the 
Emperor  William  was  to  be  in  Paris.  Imme- 
diately afterwards  a  revolution  would  break 
out  in  France,  and  Germany  would  grant  her 
defeated  enemy  a  peace,  generous  beyond  all 
expectations,  only  depriving  her  of  her  col- 


KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA       133 

onies  and  a  mere  trifle  of  territory.  Germany, 
added  the  King,  would  never  repeat  the  error 
of  maintaining  the  French  Republic.  On  the 
contrary,  she  would  help  in  the  restoration  of 
the  monarchy,  in  the  person  of  Prince  Victor 
Napoleon.  Once  peace  was  signed  in  France, 
the  Emperor  would  turn  with  all  his  force 
against  Russia,  and  before  December  would 
achieve  the  task,  which  had  been  too  much  for 
Napoleon,  of  occupying  Moscow  and  Petro- 
grad.  This  would  be  the  end  of  the  war,  to 
be  followed  by  the  dismemberment  of  Russia 
on  the  lines  of  the  famous  scheme  dating  from 
Bismarck's  time,  which,  however,  it  must  be 
remembered,  the  great  Chancellor  insisted 
should  only  be  carried  out  in  concert  with 
England.  It  is  needless  to  dwell  on  what  I 
said  in  reply  to  this  fantastic  dream,  which 
from  the  lips  of  a  man  ordinarily  so  full  of 
common-sense  as  King  Charles,  impressed  me 
very  strangely.  Quite  vainly  I  tried  to  make 
him  understand  that  there  would  be  no  rev- 
olution in  France,  that  there  would  be  no  res- 
titution of  the  monarchy,  and  that  it  was  in- 
comprehensible that  the  Napoleons,  children  of 
victory,  should  ever  owe  the  recovery  of  their 
throne  to  a  defeat.  The  King  seemed  to  have 
been  hypnotized.  The  more  he  spoke  to  me 


134      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

the  more  conscious  I  became  of  that  terribly 
intoxicating  quality  in  the  idea  of  German 
omnipotence,  which  could  at  so  great  a  dis- 
tance enchain  the  mind  of  an  old  man  whose 
deliberate  judgment  had  always  been  his  mas- 
ter quality. 

King  Charles  had  reached  such  a  point  of 
conviction  that  Germany  must  win  that  he 
quite  openly  criticized  his  nephew,  King  Al- 
bert, of  whom  he  was  really  fond,  for  what  he 
called  his  fatal  error  in  opposing  the  march 
of  the  German  troops  through  Belgium.  There 
was  something  very  painful  to  me  in  the 
King's  insistence  on  this  subject,  and  one 
August  day,  when  he  happened  to  say  that  the 
war  had  not  brought  to  the  front  a  single 
great  man,  I  replied  to  him  that  he  was  mis- 
taken, for  there  was  already  one  name  in- 
scribed on  the  page  of  immortality — that  of 
his  nephew,  King  Albert,  of  whom  he  had  full 
cause  to  be  proud.  And  since  the  King  main- 
tained his  point  of  view  that  another  policy 
would  have  been  more  to  Belgium's  advan- 
tage, I  repeated  to  him  the  answer  I  had  given 
the  evening  before  to  the  German  Minister, 
when  he,  too,  had  said  the  same  thing.  I  had 
I  asked  the  German  Minister  if  he  had  never 
sacrificed  his  interest  to  his  honor.  When  he 


KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA      135 

assured  me  that  he  would  never  do  anything 
else,  I  replied  in  my  turn  that  nations  had 
the  right  to  consider  their  personal  honor  as 
well  as  individuals. 

On  the  anniversary  of  Sedan,  or  the  day 
before,  the  Emperor  William  telegraphed 
from  Rheims  to  King  Charles  that  he  could 
assure  him,  after  having  consulted  his  military 
chiefs,  that  at  length  France  was  at  his  feet. 
The  King  had  that  day  the  last  genuine  grati- 
fication of  his  life.  Not  that  he  hated  France, 
far  from  it,  and  nothing  would  have  pleased 
him  better  than  an  understanding  between 
France  and  Germany;  but  he  thought  he  saw 
his  forecast  justified.  The  Sovereign,  who 
had  been  touched  to  his  innermost  being  by 
discovering  his  inability  to  impose  his  will  on 
Roumania,  as  he  had  hitherto  done  through- 
out his  reign,  cherished  a  last  hope  of  at  least 
being  able  to  say  to  us  one  day:  "You  see,  I 
was  right."  Further,  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  he  did  not  hope  to  revive  his  policy  and 
see  Roumania,  after  all,  at  Germany's  side 
when  the  German  victory  was  established  be- 
yond dispute.  That  this  was  his  hope  I  my- 
self believe. 

Cruel  awakening  as  the  battle  of  the  Marne 


was  for  King  Charles,  he  tried  to  deceive  him- 
self on  the  consequences  of  that  critical  event. 
I  saw  him  a  few  days  after  this  marvelous 
victory,  which  will  remain  one  of  the  happiest 
and  most  significant  dates  in  the  annals  of 
mankind.  The  King  told  me  that  what  had 
happened  was  nothing  but  a  strategic  retreat; 
as  always,  he  clung  to  the  idea  that  the  Ger- 
man army  could  not  be  beaten.  I  could  not 
control  myself  and,  forgetting  the  respect  due 
to  his  position  and  his  years,  I  explained  to 
him,  in  unrestrained  terms,  the  absurdity  of 
the  idea  that  an  army,  which  had  sacrificed 
everything  for  the  sake  of  advancing  at  head- 
long speed,  had  determined  to  lose  all  the 
benefit  of  this  forward  movement  without 
having  been  defeated.  King  Charles — the 
words  dropping  slowly  from  his  lips  in  a  fash- 
ion which  told  plainly  how  his  spirit  had  been 
overwhelmed  by  a  reality  he  had  never  dared 
to  suspect — said  to  me  very  gently,  "Perhaps, 
then,  I  am  mistaken;  perhaps  you  are  right; 
perhaps  they  have  been  beaten."  The  more 
I  think  of  this  conversation  the  more  I  am 
conscious  of  King  Charles'  moral  distress  dur- 
ing this  last  period  of  his  life.  I  often  saw 
him  then,  although  I  never  asked  for  an  audi- 


KING  CHARLES  OF  ROUMANIA      137 

ence.  It  was  always  the  King  who,  deeply 
pained  as  he  was  by  the  campaign  I  was  con- 
ducting against  Germany,  sent  for  me. 

At  one  of  these  interviews  our  talk  touched 
on  the  name  of  his  sister,  the  Countess  of 
Flanders,  mother  of  King  Albert.  In  a  tone 
of  deep  despair  the  old  King  said  to  me:  "God 
has  been  good  to  her,  he  has  taken  her  before 
this  terrible  day.  Up  to  now  the  Almighty 
has  been  good  to  me  also,  but  he  has  deserted 
me  at  last.  How  much  better  it  would  have 
been  for  me  to  die  before  this  war."  I  was 
deeply  touched,  and  answered  him  that  I  per- 
fectly understood  him,  and  that  in  truth  it 
would  have  been  better  for  him  to  have  died 
before  war  broke  out.  It  was  with  these 
melancholy  reflections  that  my  last  serious  in- 
terview with  King  Charles  came  to  an  end, 
and  I  am  convinced  that  it  was  the  spectacle 
of  the  collapse  of  his  fondest  beliefs  that  has- 
tened his  end. 

He  was  one  more  victim  of  the  belief  which 
for  every  German  had  become  a  maxim  of 
life,  that  Germany  was  so  strong  that  she  was 
invincible.  Before  the  battle  of  the  Marne  he 
expressed  it  by  saying,  "For  a  century  pan- 
Germanism  will  be  supreme:  then  will  come 


138      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

the  era  of  the  Slav."  King  Charles  believed 
the  day  of  the  Latin  world  was  done,  and  as 
for  the  Anglo-Saxon  world,  he  never  even 
began  to  understand  it. 


Herr  Riedl 


XIV 

HERR  RIEDL 

DURING  the  Balkan  crisis  Roumania  found 
herself  in  a  most  painful  position.  She  had  let 
the  opportune  moment  pass  for  discussing 
with  Bulgaria  the  pushing  of  her  frontier  be- 
yond the  Danube.  The  best  moment  was  be- 
fore Bulgaria  mobilized,  or  at  any  rate  the 
few  days  between  the  calling-up  order  and  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign.  It  was  not  till 
after  the  battle  of  Lule-Burgas,  when  a  new 
Government,  in  which  my  party  held  half  the 
portfolios,  came  into  office  that  overtures  with 
Bulgaria  were  begun.  We  know  how  difficult 
they  were. 

Russia  did  not  conceal  her  intention  of  help- 
ing Bulgaria  if  it  so  happened  that  we  at- 
tacked her. 

The  eventuality  of  Roumania  asking  for 
Austrian  aid  also  came  into  the  category  of 
possibilities. 

It  was  at  that  moment  that  Austria  thought 
fit  to  hand  us  the  note  prepared  in  anticipa- 

141 


U2      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

tion  of  her  eventual  assistance.  She  sent  a  M. 
Riedl  to  Bucharest,  a  gentleman  I  prefer  call- 
ing H err  Riedl,  for  rarely  have  I  seen  so  rep- 
resentative a  type  of  man  replete  with  that 
particular  form  of  bookish  undigested  infor- 
mation which  is  almost  a  monopoly  of  the 
German  race. 

He  filled  some  very  high  position  in  the 
Viennese  bureaucracy,  and  was  the  confiden- 
tial agent  of  Francis  Ferdinand,  some  said  his 
future  Finance  Minister.  His  mind  was  most 
dogmatic.  It  is  hardly  worth  while  to  add  that 
he  knew  nothing  about  human  psychology. 
Germans  find  it  an  inaccessible  realm. 

Herr  Riedl's  first  business  was  with  our 
Minister  of  Finance  and  our  Minister  of  Com- 
merce. I  don't  know  whether  our  Finance 
Minister  saw  through  him,  but  our  Minister 
of  Commerce  did,  and  rang  me  up  to  tell  me 
Riedl  had  asked  him  to  conclude  a  customs 
union  with  Austria-Hungary,  neither  more 
nor  less.  He  added  that  Herr  Riedl  was  com- 
ing on  to  see  me. 

He  came,  and  stayed  with  me  for  over  an 
hour.  The  talk  consisted,  for  the  most  part, 
of  a  monologue.  His  French  was  bad,  but  it 
did  not  prevent  him  from  saying  what  he 
thought.  He  became  quite  lost  among  his 


HERR  RIEDL  143 

own  theories  and  statements.  He  arranged 
facts  to  suit  himself,  instead  of  basing  his  the- 
ories on  existing  facts.  His  dogmatism  in  no 
wise  precluded  his  having  recourse  to  cunning. 
Herr  Riedl,  in  fact,  would  have  made  an  ex- 
cellent diplomatist  to  deal  with  imbeciles.  He 
would  have  impressed  them  by  his  scientific 
jargon  and  he  would  have  taken  them  in  by 
his  appearance  of  candor. 

Herr  Riedl  began  by  laying  down  that 
Turkey  in  Europe  must  be  divided  amongst 
the  Balkan  nations.  Therefore  Austria,  who 
stood  to  lose  the  Turkish  market,  had  a  claim 
to  economic  compensation,  and  in  dealing  with 
this  question  of  compensation  she  was  anxious 
to  arrive  first  at  an  understanding  with  Rou- 
mania.  If  we  made  difficulties  she  would  be- 
gin with  Bulgaria.  The  blackmail  was  ob- 
vious. 

Herr  Riedl,  who  was  out  to  ask  for  a  cus- 
toms union,  was  careful  not  to  mention  these 
words.  He  preferred  a  preferential  tariff. 

He  explained  to  me  at  some  length  that  the 
system  known  as  the  favored  nation  treatment 
had  had  its  day,  and  that  in  future  the  world 
would  advance  to  the  tune  of  the  preferential 
tariff.  Austria  wished  to  inaugurate  the  sys- 
tem, and  it  consisted  in  this:  Austria,  in  re- 


144      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

turn  for  a  certain  limited  quantity  of  our  food 
products — the  quantity  necessary  for  her  own 
consumption — would  allow  us  preference^  and 
we  were  to  do  the  same  for  certain  industrial 
products  from  Austria,  but  we  were  not  to  be 
allowed  to  grant  a  similar  preference  to  other 
nations.  The  system  was  to  be  carried  into 
effect  when  our  existing  commercial  treaties 
expired,  but  we  were  to  conclude  the  agree- 
ment immediately. 

When  I  objected  that  we  should  thus  run 
the  risk  of  having  no  other  state  to  trade  with 
us,  he  recognized  that  this  was  quite  possible. 
Austria  and  Roumania  would  then  have  a 
tariff  war  with  all  the  rest  of  the  world.  And 
when  I  said  that  all  it  meant  was  our  entry 
into  a  customs  union  with  Austria,  he  was 
obliged  to  admit  that  I  was  right. 

I  pointed  out  to  him  that  his  system  had 
not  been  tried  anywhere,  and  he  instanced 
the  preferential  tariffs  of  Canada  and  South 
Africa  in  favor  of  England.  "But  they  are 
parts  of  the  British  Empire,"  I  said,  "and 
Roumania  is  a  state  independent  of  Austria." 
He  pretended  not  to  understand  my  objec- 
tion. At  bottom  he  knew  well  enough  that 
for  us  to  enter  a  customs  union  with  Austria 
would  mean  the  loss  of  our  independence. 


HERR  RIEDL  145 

Probably  he  thought  that  we  should  be  flat- 
tered by  this  prospect. 

I  proved  to  him  at  length  why  we  never 
could  accept  his  system,  and  I  explained  to 
him  that  we  meant  to  develop  our  industries. 
I  told  him  we  wished  to  control  our  own  tariff 
system,  and  that  as  for  our  cereals,  our  wood 
and  our  petrol,  we  could  export  them  every- 
where, especially  to  the  west  and  to  Germany, 
without  any  preference  in  the  Austrian  mar- 
ket. I  added  that  we  clung  too  tightly  to  our 
political  and  economic  independence  to  be 
tempted  by  the  dole  of  a  little  extra  profit  on 
our  cereals. 

Then  he  let  his  imagination  loose.  He  told 
me  that  the  world  could  no  longer  continue 
as  it  was,  that  Europe  must  organize  herself 
against  the  tyranny  of  pirate  powers  and  of 
America. 

He  divided  old  Europe  into  three  groups. 
The  first,  composed  of  England  and  France, 
were  pirate  states,  which  lived  not  by  their 
own  production  but  by  exploiting  colonies. 
He  developed  this  nonsense  with  so  much 
gravity  and  emphasis  that  I  had  greatly  diffi- 
culty in  preventing  myself  from  laughing. 
The  two  pirate  states  ought  to  be  hunted  out 


146      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

of  the  European  market  and  isolated  and  left 
to  pine  alone. 

The  second  group  consisted  of  Russia,  who 
had  no  right  to  remain  in  Europe.  She  ought 
to  be  hunted  into  Asia,  or  at  any  rate  banished 
beyond  Moscow.  Russia  ought  to  be  cut  off 
from  the  Baltic  and  from  the  Black  Sea,  and 
thus  reduced,  should  be  left  to  her  proper  eco- 
nomic fate. 

The  rest  of  Europe  was  to  be  organized  into 
a  great  tariff  union,  of  which  the  Austro- 
Roumanian  agreement  was  to  be  the  corner- 
stone. He  said  that  Austria  would  take  upon 
herself  to  get  the  consent  of  Germany  to  his 
scheme.  Once  this  was  done,  Switzerland, 
Italy,  Belgium,  and  Holland,  the  states  of  the 
north  and  the  states  cut  away  from  Russia 
would  be  compelled  to  enter  this  union,  and 
the  world  would  be  transformed. 

When  I  objected  that  Germany  had  much 
to  lose  in  such  an  arrangement,  as  she  risked 
forfeiting  that  oversea  commerce  which  played 
so  great  a  part  in  her  national  economy,  he 
replied  that  it  was  precisely  in  order  to  fight 
the  United  States  that  the  new  organization 
of  Europe  had  become  necessary.  And  he  let 
himself  go  about  the  American  invasion,  the 
American  danger,  and  so  on. 


HERR  RIEDL  147 

He  was  immensely  astonished  when  I  told 
him  that  I  saw  nothing  to  worry  about  in  the 
development  of  America,  that  it  was  perfectly 
natural,  and  that  the  hegemony  of  the  white 
races  would  pass  to  the  other  side  of  the  At- 
lantic. 

"Just  think,"  I  said.  "The  nations  over 
there  are  not  hampered  by  our  military  slav- 
ery, our  prejudices,  our  monarchies,  our  aris- 
tocracies. For  this  reason  they  are  greatly 
superior  to  us,  and  it  is  impossible  that  they 
should  not  get  the  upper  hand." 

At  that  moment  I  was  not  able  to  add  the 
strongest  argument  of  all — the  madness  of  a 
universal  war,  which  has  brought  the  transfer 
of  this  hegemony  nearer  by  half  a  century. 

I  think  this  was  the  climax  for  Herr  Riedl. 
He  realized  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  done 
with  me,  and  though  he  still  paid  calls  and 
pretended  to  take  quite  seriously  the  promises 
made  to  him  of  examining  his  system  care- 
fully, he  was  under  no  illusions,  and  went  back 
to  Vienna. 

I  have  never  heard  of  him  since. 


Count  Szeczen 


XV 
COUNT  SZECZEN 

COUNT  SZECZEN  was  the  last  Austro-Hun- 
garian  ambassador  in  Paris,  and  we  must  hope 
he  will  remain  the  last.  Whatever  survives 
of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy,  if  by  ill  fortune 
anything  does  survive,  will  never  be  able  to 
afford  the  luxury  of  having  an  ambassador. 

There  is  nothing  either  good  or  bad  about 
Count  Szeczen  which  makes  him  stand  out. 
He  is  just  one  of  those  many  Counts  out  of 
which  the  Dual  Empire  manufactured  diplo- 
matists. If  he  took  the  trouble  to  look  at 
my  souvenirs  he  would  find  out  that  he  was 
the  first  Hapsburg  diplomat  to  appear  to  me 
under  a  new  and  purely  Magyar  form.  Since 
then  I  have  seen  many  more  of  them.  But 
before  I  met  Count  Szeczen  I  had  only  met 
what  are  called  "Kaiserlicks"  even  among  the 
Magyars.  My  memory  of  Szeczen  is  distinct 
because  of  that.  Even  twenty  years  ago, 
though  he  represented  the  Dual  Monarchy 
and  received  his  instructions  from  Vienna,  he 

151 


152      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

was  Magyar,  very  Magyar  and  nothing  but 
Magyar.  At  the  time  of  which  I  am  speaking 
he  was  first  secretary  of  the  Legation  of 
Bucharest,  under  Count  Goluchowsky.  There 
was  an  agitation  at  the  time  in  our  country 
over  the  Roumanians  in  Hungary.  The 
Magyars  had  made  harsher  the  rule  to  which 
they  subjected  non-Magyar  nationalities  in 
their  midst,  and  naturally  we  were  not  able 
to  hide  the  sense  of  bitterness  which  Magyar 
injustice  left  in  our  souls.  The  press  was 
violent  and  all  sorts  of  demonstrations  took 
place. 

Similarly  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment began  to  take  umbrage,  and  the  Rou- 
manian Government,  of  which  I  was  a  mem- 
ber, did  not  know  which  way  to  turn. 

I  was  very  intimate  with  Count  Szeczen. 
We  saw  each  other  constantly,  and  tacitly 
agreed  never  to  touch  on  the  question  of  the 
Roumanians  in  Hungary.  This  often  was 
awkward,  but  we  pretended  not  to  be  aware 
of  it.  Our  intimacy  was  only  possible  on 
these  terms. 

One  day  Count  Szeczen  broke  the  silence. 
An  incident  had  occurred  which  was  of  no  par- 
ticular gravity,  but  it  was  something  Count 
Szeczen  could  not  swallow.  I  think  a  Hun- 


COUNT  SZECZEN  153 

garian  flag  had  been  torn  up.  He  had  just 
had  luncheon  with  me,  and  he  made  up  his 
mind  to  speak  to  me  as  soon  as  we  were  alone 
together  in  my  study.  He  began  bitterly  by 
imputing  motives  of  tolerance  or  complicity 
to  our  Government,  as  we  had  not  taken 
action  against  the  demonstrators,  and,  warm- 
ing up,  he  said  word  for  word  almost  as  fol- 
lows: "You  are  now  playing  a  dangerous 
game.  You  accept  the  axiom  that  we  can 
never  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia 
and  you  count  on  a  future  war  between  us 
and  the  Russians.  Well,  you  are  mistaken. 
If  the  time  ever  comes  that  we  are  convinced 
that  we  cannot  count  on  you  as  the  loyal  ally 
of  the  Magyar  Union,  the  only  state  which 
concerns  us  and  one  which  we  would  defend 
with  the  last  drop  of  our  blood,  we  shall  come 
to  an  understanding  with  Russia.  After  all, 
the  Carpathians  make  a  first-rate  frontier,  and 
Galicia,  Roumania,  Constantinople  even,  are 
as  nothing  when  it  is  a  question  of  preserving 
to  Hungary  its  character  as  a  Magyar  Union. 
Believe  me,  nothing  is  more  possible  than  a 
definite  and  permanent  understanding  between 
Magyars  and  Russians.  We  shall  be  on  one 
slope  of  the  Carpathians,  looking  towards  the 
Adriatic,  they  will  be  on  the  other  slope,  fac- 


ing  towards  the  Black  Sea.  And  that  will  be 
the  end  for  ever  of  the  Roumanian  question, 
not  only  in  Hungary  but  everywhere." 

I  let  Count  Szeczen  unfold  his  scheme.  He 
was  furious,  and  paid  no  heed  to  the  fact  that 
it  was  very  strange  that  an  Austro-Hungarian 
diplomat  should  speak  in  this  way  to  a  Rou- 
manian Minister. 

When  I  replied  that  I  had  never  had  any 
doubt  about  the  hostility  of  Magyar  feeling 
towards  us,  but  that  all  the  same  his  threats 
had  no  effect  on  me,  as  I  did  not  believe  in  the 
possibility  of  a  Russo-Magyar  alliance,  he  saw 
his  mistake  and  stammered  out  an  excuse  that 
was  no  excuse.  As  we  neither  of  us  had  any 
wish  to  quarrel  we  let  the  discussion  drop. 

That  day  Szeczen  had  revealed  to  me  the 
depths  of  his  Magyar  soul.  This  proud  preda- 
tory people  will  never  become  resigned  to  live 
its  own  life  as  a  national  state  like  England, 
France,  Spain  or  Italy.  They  mean  to  domi- 
nate other  nationalities  or  perish.  Any  other 
solution  is  impossible. 

Count  Karolyi's  policy  cannot  be  explained 
in  any  other  way.  It  is  identical  with  that  with 
which  Count  Szeczen  in  an  angry  moment 
threatened  me  more  than  twenty  years  ago. 
Often  what  appears  to  be  new  is  really  old. 


Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace 


XVI 

SIR  DONALD  MACKENZIE  WALLACE 

MANY,  many  years  ago,  during  the  last  period 
of  the  reign  of  the  great  Queen  Victoria,  Sir 
Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace  was  my  guest  at 
Sinaia.  Sir  Donald  was  very  well  known  in 
England.  He  began  life  in  diplomacy,  di- 
rected the  foreign  policy  of  the  Times  for  a 
very  long  period,  was  Lord  Dufferin's  right- 
hand  man  in  India,  and  was  extremely  intimate 
up  till  the  day  of  his  death  with  King  Edward, 
then  Prince  of  Wales.  Sir  Donald  wrote  a 
classic  on  Russia,  a  book  which  has  been  trans- 
lated into  all  languages.  He  was  chosen  by 
King  Edward  to  accompany  King  George, 
then  Prince  of  Wales,  in  his  tour  around  the 
Empire,  and  he  wrote  an  account  of  the  trip. 
He  attended  the  peace  conferences  of  Ports- 
mouth and  Algeciras;  and  at  Petrograd  he 
was  the  guest  of  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson  when 
the  Anglo-Russian  alliance  was  concluded. 

I  have  had  many  interesting  interviews  with 
Sir  Donald  during  my  life.     The  one  I  am 

157 


158      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

about  to  relate  is  of  extraordinary  impor- 
tance. 

We  were  walking  in  a  splendid  forest,  and 
our  conversation  naturally  turned  to  world 
politics.  Sir  Donald  said: 

"The  present  policy  of  the  European  Pow- 
ers is  absurd.  We  are  all  victims  of  the  prej- 
udices of  the  elder  statesmen  who  perpetuate 
the  truths  of  their  youth  which  no  longer  cor- 
respond with  actuality.  For  example,  in 
England  we  are  dominated  by  two  so-called 
axioms,  both  equally  out  of  date.  We  live  in 
dread  of  the  bogey  of  Russia  wishing  to  chase 
us  out  of  India,  and  we  believe  ourselves  the 
eternal  rival  of  France.  Now  all  that  is  un- 
true— utterly  untrue.  There  is  enough  room 
on  Asia  for  England  as  well  as  Russia,  per- 
haps we  already  take  up  more  room  there  than 
the  Asiatics  approve  of.  Anglo-French  riv- 
alry is  a  prehistoric  peep  dating  from  the 
epoch  when  there  were  only  two  great  powers 
in  the  world,  France  and  England.  To-day 
it  means  nothing  whatever.  England  always 
has  been  and  always  must  be  an  essentially 
pacific  power,  essentially  conservative  so 
far  as  international  politics  are  concerned. 
France,  for  a  thousand  reasons,  is  now  an 
equally  pacific  and  conservative  power.  The 


SIR  DONALD  MACKENZIE  WALLACE     159 

only  revolutionary  power  in  international  poli- 
tics is  Germany.  It  is  Germany  who  keeps 
the  world  on  the  alert,  it  is  Germany  alone 
who  threatens  its  peace.  You  may  expect  to 
see  great  changes  when  the  elder  statesmen 
have  given  way  to  another  generation.  You 
will  see  England  become  France's  greatest 
friend,  and  the  famous  antagonism  between 
England  and  Russia  relegated  to  a  museum  of 
antiquities." 

When  Sir  Donald  predicted  this,  speaking 
so  succinctly  and  frankly,  it  was  a  new  point  of 
view.  But  since  then  it  has  all  happened. 

That  evening  we  spoke  of  Roumania,  of  her 
people,  of  her  future.  Sir  Donald  had  studied 
the  question  of  the  Roumanians  in  Hungary 
in  detail.  He  had  even  been  to  Brashov, 
Sibiu  and  Blaj,  the  districts  chiefly  concerned, 
and  had  talked  to  the  representative  Rouma- 
nians living  there. 

Suddenly  he  asked  me  the  great  question: 

"You  have  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Austria 
— you  needn't  deny  it,  I  know  it.  But  do  you 
think  that  when  the  moment  comes  for  you  to 
put  it  into  effect  you  will  be  able  to  do  it? 
Personally  I  cannot  see  how  you  can." 

"I  do  not  know  whether  we  have  a  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Austria  or  not,"  I  replied,  for  I 


160      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

was  bound  to  absolute  secrecy.  "If  it  exists 
I  agree  with  you  no  one  in  the  world  would 
carry  it  into  effect." 

Sir  Donald  must  have  made  a  mental  note 
of  my  statement,  which  was  as  clear  as  his 
own. 

Circumstances  have  shown  that  I,  in  my 
turn,  was  a  true  prophet. 


Baron  Banff y 


XVII 
BARON  BANFFY 

I  SAW  Baron  Banffy,  the  most  overbearing  of 
all  Hungarian  ministers  (and  that  is  saying  a 
good  deal),  but  once.  It  was  in  the  first  days 
of  January,  1896.  Banffy  was  a  big  cheery 
fellow  with  pointed  mustaches,  who  looked 
like  a  Magyarized  edition  of  a  typical  French 
official. 

He  was  a  second  rate  man,  but  in  spite  of 
this  his  extreme  energy  imposed  on  people 
even  when  he  was  expressing  himself  in  a 
language  he  spoke  badly.  Banffy  came  from 
Transylvania,  and  could  speak  Roumanian. 
As  a  prefet  (for  he  had  begun  by  being  a 
prefet)  he  had  served  a  good  apprenticeship 
in  working  the  political  oracle  among  the 
electorate,  first  as  a  district  official  and  later 
on  as  Prime  Minister  of  Hungary. 

When  I  was  in  Vienna  in  January,  1896,  he 
intimated  his  wish  to  make  my  acquaintance 
through  a  Hungarian  deputy  of  the  Independ- 
ent Party.  The  reason  that  the  Hungarian 
Premier  wanted  to  see  me  was  not  far  to  seek. 

163 


164      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

It  was  merely  curiosity.  It  was  because  I  was 
the  first  Roumanian  Minister  to  give  subsidies, 
secret  subsidies,  not  only  to  the  Roumanian 
schools  and  churches  of  Transylvania,  but  also 
to  newspapers  and  political  committees.  In 
order  to  subsidize  the  papers  I  commissioned 
journalists  to  write  class  books  ostensibly  for 
use  in  the  Roumanian  schools  of  Macedonia, 
and  I  paid  for  the  work  right  royally.  I  need 
hardly  explain  that  the  class  books  were  not 
always  written. 

Banffy  after  a  while  had  scented  something 
of  this  political  activity,  of  which,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  my  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Lascar  Ca- 
targi,  were  unaware,  and  I  only  told  him  after 
having  done  it  for  two  and  a  half  years.  He 
did  not  blame  me,  but  my  political  opponents 
in  Roumania  denounced  my  activities,  and  it 
was  in  this  way  that  Banify  came  to  be  cer- 
tain of  what  I  was  up  to.  As  I  had  been 
turned  out  of  office  in  October,  1895,  Banffy 
was  anxious  to  see  the  enemy  of  his  people  at 
close  quarters. 

After  leaving  Vienna  I  stayed  at  Buda- 
pesth,  and  asked  for  an  audience  from  the 
Hungarian  Prime  Minister.  He  received  me 
in  the  wonderful  Royal  Palace  of  Bude,  from 


BARON  BANFFY  165 

which  one  gets  such  a  glorious  view  over  the 
Danube  and  over  Pesth.  Banffy  quite  natu- 
rally spoke  to  me  on  the  subject  of  the  Rou- 
manians in  Hungary. 

He  began  rather  brusquely  by  saying,  "I 
hope  you  are  not  going  to  tell  me  that  you 
don't  want  to  annex  Transylvania."  "No,"  I 
replied,  "I  shall  not  tell  you  that;  if  I  did  you 
would  not  believe  it,  and  would  only  think 
that  you  were  dealing  with  a  liar  or  with  a 
man  who  does  not  love  his  country.  I  want 
to  annex  Transylvania,  but  I  can't  do  it." 

And  then  in  my  turn  I  said  to  him,  "I  hope 
you  are  not  going  to  tell  me  that  you  don't 
wish  to  move  the  frontiers  of  the  Magyar  state 
to  the  Black  Sea."  With  real  good  temper 
Banffy  replied,  "No,  I  won't  tell  you  that.  I 
do  want  to  move  Hungary's  frontier  to  the 
Black  Sea,  but  I  can't  do  it." 

Then  I  said,  "As  the  historical  case  between 
us  cannot  be  settled  either  in  your  favor  or  in 
mine,  and  since  we  are  neighbors,  is  it  not 
possible  for  us  to  find  a  modus  Vivendi?  You 
have  made  the  conditions  for  Roumanians  in 
Hungary  intolerable,  why  don't  you  change 
them?"  " 

Banffy  began  a  series  of  explanations,  one 
falser  than  the  other,  in  order  to  prove  that 


there  had  been  no  oppression.  And  by  way 
of  something  final  he  asked  me  why  Rouma- 
nians in  Hungary  would  not  take  part  iri  elec- 
tions and  would  not  come  to  the  Parliament 
at  Budapesth  to  put  forward  their  grievances. 
I  must  explain  that  at  this  period  the  Rou- 
manians of  Hungary  had  adopted  the  policy 
of  passive  resistance,  which  included  absten- 
tion from  the  farce  known  in  Hungary  as 
elections.  I  looked  Baron  Banff y  straight 
between  the  eyes,  knowing  that  I  was  dealing 
with  a  vain  man  from  whom  one  might  ob- 
tain anything  by  flattering  his  vanity.  "Look 
here,  Baron  Banffy,"  I  said,  "we  both  know 
what  elections  are  in  our  respective  countries. 
Can  you  tell  me  perfectly  truthfully  that  if 
Roumanians  were  to  offer  themselves  for  elec- 
tion and  you  did  not  wish  them  to  be  elected 
there  would  be  a  single  one  who  could  be  re- 
turned against  your  will?"  Banffy  answered, 
"Not  a  single  one  if  I  did  not  wish  it."  Thus 
I  got  him  to  discard  his  little  joke  about 
Roumanians  participating  in  elections,  a  pro- 
ceeding devoid  of  all  sense  unless  Roumanians 
and  Magyars  were  to  come  to  a  mutual  un- 
derstanding. Then  going  back  to  the  idea  of 
a  modus  vivendi,  I  said,  "I  have  no  mandate 
for  the  Roumanians  of  Hungary,  I  am  not 


BARON  BANFFY  167 

speaking  in  their  name,  but  would  it  be  im- 
possible for  you  to  come  to  an  agreement 
similar  to  that  you  have  made  with  the  Saxons 
in  Transylvania  and  in  this  way  protect  their 
churches,  their  schools  and  certain  electoral 
divisions?" 

Banffy  answered  with  the  most  brutal 
frankness :  "As  for  that,  never.  The  Saxons 
in  Transylvania  are  but  230,000  in  number 
and  they  are  more  than  700  miles  from  the 
Germans  of  Germany,  whereas  the  Rouma- 
nians in  Hungary  are  three  and  a  half  mil- 
lions strong  and  are  geographically  contigu- 
ous to  the  Roumanians  of  Roumania.  It  can 
never  be." 

We  continued  to  discuss  the  matter.  I 
asked  him  whether  it  would  not  at  least  be 
possible  to  give  Transylvania  the  same  elec- 
toral franchise  as  Hungary,  and  the  secret 
ballot. 

"Never,"  answered  Banffy  once  again. 

He  rang  and  ordered  the  electoral  map  of 
the  Kingdom  of  Hungary  to  be  brought  in. 

"Look  at  this  map,"  he  said;  "the  purely 
Magyar  areas  of  Hungary  return  'Kossuthist' 
deputies,  that  is  to  say  partisans  of  a  rupture 
with  Austria,  which  would  be  the  end  of 
Magyar  domination.  My  Government,  like 


the  governments  that  have  gone  before  and 
those  which  will  follow  after,  only  exists  be- 
cause of  the  division  amongst  nationalities. 
With  the  secret  ballot  we  should  lose  this 
advantage;  in  short,  we  could  no  longer 
govern." 

After  an  hour  of  useless  talk  Banff y  asked 
me  if  there  was  a  single  point  on  which  we 
agreed. 

"Yes,"  I  said,  "we  are  agreed  that  we 
never  can  agree  on  any  point." 

When  I  rose  to  bid  him  farewell  we  walked 
past  the  window  with  the  view  over  the 
Danube  and  over  Pesth.  "What  a  magnificent 
capital  you  have  there,"  I  remarked.  "Well, 
come  and  take  it,"  gaily  answered  Banffy. 

"Even  if  I  could,  I  never  would  take  it; 
but  its  occupation  is  quite  another  matter," 
said  I. 

Most  of  this  conversation  with  Baron 
Banff  y  has  already  appeared  in  the  pages  of 
Sir  Mount  Stuart  Grant  Duff's  diary.  I  had 
told  him  about  it  in  London  some  years  after 
it  happened. 

Never  have  I  had  so  clear  and  categorical 
an  explanation  from  any  Hungarian  states- 
man of  the  irremediable  antagonism  of  our 
two  points  of  view. 


Roumanian  Policy 


XVIII 

ROUMANIAN  POLICY 

IN  1908  I  was  dining  at  the  house  of  a  great 
friend  in  Paris.  There  were  a  number  of 
people  there,  amongst  them  two  former 
French  Foreign  Ministers.  If  they  read  this 
they  will  remember  the  conversation  I  am 
about  to  relate. 

One  of  them,  whom  we  will  call  X,  was  a 
widely  erudite  man  and  a  writer  of  great  tal- 
ent, but  the  sort  of  nature  which  does  not  re- 
tain its  impressions.  The  other,  Y,  was  con- 
centrated by  nature  and  spoke  little  and 
seldom. 

After  dinner,  when  most  of  the  guests  had 
gone  off  to  listen  to  music,  we  three  found 
ourselves  alone  in  the  study. 

We  talked  of  Roumania,  which  had  just 
made  an  act  of  unnecessary  submission  to 
Austria,  and  X  suddenly  exclaimed: 

"The  more  I  think  about  it,  the  less  I  under- 
stand the  policy  of  Roumania.  You  have  no 
chance  of  becoming  a  great  nation  except  at 

171 


172      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Hungary's  expense.  Yet  you  are  the  allies  of 
Hungary;  for  make  no  mistake,  Austria  no 
longer  exists.  In  reality  you  are  in  the  first 
place  allies  of  Hungary,  and  in  the  second 
place  allies  of  Germany.  It  is  impossible  for 
me  to  understand  your  policy." 

"Do  you  understand  the  policy  of  Italy?" 
I  asked. 

"Of  course,"  X  replied,  "it  is  the  policy  of 
fear." 

"And  why  do  you  think  that  Italy  is  the 
only  country  that  is  afraid?" 

Y,  who  had  said  nothing,  began  to  speak. 
He  recognized  that  the  policy  of  Roumania 
was  to  be  explained  by  fear,  and  the  conversa- 
tion turned  on  the  profound  difference  be- 
tween the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple 
Entente.  In  the  Triple  Alliance,  or  rather 
the  Austro-German  alliance,  there  was  com- 
plete unity  of  control,  as  Berlin  alone  was  in 
command;  in  the  Triple  Entente  the  bonds 
were  so  intangible  that  it  was  difficult  at  the 
moment  to  rely  on  them. 

"What  can  we  do,"  asked  X,  "in  order  to 
show  you  the  great  interest  we  take  in  your 
happenings  and  in  your  future?" 

Y  then  said,  "All  we  can  do  for  Roumania 
is  to  help  her  to  become  strong,  so  that  when 


ROUMANIAN  POLICY  173 

the  day  of  the  great  catastrophe  arrives  and 
she  has  to  make  her  choice,  she  may  choose 
with  perfect  freedom." 

I  thanked  these  two  ex-ministers,  and  told 
them  that  in  spite  of  the  apparent  political 
slavery  of  Roumania  and  in  spite  of  the  diplo- 
matic folly  she  had  just  perpetrated,  a  folly 
that  consisted  in  informing  Sofia  that  she 
would  be  obliged  to  intervene  if  Bulgaria  took 
advantage  of  troubles  in  Constantinople  to  at- 
tack Turkey — in  spite  of  these  things  I  prom- 
ised that  Roumania's  choice  would  be  made  in 
perfect  freedom. 

My  friends  must  now  see  I  was  right,  and 
they  cannot  regret  the  support  given  us  by 
France  in  1913. 


Tragedy 


XIX 

TRAGEDY 

THE  scene  was  London,  on  the  27th  of  July, 
1914. 

In  spite  of  the  pacific  assurances  which  had 
in  all  good  faith  been  given  me  that  morning 
by  Prince  Lichnowsky,  who  had  been  studi- 
ously kept  in  ignorance  of  the  warlike  designs 
of  the  Emperor,  I  saw  the  world  war  ap- 
proaching and  I  was  gripped  by  the  horror  of 
it.  The  last  chance  of  salvation  lay  in  adopt- 
ing the  English  proposal  for  a  conference  of 
the  four  Great  Powers,  but  that  had  come  to 
nothing,  owing  to  Germany's  refusal  to  take 
any  part  in  it. 

Although  I  was  convinced  that  no  one 
would  ever  make  the  Roumanian  army  fight 
side  by  side  with  Hungarian  troops,  yet  I  was 
anxious,  for  I  could  not  foresee  how  the  war 
would  open,  or  be  certain  that  Germany  and 
Austria  would  not,  by  some  diabolic  stroke  of 
ingenuity,  arrange  things  in  such  a  way  as  to 
force  Russia  to  declare  war  herself. 

177 


178      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Not  having  the  text  of  our  treaty  of  alliance 
under  my  eyes,  I  could  not  be  sure  that  we 
could  escape  its  entanglements  without  ap- 
pearing to  violate  the  letter  of  our  engage- 
ment. In  particular  I  could  not  recall  exactly 
how  the  key  phrase,  "without  provocation  on 
her  part,"  was  worded. 

In  the  afternoon  I  asked  my  old  friend,  the 
Italian  Ambassador  in  London,  the  Marquis 
Imperiali,  to  come  and  see  me.  Having  played 
an  important  part  in  affairs  in  his  own  coun- 
try, I  felt  sure  he  would  know  the  text  of  the 
Italian  treaty,  the  provisions  of  which  were 
identical  with  those  of  the  Roumanian  treaty 
which  I  had  read  through  in  June,  1908. 

We  talked  together  for  a  long  while  over 
the  grave  peril  that  threatened  European 
civilization.  We  hoped  against  all  hope.  We 
even  imagined  we  had  discovered  catchwords 
which  would  make  the  war  impossible,  so 
monstrous  did  it  all  seem  to  us. 

But  we  did  more  than  this,  for  we  also  dis- 
cussed the  war  as  a  real  possibility.  It  did  not 
take  us  long  to  find  out,  firstly,  that  we  were 
completely  agreed  that  if  war  did  break  out 
the  blame  would  be  entirely  with  Germany 
and  the  Magyars,  and  secondly,  that  the  fate 


TRAGEDY  179 

of  the  world  for  generations  to  come  must  de- 
pend on  the  result  of  the  war. 

We  both  were  clearly  of  opinion  that  in  the 
event  of  a  German  victory  the  future  of 
Roumania  as  well  as  Italy  would  be  seriously 
compromised,  if  not  destroyed.  Supposing 
Germany  and  Austria  to  be  the  victors,  all  the 
risorgimento,  all  the  battles  and  sacrifices  of 
the  Italian  people  would  be  in  vain.  For 
Roumania  a  German  victory  meant  even  more 
than  this,  it  meant  sudden  death,  while  Italy 
at  the  worst  might  accustom  herself  to  slow 
strangulation. 

We  believed  in  the  wisdom  of  our  respective 
Governments,  and  we  also  felt  certain  that  if 
our  rulers  attempted  to  force  our  people  to 
fight  side  by  side  with  the  enemies  of  all 
liberal  civilization,  our  people  would  resist. 
All  the  .same  we  asked  ourselves,  in  our 
wretchedness,  whether  by  the  literal  interpre- 
tation of  treaties  we  were  obliged  to  acquiesce 
in  race-suicide. 

The  Marquis  Imperiali  had  read  the  treaty 
— as  a  matter  of  fact  he  had  done  so  before  I 
did — and  we  tried  together  to  reconstitute  the 
text,  but  we  could  not  do  it.  I  shall  never 
forget  our  despair,  our  misery,  at  not  being 
able  to  say  with  certainty  what  the  exact  word- 


180      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

ing  of  the  treaty  really  was.  Yet  on  the  letter 
of  the  treaty — for,  remember,  we  had  not  yet 
become  acquainted  with  the  "scrap  of  paper" 
doctrine — depended  our  honor  and  our  future. 

"What  a  tragedy!"  we  said  to  each  other. 

We  both  felt  tears  trickling  down  our  faces, 
and  we  were  not  ashamed  of  them;  but  our 
talk  came  to  an  end;  and  with  a  prolonged 
hand-grip  we  said  farewell. 

I  have  never  seen  the  Marquis  Imperiali 
since  that  day,  but  when  he  reads  this  he  will 
forgive  me  for  having  preserved  the  memory 
of  his  tears.  We  wept  together. 


Count  Tisza 


XX 

COUNT  TISZA 

IN  the  great  war  Count  Tisza  was  the  strong- 
est statesman  the  Central  Powers  had.  He 
was  the  prime  mover  in  unchaining  the  con- 
flict. Tisza  provoked  the  universal  carnage, 
but  without  the  backing  of  Berlin  he  would 
not  have  dared  to  do  it,  and  therefore  the  real 
criminal  must  be  looked  for  in  Berlin.  He 
ran  the  war  with  an  energy  worthy  of  a  bet- 
ter cause,  and  paid  for  his  crime  with  his  life. 
The  punishment  has  been  carried  out,  so  the 
case  for  the  prosecution  is  closed. 

I  only  met  Tisza  once,  twenty  years  ago. 
He  was  then  chairman  of  the  board  of  a 
Budapesth  bank  which  did  business  with  an 
industrial  company  in  Roumania  of  which  I 
was  chairman.  We  talked  business  and  travel, 
not  a  word  of  politics.  But  this  short  con- 
versation sufficed  to  give  me  an  idea  of  his 
personality.  He  was  strong  in  every  sense  of 
the  word.  Cold  as  the  blade  of  a  knife;  with 
a  will  of  extreme  brutality,  and  a  demeanor 

183 


184      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

as  serious  as  an  English  non-conformist  min- 
ister's. 

Though  he  was  a  strong  man  he  could  never 
be  a  popular  one.  He  had  no  magnetism,  no 
emotional  quality,  no  outward  sign  of  the  di- 
vine fire,  none  of  the  things  that  enable  a  public 
man  to  influence  a  crowd. 

I  have  often  wondered  how  it  was  possible 
for  so  strong  a  man  to  blunder  so  badly.  He 
committed  the  unspeakable  crime  of  provoking 
a  War  that  would  end  Magyar  domination, 
which,  in  Tisza's  eyes,  was  synonymous  with 
Magyar  patriotism.  There  evidently  must 
have  been  several  reasons  why  Tisza  made 
such  a  mistake,  but  Magyar  megalomania  is 
not  the  least  of  them. 

The  recollection  of  my  solitary  conversa- 
tion with  Tisza  helps  me,  however,  to  under- 
stand this  psychological  problem. 

The  intellectual  isolation  in  which  Tisza 
lived  may  have  had  something  to  say  to  it,  too, 
for  it  prevented  him  from  realizing  what  was 
happening  in  other  countries.  In  talking  with 
him  I  asked  him  whether  it  was  long  since  he 
had  visited  the  west  of  Europe.  He  answered 
me  that  it  was  seven  years  since  he  had  left 
Austria-Hungary  and  that  he  felt  no  need 
ever  to  leave  it  again. 


COUNT  TISZA  185 

I  should  die  if  I  went  in  for  the  same 
e"  I  said.  "I  leave  Roumania  three 
times  a  year  and  pass  four  months  in  West- 
ern Europe,  and  look  upon  these  journeys  as 
a  necessity — a  sort  of  intellectual  hygiene. 

"If  we  stay  at  home  too  long  our  horizon 
contracts.  Little  local  questions  assume  an 
importance  which  they  do  not  really  possess. 
One  must  treat  events  in  the  political  world  as 
one  does  Mont  Blanc;  if  one  wishes  to  ap- 
preciate its  size,  one  must  go  away  from  it. 
I  have  to  cross  the  frontier  in  order  to  under- 
stand how  small  are  the  questions  which  at 
Bucharest  seem  to  me  of  the  first  magnitude." 

Tisza  listened  to  me,  but  did  not  under- 
stand. He  was  satisfied  with  knowing  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  more  espe- 
cially the  Kingdom  of  Hungary,  and  from 
that  standpoint  to  judge  the  course  of  human 
events. 

This  political  myopia  must  have  blinded  the 
strongest  man  the  Central  Empires  possessed 
and  led  him  to  unloose  a  war  in  which  were 
to  founder  the  hegemony  of  his  race,  the  inter- 
ests of  his  caste  and  his  own  historical  reputa- 
tion. 

One  must  at  any  rate  do  this  much  justice 


186      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

to  Tisza.  He  made  his  exit  from  the  scene 
better  than  the  two  Emperors  who  had  banded 
themselves  together  against  the  liberty  of  the 
world. 


Talaat  Pasha 


XXI 

TALAAT  PASHA 

TALAAT  PASHA  was  the  strongest  man  of  the 
Young  Turk  Party.  Djavid  was  better  in- 
formed, Djemal  more  cultured,  Enver  made 
more  noise,  but  Talaat,  without  doubt,  had 
more  strength  of  character.  He  was  a  Turk, 
but  a  Turk  trying  to  be  a  modern  man  with- 
out, however,  imitating  the  externals  of  a 
European.  He  was  uneducated;  had  read 
hardly  anything,  had  traveled  very  little,  and 
knew  none  of  those  things  which  are  a  com- 
mon bond  among  public  men  in  Western 
countries.  Talaat  made  up  for  all  these  defi- 
ciencies by  a  will  of  iron,  indomitable  courage, 
and  by  a  quality  which  is  unusual  among 
Turks,  a  quickness  of  decision  and  a  firmness 
in  execution  which  had  nothing  Oriental  about 
them. 

Like  all  the  Young  Turks,  Talaat  was  a 
Jingo.  When  I  saw  him  for  the  second  time 
on  my  return  from  Athens  in  November, 
1913,  where  I  had  assisted  in  the  conclusion 

189 


of  peace  between  Turkey  and  Greece,  Talaat 
explained  to  me  how  he  had  plotted  and 
brought  about  the  recapture  of  Adrianople  in 
1913.  It  was  a  wonderful  example  of  rash- 
ness and  of  resolution.  In  twenty-four  hours 
he  had  forced  his  will  upon  the  Cabinet,  the 
Generals  and  the  Great  Powers,  in  order  to 
procure  the  necessary  money  to  carry  out  an 
expedition  which  the  Bulgarians  could  easily 
have  turned  into  a  disaster  for  the  Turks  had 
they  wished  to  do  so.  On  the  eve  of  this  coup 
Talaat  had  found  few  people  to  approve  of  it, 
on  the  morrow  everyone  was  his  accomplice. 
"As  to  the  Great  Powers,"  said  he  to  me,  "I 
knew  that  they  would  not  move,  and  that  the 
very  audacity  of  the  thing  would  force  it  on 
them.  I  shall  soon  do  the  same  thing  when  I 
suppress  the  capitulations.  We  do  not  mean 
to  have  those  capitulations  any  more.  I  know 
quite  well  that  Europe  will  protest,  but  she 
will  not  act."  He  showed  the  same  determin- 
ation in  discussing  the  Sultan.  I  had  asked 
him  if  the  Sultan  or  the  heir-apparent  might 
not  wish  to  recover  the  powers  of  former 
sovereigns.  "We  will  never  allow  him  to," 
replied  Talaat.  "We  are  the  masters,  and  if 
a  Sultan  thinks  he  is  going  to  run  things  as 
he  pleases  we  shall  simply  depose  him." 


TALAAT  PASHA  191 

These  qualities  of  Talaat's  were  spoilt  by  a 
spirit  of  party  prejudice,  which  we  in  the  west 
find  some  difficulty  in  realizing.  For  example, 
when  after  my  return  from  Athens  I  was 
discussing  with  Talaat  a  proposal  for  an 
understanding  between  Turkey  and  Greece 
about  which  Venizelos  had  charged  me  to 
sound  the  Turks,  I  felt  that  party  interests 
more  than  anything  else  lay  behind  the  argu- 
ments which  Talaat  used  to  me  in  countering 
my  proposal.  Talaat  would  have  liked  to  raise 
the  popularity  of  the  Young  Turk  Party  by 
striking  at  a  neighbor,  and  his  Greek  neigh- 
bor seemed  to  him  the  easiest  to  hit  without 
incurring  too  big  a  risk. 

When  I  saw  Talaat  for  the  first  time  he 
impressed  me  by  his  thoroughly  un-Turkish 
characteristics.  Early  in  November,  1913,  I 
went  from  Sinaia  to  Athens  under  the  pretext 
of  a  pleasure  trip,  but  in  reality  to  try  to 
induce  Turkey  to  make  peace  with  Greece. 
Turkey  was  being  encouraged  in  her  attitude 
by  Bulgaria,  and  thought  of  nothing  less  than 
restarting  the  Balkan  war.  My  friend 
Venizelos  was  of  opinion  that  my  going  there 
might  perhaps  cause  the  Turks  to  pause  in 
their  insane  project. 

I  said  nothing  about  my  intentions  to  any- 


one  in  Roumania  except  King  Charles,  with 
whom  I  arranged  that  if  I  succeeded  the  credit 
of  it  should  go  to  Roumania,  but  that  if  I 
failed  the  blame  should  be  mine  for  having 
undertaken  a  mission  which  no  one  had 
charged  me  with. 

I  asked  an  old  friend,  a  Roumanian  of 
Macedonia,  formerly  in  the  Young  Turk  Gov- 
ernment, Batzaria  by  name,  to  meet  me  at 
Constantinople,  where  I  only  intended  stop-4 
ping  a  couple  of  hours.  I  wanted  him  to 
tell  his  friend  Talaat,  whom  I  did  not  at  that 
time  know,  what  a  dangerous  game  the  Turks 
and  Bulgarians  were  playing,  and  how  de- 
termined Roumania  was  not  to  tolerate  a  new 
conflagration  in  the  Balkans.  To  my  great 
surprise  Talaat  himself  turned  up.  He  made 
a  good  impression  on  me.  We  talked  for 
more  than  an  hour.  He  complained  that  my 
going  to  Athens  at  such  a  moment  looked  like 
a  demonstration  against  Turkey.  I  replied 
that  I  certainly  intended  to  demonstrate  in 
favor  of  peace  and  against  Turkey  if  she  al- 
lowed herself  to  be  worked  up  by  Bulgar 
intrigues,  and  added  that  Roumania  was  de- 
termined to  strike  at  anybody,  no  matter 
whom,  who  disturbed  the  peace  of  Bucharest, 
and  that  she  was  quite  in  a  position  to  do  so. 


TALAAT  PASHA  193 

Talaat  was  much  moved,  and  we  at  length 
reached  a  point  at  which  he  requested  me  to 
act  as  arbitrator  between  the  Turks  and  the 
Greeks  on  all  the  questions  which  divided 
them — and  they  were  very  numerous — ques- 
tions which  had  brought  about  a  complete 
deadlock  in  the  negotiations  at  Athens.  I  ac- 
cepted the  mission,  and,  as  is  well  known,  I 
succeeded.  But  at  this  interview  I  said  to 
Talaat  that  he  must  prove  to  me  that  he  rep- 
resented something  different  from  the  old  Tur- 
key, and  must  do  so  by  undertaking  to  push 
the  affair  through  in  three  days.  He  agreed 
to  this  stipulation,  an  almost  unheard-of  pro- 
ceeding for  a  Turk,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact 
everything  was  put  through  in  Athens  in  six 
days,  though  not  without  difficulties  and 
worries  which  need  not  be  detailed  now. 

Talaat  promised  to  return  the  visit  which  I 
had  paid  to  him  on  my  way  back  from  Athens, 
and  came  to  Bucharest  in  the  Spring  of  1914, 
when  I  was  no  longer  a  member  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. He  made  the  same  impression  on 
me,  of  being  a  determined  man,  energetic  and 
brave,  but  completely  ignorant  of  European 
men  and  affairs. 

The  last  time  I  saw  him  was  at  Sinaia,  and 


194      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

I  then  realized  that  his  blindness  must  in  the 
long  run  prove  fatal  to  Turkey. 

It  is  well  known  that  in  spite  of  the  peace 
which  I  had  succeeded  in  negotiating  at  Athens 
the  question  of  the  islands  remained  to  be 
settled  between  Turkey  and  Greece.  This 
matter  was  not  by  its  nature  a  question  for 
Roumanian  arbitration,  but  for  settlement  by 
the  Great  Powers. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  great  European 
war,  when  I  was  still  at  my  villa  in  Sinaia,  I 
learned  that  Talaat,  accompanied  by  Hakki, 
then  president  of  the  Turkish  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  had  arranged  a  meeting  in  Rou- 
mania  with  the  Greek  delegates,  Messrs. 
Zaimis  and  Politis,  to  discuss  the  question  of 
the  islands. 

On  the  way  the  Turkish  delegates  stopped 
two  or  three  days  at  Sofia,  which  was  a  clear 
indication  of  their  intentions;  the  so-called 
negotiations  being  but  a  trap  laid  by  Austria 
and  Germany.  The  discussions  were  carried 
on  at  Bucharest,  but  the  Turkish  delegates, 
under  pretext  of  seeking  country  air,  estab- 
lished themselves  at  Sinaia.  The  truth  is  that 
they  wished  to  be  in  close  touch  with  the  Ger- 
man, Bulgarian  and  Austrian  Ministers  who 
were  then  at  Sinaia. 


TALAAT  PASHA  195 

The  negotiations  did  not  progress;  they 
were  not  meant  to.  The  only  thing  the  Turks 
wanted  was  to  find  a  casus  belli  against  Greece, 
the  sooner  to  bring  about  the  conflagration  in 
the  whole  Balkan  Peninsula. 

Talaat  naively  believed  that  King  Charles, 
who  against  his  will  had  acquiesced  in  the 
neutrality  of  Roumania,  might  still  drag  the 
country  into  a  war  against  Russia  by  allying 
himself  with  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  It  was 
ridiculous,  but  although  Talaat  had  plenty  of 
determination  he  was  quite  ignorant  of  men 
and  things. 

One  incident  in  these  precious  negotiations 
is  worthy  of  being  noted.  It  is,  moreover,  the 
first  and  last  occasion  on  which  I  had  a  really 
serious  talk  with  Talaat. 

One  evening  I  was  in  the  Casino  at  Sinaia, 
having  a  talk  with  the  Russian  and  Italian 
Ministers.  It  was  about  ten  o'clock  at  night, 
when  one  of  my  journalist  friends  came  to 
warn  me  that  the  next  day  the  Turkish  dele- 
gates intended  to  present  an  ultimatum  to  the 
Greek  delegates  at  Bucharest,  and  finish  off 
the  procedings  by  a  declaration  of  war. 

The  very  idea  that  the  Turks,  egged  on  by 
the  Central  Powers  and  by  the  Bulgarians, 
were  about  to  let  loose  a  fresh  Balkan  war 


196      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

from  Bucharest  on  the  hospitable  soil  of  Rou- 
mania  was  hateful  to  me.  At  once  I  cast 
about  for  means  to  prevent  such  a  calamity 
happening.  I  knew  that  Talaat  and  his  col- 
leagues were  certain  to  come  into  the  gambling 
room,  as  they  were  not  due  to  go  to  Bucharest 
until  the  next  morning  at  eight  o'clock,  and  as 
a  matter  of  fact  they  turned  up  soon  after 
eleven  o'clock.  I  at  once  spoke  to  Talaat, 
and  told  him  that  I  must  have  a  word  with 
him.  He  tried  to  put  me  off  by  making  an 
appointment  for  the  following  evening,  after 
his  return  from  Bucharest,  to  which  I  replied 
that  that  would  be  too  late,  that  I  must  speak 
to  him  immediately;  that  the  business  was  one 
of  extreme  urgency,  and  that  the  least  he 
could  do  was  to  accede  to  my  request. 

Much  against  his  will  Talaat  consented,  and 
asked  me  whether  Hakki  could  also  take  part 
in  our  conversation.  Firmly  I  replied  "No," 
but  said  that  if  he  wished  to  communicate 
what  I  said  to  Hakki  that  was  his  own  busi- 
ness, but  that  so  far  as  I  was  concerned  I 
meant  to  speak  to  him  alone. 

Leading  Talaat  off  into  a  corner,  I  made 
him  sit  down  facing  me,  and  the  following 
strange  conversation  began. 

The  general  public  which  crowded  round 


TALAAT  PASHA  197 

the  baccarat  tables  paid  no  attention  to  us, 
but  the  Russian  and  Italian  Ministers,  who 
knew  what  I  was  about,  kept  their  eyes  fixed 
on  our  little  group. 

In  a  sharp  voice  I  told  Talaat  that  I  knew 
of  his  plan  for  the  morrow,  and  that  I  asked 
him,  in  the  name  of  the  respect  which  he 
owed  to  Roumanian  hospitality,  to  give  it  up. 

Talaat  tried  to  stammer  out  that  I  was  mis- 
taken as  to  his  intentions  and  so  on. 

I  replied  that  he  was  wrong  to  deny  it,  as 
I  knew  everything,  whereupon  Talaat  ac- 
knowledged his  scheme,  and  added  that  he 
was  convinced  that  sooner  or  later  Roumania 
would  go  to  war  against  Russia  side  by  side 
with  Turkey  and  Bulgaria. 

Thoroughly  angry,  I  asked  him  whether  he 
had  warned  the  King  of  his  scheme  to  provoke 
war  while  a  guest  on  Roumanian  soil.  He 
admitted  that  he  had  not  done  so,  but  stated 
that  he  knew  that  the  King  remained  favor- 
able to  the  policy  of  war  in  alliance  with  the 
Austro-Germans.  I  then  pressed  Talaat  as 
hard  as  I  could.  Carried  away  by  my  feelings, 
I  gesticulated  in  a  way  I  never  do,  and  so 
completely  forgot  the  consideration  due  to  a 
guest  that  I  told  him  that  Roumania  would 
never  forget  the  insult  which  the  Turkish 


198      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

delegates  were  about  to  offer  her  by  thus 
abusing  Roumanian  hospitality. 

"You  shall  not  do  it  in  Roumania.  I  give 
you  a  fair  warning,  and  believe  me  that  in 
doing  so  I  speak  for  all  Roumania.  If  you  do 
it  you  will  repent  of  it." 

I  pressed  Talaat  so  hard  that  he  ended  by 
giving  me  his  word  of  honor  that  he  would  not 
present  an  ultimatum  to  Greece  next  day  at 
Bucharest.  I  suggested  to  him  to  propose  an 
adjournment  of  the  question  sine  die. 

"All  right,"  said  he,  "provided  the  Greeks 
don't  provoke  me  to-morrow." 

Once  I  got  Talaat's  promise  to  give  up  his 
plan  I  added,  "I  have  given  you  a  warning  and 
you  have  frankly  heeded  me.  Now  I  wish  to 
give  you  a  piece  of  information  and  a  piece  of 
advice.  The  piece  of  information  is  this: 
owing  to  the  ambiguous  language  of  certain 
personages  you  may  perhaps  have  deluded 
yourself  into  thinking  that  circumstances 
might  arise  in  which  Roumania  may  find  her- 
self at  war  against  the  Powers  of  the  Entente. 
Well,  believe  me,  that  will  never  happen,  and 
nobody  in  the  world — understand  me  clearly, 
nobody  in  the  world — is  strong  enough  to  drag 
Roumania  into  a  war  against  the  Powers  of 
the  Entente.  The  exact  opposite  is  not  only 


TALAAT  PASHA  199 

possible  but  is  more  than  probable.  I  give  you 
this  piece  of  information  so  that  you  may  not 
deceive  yourself  in  weighing  the  probabilities 
which  will  decide  the  policy  of  your  country." 

As  Talaat  still  seemed  to  doubt  whether  I 
was  speaking  from  facts,  and  as  he  still  ques- 
tioned me  as  to  the  will  of  the  King,  I  reiter- 
ated my  point  again,  and  said  to  him,  "No  one, 
absolutely  no  one,  is  strong  enough  to  prevent 
Roumania  following  the  policy  dictated  by  her 
national  instinct." 

"And  now  for  the  piece  of  advice,"  I  said 
to  him.  ''Providence  has  not  entrusted  me 
with  the  task  of  looking  after  the  fate  of 
Turkey;  it  is  quite  enough  for  me  to  worry 
about  that  of  my  own  country ;  but  I  will  give 
you  one  piece  of  advice  as  a  true  friend.  Re- 
main neutral.  Never  has  Turkey  had  a  bet- 
ter chance  of  living,  if  she  has  any  vitality  in 
her,  than  by  remaining  neutral  in  this  war. 
In  return  for  your  neutrality  demand  of  the 
Entente  the  guarantee  of  your  independence, 
demand  the  abolition  of  the  capitulations. 
You  will  get  everything,  but  war  can  bring 
you  nothing.  If  you  are  beaten,  and  you  will 
be  beaten,  you  disappear.  If  you  are  vic- 
torious you  will  get  nothing.  A  victorious 
Germany,  even  if  such  a  thing  is  possible,  will 


never  commit  the  folly  you  dream  of,  of  giving 
you  the  Caucasus  or  Egypt.  She  would  take 
them  for  herself  if  she  could;  but  once  more 
this  is  merely  advice,  and  the  day  will  come 
when  you  will  see  whether  it  came  from  a 
friend  or  not." 

The  next  day  at  Bucharest  Talaat  kept  his 
word. 

I  warned  the  Greeks  by  a  letter  sent  to  them 
that  very  night  by  special  messenger,  and  the 
conference  was  adjourned  for  good. 

Since  those  days  I  have  never  seen  Talaat. 
At  the  time  of  the  English  expedition  to 
Gallipoli  I  wrote  to  him  and  asked  him  to 
make  peace  with  the  Entente,  telling  him  that 
it  was  the  last  chance  of  salvation  for  Turkey. 
Talaat  sent  me  a  verbal  reply  to  this  letter  in 
the  Spring  of  1916  by  the  Roumanian  Min- 
ister at  Constantinople,  saying  that  events  had 
proved  that  he  was  right  and  that  I  was 
wrong. 

But  how  do  things  stand  to-day? 


Prince  Von  Billow 


XXII 

PRINCE  VON  BULOW 

I  HAVE  known  many  of  the  men  who  have 
played  an  important  part  in  German  policy. 
Only  three  of  them  gave  me  the  impression 
that  I  had  to  do  with  really  strong  men.  Two 
are  dead,  Kiderlen-Waechter  and  Baron  Mar- 
schall.  The  third  was  Prince  von  Biilow.1 

So  far  from  being  a  man  of  the  past,  like 
the  Goluchowskys  and  the  Berchtolds,  Prince 
von  Biilow  is  at  this  moment  a  man  of  to-day. 
Everything  about  him  is  therefore  of  interest. 
He  has  a  remarkable  mind,  one  of  those  minds 
which  bring  a  man  to  the  front  in  all  countries 
and  in  all  ages.  Of  course  he  thinks  like  a 
German,  like  a  reactionary,  and  like  a  coun- 
try gentleman ;  but  in  spite  of  these  drawbacks 
his  mind  is  of  the  most  brilliant  quality.  He 
possesses  remarkable  clearness  of  vision,  ability 

1  If  the  Germans  had  been  wise  they  would  have  made  Prince 
von  Biilow  their  representative  at  the  Peace  Congress.  He  was 
the  only  man  fit  to  have  been  intrusted  with  the  part  of  repre- 
senting his  country  in  defeat,  which  Talleyrand  played  so  well 
a  century  ago,  and  which  M.  Thiers  sustained  in  1871. 

203 


204      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

to  appreciate  situations,  adroitness  and  under- 
standing. It  is  impossible  to  be  in  his  com- 
pany without  feeling  that  he  is  a  man  whose 
family  position  has  merely  been  an  accessory 
to  a  distinguished  career. 

To  say  that  Prince  von  Billow  is  a  great 
man  would  be  an  exaggeration,  and  I  believe 
that  he  has  sufficient  sense  not  to  claim  any- 
thing of  the  kind.  He  is  even  below  the  level 
of  Kiderlen,  merely  to  instance  another  Ger- 
man, but  he  is  a  strong  man,  thoroughly  able 
to  understand  things  and  to  find  the  best  solu- 
tion of  a  given  problem.  In  the  intellectual 
desert  of  German  public  life  that  alone  is  a 
great  quality. 

Prince  von  Bulow  ic,  also,  a  man  of  great 
personal  charm,  which  is  always  to  the  good, 
and  his  conversation  is  most  entertaining.  Al- 
though one  must  not  expect  Bismarckian 
aphorisms  to  fall  from  his  lips,  yet  his  con- 
versation is  not  tainted  by  any  touch  of 
brutality,  roughness  or  arrogance. 

At  first  sight  one  can  almost  believe  oneself 
to  be  dealing  with  a  Latin,  so  flexible,  so  in- 
sinuatingly frank  and  almost  caressing  is  his 
manner  of  talking,  and  though  it  would  be 
wrong  to  be  taken  in  by  appearance,  the  charm 
is  undeniable. 


PRINCE  VON  BULOW  205 

The  first  time  I  had  a  serious  political  talk 
with  Prince  von  Bulow  was  towards  the  end 
of  the  year  1888.  In  April  he  had  been  ap- 
pointed Minister  at  Bucharest,  and  was  to 
have  remained  there  until  December,  1893. 
He  came  from  Petrograd,  and  was  seemingly 
thoroughly  conversant  with  Russian  affairs, 
and  he  told  me  that  he  had  spent  the  last  few 
weeks  in  the  Russian  capital  studying  the 
Roumanian  question  in  the  archives  of  the 
German  Embassy.  His  studies  had  given 
him,  he  said,  great  confidence  in  the  virtues 
and  ability  of  the  Roumanian  people,  for 
whom  he  foresaw  a  great  future. 

No  doubt  this  was  a  very  good  way  of  be- 
ginning a  conversation  with  me  on  the  prob- 
lems of  European  policy,  in  so  far  as  they 
affected  Roumania  and  the  Roumanian  peo- 
ple, for,  unlike  the  late  Kiderlen,  Prince  von 
Billow  recognized  the  existence  of  the  na- 
tionality question. 

In  this  long  conversation,  which  touched  on 
all  subjects  and  consequently  on  our  own  pub- 
lic men,  we  came  to  talk  about  Cogalniceano, 
who  was  not  only  one  of  our  most  shining 
lights,  but  what  is  more  important,  a  really 
great  man. 

Bulow  did  not  understand  why  Cogalniceano 


206     SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

was  inimical  to  the  policy  of  an  Austro-Ger- 
man  alliance.  He  was  too  intelligent  to  at- 
tribute mean  motives  to  Cogalniceano,  for  he 
knew  his  patriotism,  his  great  soul,  and  his 
high  capacity.  He  was  astonished,  however, 
that  he  seemed  to  take  no  account  of  the  Rus- 
sian danger  for  Roumania  or  see  that  our 
salvation  lay  in  an  alliance  with  Germany,  who 
could  protect  us.  I  answered  Prince  von 
Billow  by  repeating  to  him  as  well  as  I  could 
all  the  arguments  which  Cogalniceano  had 
used  so  many  times  to  me  against  the  policy 
of  an  alliance  with  Austria  and  Germany,  and 
this  in  spite  of  the  genuine  admiration  which 
he  had  at  that  time  for  Germany. 

After  I  had  repeated  these  arguments  to 
Prince  von  Biilow  he  made  a  statement  which 
I  now  record. 

Amongst  other  things,  Cogalniceano  had 
said  to  me,  "This  Austro-German  policy  is 
perfectly  absurd,  because  it  is  based  on  the 
idea  of  a  war  between  Russia  and  Germany. 
Now,  such  a  war  will  never  take  place,  it 
would  be  too  much  against  the  traditions  of 
the  House  of  Prussia  and  too  much  against 
the  interests  of  Germany."  In  1888  this  rea- 
soning seemed  faultless.  "He  is  wrong,"  in- 
terrupted Prince  von  Biilow.  "Under  the  last 


PRINCE  VON  BULOW  207 

reign  M.  Cogalniceano  would  have  been  right, 
but  I  am  anxious  to  make  you  realize  that 
the  new  reign  will  show  a  complete  change  of 
front.  It  will  be  one  of  the  cardinal  points  of 
the  policy  of  the  new  reign  [William  II  had 
been  on  the  throne  since  June,  1888]  to  be  on 
guard  against  Russia.  You  will  soon  see  that 
our  policy  will  not  leave  room  for  doubt  as  to 
this  question." 

Then  the  talk  switched  off  to  other  sub- 
jects, as  invariably  happens  in  the  case  of  con- 
versation without  any  definite  objective. 

Later  oh,  when  I  saw  the  new  Emperor  go 
in  for  a  pro- Polish  policy,  I  understood  that 
Prince  von  Billow  had  not  been  mistaken.  It 
did  not  last  long,  but  what  could  last  long  in 
the  case  of  an  absolute  Monarch  who  is  strong 
enough  to  wish  to  guide  everything  and  not 
strong  enough  to  be  able  to  do  so?  Anyway 
the  fact  stands  that  this  first  talk  of  mine  with 
Prince  von  Biilow  (and  I  have  had  many 
others  since  then)  remains  deeply  engraved  in 
my  memory.  It  explained  to  me  many  things 
which  have  happened  during  the  last  twenty- 
eight  years. 

Dr.  Dillon,  the  very  distinguished  writer, 
has  lately  published  in  an  English  review  a 
most  interesting  account  of  Prince  von 


208      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Billow's  intrigues  for  the  entanglement  of 
Italy,  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  her  honor 
and  her  national  will,  in  the  war. 

This  article  has  been  republished  in  the 
Roumanian  papers,  and  has  given  its  readers 
a  welcome  opportunity  of  getting  a  good  idea 
of  German  methods  in  neutral  countries.  It 
is  the  first  instance  in  modern  history  in  which 
a  foreign  power  has  mixed  itself  up  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  another  country  on  so  great 
a  scale;  has  bought  political  honor  like  mer- 
chandise in  the  market  place,  and  has  framed 
real  plots  against  a  foreign  state  and  its 
sovereign  will. 

When  one  reads  it  all  one  shivers  at  the  idea 
of  what  the  fate  of  Europe,  the  fate  of  hu- 
manity would  have  been  if  the  Nero  of  Berlin 
had  been  the  conqueror  in  this  war.  For- 
tunately it  is  now  no  more  than  a  bad  dream. 

One  regrets  that  Prince  von  Bulow  ever 
thought  it  his  duty  to  be  mixed  up  in  so  un- 
savory a  business.  Even  patriotism  cannot 
excuse  everything.  Civilization  also  has  its 
rights,  though  modern  Germany  repudiates 
this  idea;  for  her  doctrine  is  that  German  in- 
terests are  superior  to  right,  honor,  decency 
and  humanity,  and  if  we  hold  the  same  ideas 
on  these  questions  as  Germany,  how  can  we 


PRINCE  VON  BULOW  209 

explain  the  sacred  indignation  which  burns  in 
every  breast? 

Von  Biilow  deserved  a  better  fate.  He  had 
shown  himself  one  of  the  most  brilliant  men  of 
present-day  Germany,  and,  in  spite  of  his 
book,  remained  in  comparison  with  his  con- 
temporaries on  a  pedestal. 

Prince  von  Biilow  had  one  great  merit  in 
the  eyes  of  those  who  think,  for  he  was  the 
first  German  Minister  who  dared  to  put  the 
Kaiser  in  his  place.  In  an  autocratic  country 
where  Parliament  is  nothing,  where  the  First 
Minister  of  the  Crown  is  chosen  by  the 
Sovereign,  and  is  responsible  only  to  the 
Sovereign  and  can  be  dismissed  by  the 
Sovereign  without  it  being  possible  for  the  na- 
tion— as  in  the  case  of  Venizelos — to  compel 
his  return;  in  a  country  whose  political  or- 
ganization was  out  of  date  by  several  centuries, 
the  courage  of  this  act  was  astonishing.  Prince 
von  Billow's  celebrated  speech  was  received 
with  a  general  psean  of  admiration.  In  the 
course  of  that  ovation,  with  masterly  skill  he 
taunted  his  Sovereign  with  useless  speechify- 
ing, and  undertook  in  the  presence  of  a  phan- 
tom parliament  that  the  Monarch  should  not 
repeat  his  mistake.  It  was  a  first  step,  a 
modest  step,  it  is  true,  but  the  first  step  to- 


210      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

wards  popular  government  in  Germany.  This 
criticism  of  the  Emperor  in  the  Reichstag  was 
the  dawn  of  a  revolution,  a  revolution  de- 
signed to  save  Germany  and  the  world  from 
the  absurd  regime  which  could  only  result  in 
the  horrors  of  the  great  war. 

And  why  was  the  attempt  not  followed  up? 
Why  did  it  fail? 

Perhaps  Prince  von  Bulow  never  formed  a 
clear  estimate  of  the  enormity  of  his  daring. 
Who  knows  whether  he  was  not  even  alarmed 
by  it  himself?  It  is  difficult  for  the  soul  of 
the  free  man  to  emerge  from  generations  who 
have  indulged  in  the  fetish  worship  of  mon- 
archy. 

What  is  certain  is  that  the  Kaiser  watched 
von  Biilow  like  a  cat  on  the  pounce  to  take  his 
revenge.  The  day  the  Chancellor  committed 
the  mistake  of  making  up  to  our  Nero  in  the 
hope  that  he  would  forget  this  salutary  though 
distasteful  reprimand,  William  realized  that 
von  Biilow  was  no  Cromwell,  not  even  a  Bis- 
marck, and  he  decided  to  make  him  undergo 
the  fate  of  Seneca,  though  in  a  modern  fash- 
ion. In  the  same  Reichstag  in  which  von 
Biilow  had  allowed  himself  to  speak  on  one 
occasion  as  if  to  an  assembly  of  free  men,  the 
Emperor  raised  against  him  a  reactionary 


PRINCE  VON  BULOW  £11 

intrigue,  and  he  fell.  The  rest  of  the  story  is 
well  known.  Prince  von  Biilow  retired  with 
a  great  deal  of  dignity  and  without  sulking. 

He  divided  his  time  between  Norderney  and 
Rome.  From  the  Eternal  City  he  watched 
with  a  fine  sense  of  irony  the  performances  of 
his  former  master,  whose  inevitable  collapse 
he  foresaw  might  take  place  any  day. 

When  the  collapse  came  Nero  recalled 
Seneca  and  demanded  of  him  the  supreme 
sacrifice,  a  harikari,  not  of  his  body,  but  of  his 
reputation  and  of  his  name  in  history. 

Prince  von  Biilow  must  be  congratulated 
that  his  patriotism  got  the  better  of  a  very 
proper  feeling  of  resentment.  He  was  bound 
to  know  that  he  was  going  to  certain  defeat, 
and  he  knew  Italy  too  well  to  deceive  himself 
either  as  to  her  intelligence  or  her  sense  of 
honor.  For  that  he  deserves  the  commisera- 
tion of  all  mankind.  But  he  lost  his  head.  He 
was  not  made  of  fine  enough  stuff  for  the 
sacrifice,  and  he  ended  by  believing  success  to 
be  possible,  and  then  stooped  to  the  task  which 
Dr.  Dillon  has  described,  a  task  which  has 
robbed  our  modern  Seneca  of  all  claim  to  a 
martyr's  halo. 

What  a  pity  for  him,  and  what  a  triumph 
for  Nero! 


Taticheff 


XXIII 

TATICHEFF 

TATICHEFF  is  no  longer  a  well-known  name  in 
the  world  of  European  politics,  and  yet  he  was 
one  of  the  most  genuinely  intelligent  people  it 
has  ever  been  my  lot  to  meet.  I  had  a  talk 
with  him  twice,  both  times  in  London. 

The  first  time  was  at  a  dinner  at  the  St. 
James  Club.  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace, 
then  foreign  editor  of  the  Times,  and  Lord 
Reay,  a  former  governor  of  Bombay,  a  man 
well  known  in  the  world  of  international  juris- 
prudence, were  also  present. 

The  second  time  was  at  Taticheff's  house, 
and  I  talked  for  a  few  minutes  to  Stead,  the 
well-known  publicist,  who  was  to  lose  his  life 
later  on  in  the  Titanic  disaster.  At  the 
moment  Taticheff  was  the.  late  Witte's  agent 
in  England.  Everyone  will  remember  Witte, 
the  great  Finance  Minister  of  the  Russian 
Empire,  who  as  an  adjunct  to  his  dictatorship 
had  financial  representatives  in  all  the  capitals 

215 


216      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

in  Europe,  which  in  reality  formed  a  second 
diplomatic  body,  controlled  by  himself  alone. 

Taticheff  had  a  very  singular  history.  He 
had  begun  life  brilliantly  in  diplomacy.  Ap- 
pointed to  the  Embassy  at  Vienna,  he  began 
to  work  in  an  anti-German  sense,  or  to  say  the 
least  of  it,  not  in  a  pro-German  sense.  At 
that  time  it  was  a  most  dangerous  game  to 
play,  and  Bismarck,  who  never  overlooked 
anything  and  whose  influence  in  governing 
circles  in  Petrograd  is  well  known,  determined 
to  destroy  him.  An  incident  in  the  senti- 
mental side  of  Taticheff 's  life  gave  the  Iron 
Chancellor  the  opportunity  he  sought.  The 
Petrograd  Cabinet  broke  Taticheff,  who  at 
once  began  to  avenge  himself  after  the  fashion 
of  a  strong  man.  He  devoted  himself  to  the 
study  of  history,  and  produced  books  that 
gave  him  a  great  reputation.  During  the  war 
of  1877  he  served  as  a  volunteer,  and  behaved 
in  such  a  way  as  to  win  the  Cross  of  St. 
George.  Then  he  went  on  with  his  literary 
career,  until  Witte  took  him  back  to  the 
service  of  the  state,  in  the  capacity  of  financial 
agent.  Death  overtook  him  before  he  had  at- 
tained the  summit  of  his  powers. 

Like  all  intelligent  Russians,  Taticheff  was 
a  most  attractive  talker.  He  had  subtlety,  im- 


TATICHEFF  217 

agination,  wit  and  charm,  and  beyond  this  a 
sort  of  courage  which  enabled  him  to  touch  on 
delicate  matters  with  perfect  tact. 

Naturally  we  discussed  Russo-Roumanian 
relations.  They  were  in  a  very  bad  way. 
Being  afraid  of  Russia,  we  were  plunged  into 
a  sea  of  Germanism,  and  Taticheff  was  well 
informed  on  this  point.  He  explained  to  me 
the  plain  truth  of  the  matter,  which  was  that 
the  interests  of  Roumanian  national  unity 
were  absolutely  opposed  to  a  Russophobe 
policy,  and  that  consequently  we  were  travel- 
ing on  a  'wrong  road,  since  any  day  might 
find  the  interests  of  self-preservation  driv- 
ing us  inevitably  to  reverse  our  existing  pro- 
gramme. 

It  is  easy  to  imagine  Taticheff's  line  of 
argument;  there  is  no  need  for  me  to  dwell  on 
it.  To-day  the  arguments  used  by  the  Rus- 
sian writer  are  established  in  the  head  and 
heart  of  every  Roumanian. 

Taticheff  came,  of  course,  to  the  question  of 
Bessarabia.  He  recognized  that  the  Russian 
Government  had  been  wrong  to  insist  on  our 
exchanging  the  three  districts  of  Bessarabia 
for  the  Dobrudja.  He  was  of  opinion  that 
Russia  ought  merely  to  have  offered  us  this 


exchange  and  to  have  abstained  from  it  if  we 
refused  to  accept  it. 

"But,"  he  said,  "you  would  have  been  very 
wrong  to  refuse  it.  I  quite  understand  Rou- 
manian sentiment  about  Bessarabia,  but  this 
sentiment  is  not  bound  up  only  with  the  three 
southern  districts,  the  least  Roumanian  of  all, 
but  with  the  entire  province,  the  entire  terri- 
tory between  the  Pruth  and  the  Dniester  lost 
in  1812.  I  understand  this  feeling  of  sad 
regret  and  also  your  keen  aspirations  in  the 
matter.  It  is  too  human  and  natural  for  a 
friend  of  truth  to  be  able  to  deny  it.  But 
what  I  do  not  understand  is  why  the  preserva- 
tion of  these  three  districts,  separated  from 
Russian  Bessarabia  by  the  most  conventional 
of  frontiers,  could  satisfy  the  Roumanian  in- 
stinct towards  national  unity  or  augment  the 
chances  of  the  future  acquisition  of  the  whole 
of  Bessarabia.  Danubian  Bessarabia,  except 
for  the  district  of  Cahul,  is  the  least  Rou- 
manian corner  of  the  Roumanian  state,  and 
although  the  possession  of  Kilia  has  played  a 
great  part  in  Roumanian  history  we  should 
recognize  the  fact  that  Moldavian  rule  has 
never  been  more  intermittent  in  any  other 
province  of  the  former  state  of  Moldavia.  To 
envisage  the  marshes  of  southern  Bessarabia 


TATICHEFF  219 

as  a  strategic  point  from  which  to  advance  on 
the  Dniester  is  simply  childish.  The  delta  of 
the  Danube  is  of  course  very  valuable.  But 
a  Roumania,  mistress  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Kilia  branch,  with  Bulgaria  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  stream,  would  have  been  far  less 
mistress  of  the  Danube  delta  than  she  would 
be  in  the  situation  created  by  her  annexation 
of  the  Dobrudja.  As  for  access  to  the  sea, 
one  cannot  compare  the  two  solutions.  The 
Bessarabian  coast  even  with  the  proposed 
bridge  at  Jibriani  would  never  really  have 
given  Roumania  proper  access  to  the  sea, 
whereas  with  Sulina,  Constantza  and  Man- 
galia  it  is  quite  another  matter.  And  it  was 
up  to  you  to  add  Varna,  the  best  port  on  the 
Black  Sea — Varna,  which  in  1878  might  have 
been  anything  you  liked  to  make  it,  except  a 
Bulgarian  town." 

And  as  I  tried  to  interrupt  him,  Taticheff 
added,  "I  say  once  more  that  we  were  wrong 
to  force  your  hand  and  you  were  still  more 
wrong  in  refusing  an  exchange  so  favorable 
to  yourself.  If  it  had  been  a  question  of  ob- 
taining possession  of  the  whole  of  Bessarabia 
I  should  have  understood  your  policy,  but 
it  was  not  a  question  of  that  or  anything 
approaching  it.  In  1878  you  had  a  rare 


220      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

opportunity  of  making  capital  out  of  your  al- 
liance with  Russia,  especially  after  the  glori- 
ous days  of  Plevna.  You  lost  the  opportunity, 
and  what  did  you  gain  in  exchange?  Sooner 
or  later  the  nemesis  of  history  which  has 
placed  the  greater  number  of  your  nationals 
in  Austria-Hungary,  that  is  to  say  among 
the  Germans,  will  oblige  you  to  draw  near  to 
us,  will  make  you  our  ally  in  war,  if  you  do 
not  yourselves  intend  to  seal  the  destruction 
of  your  race  and  of  your  independence.  And 
then,"  said  Taticheff,  "in  spite  of  these  treaties 
of  yours,  treaties  you  pretend  not  to  know  the 
existence  of,  but  which  I  know  to  be  real 
enough,  I  am  counting  on  you  as  allies  when 
the  great  day  of  reckoning  comes.  I  cannot 
admit  that  nations  can  ever  commit  suicide. 
They  may  delude  themselves  for  a  time,  but 
they  are  obliged  to  come  back  to  the  truth  in 
the  end.  I  hope  the  great  day  will  find  you 
strong  and  ready. 

Taticheff  was  right.    In  the  end  truth  pre- 
vailed. 


France  and  the  Teuton 


XXIV 

FRANCE  AND  THE  TEUTON 

EVERYONE  in  Roumania  knew  the  late  Cou- 
touly,  formerly  French  Minister  in  Bucharest, 
and  everyone  appreciated  his  gentle  character 
and  his  real  friendliness  towards  our  country. 

Gustave  de  Coutouly  had  served  in  the 
garde  mobile  in  1870  and  also  had  assisted  in 
suppressing  the  Commune.  It  was  quite 
natural  that  he  should  cherish  an  unfading 
memory  of  that  dreadful  year,  and  that  in  his 
heart  there  should  ever  burn  the  passionate 
feelings  of  the  vanquished. 

The  last  time  I  saw  him  in  Paris  was  at  the 
time  of  the  Tangier  difficulty:  it  will  be  re- 
membered that  the  incident  which  accelerated 
the  first  Morocco  crisis  and  almost  set  Europe 
ablaze  was  the  famous  landing  of  the  Emperor 
at  Tangier.  It  was  like  a  thunderclap  in 
Paris.  People  had  become  accustomed  to  the 
idea  of  peace,  and  it  was  believed  that  France 
was  safe  from  any  new  sort  of  aggression  on 
the  part  of  Germany.  This  thunderclap  out 

223 


of  a  blue  sky  was  in  truth  the  beginning  of  a 
new  era  in  the  psychology  of  the  people  of 
France. 

Some  precautions  against  the  possibility  of 
a  sudden  and  absolutely  unjustified  attack 
had  been  taken.  The  eastern  garrisons  had 
been  strengthened  and  frontier  regiments  were 
kept  always  on  the  alert. 

Monsieur  de  Coutouly's  only  son  was  serv- 
ing in  one  of  these  regiments.  He  was  killed 
in  the  war,  righting  gallantly,  two  days  after 
his  marriage. 

I  was  discussing  the  gravity  of  the  time  with 
my  friend  de  Coutouly,  when  he  began  to 
read  me  a  letter  which  his  son  had  sent  from 
the  frontier.  The  young  soldier  expressed 
himself  in  this  letter  with  the  magnificent 
courage,  the  gayety,  the  humor,  which  is  char- 
acteristic of  the  Frenchman.  He  told  his 
father  he  had  nothing  to  fear,  that  the  new 
generation,  in  spite  of  its  apparent  softness 
and  indifference,  would  do  its  duty  as  French- 
men, would  prove  worthy  of  their  ancestors, 
and  that  if  war  broke  out  the  heroes  who  were 
the  glory  of  French  history  would  have  reason 
to  be  proud  of  the  exploits  of  the  French  of 
to-day.  "But,"  he  added,  "it  is  impossible 
for  us  to  hate.  You  who  were  beaten  in  1870 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TEUTON         225 

cherish  a  natural  and  legitimate  hatred  for 
Germany,  and  you  must  not  mind  if  we  do 
not  share  it.  France  has  after  all  fought  in 
turn  with  so  many  nations.  She  has  been 
beaten  and  she  has  been  victorious.  Must  we 
hate  the  English  because  of  Waterloo,  when 
we  have  a  Crimea  in  common?  Undoubtedly 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  are  very  dear  to  us  and 
we  will  shed  our  blood  willingly  to  get  them 
back,  but  hate  the  Germans  because  of  Sedan 
we  can't." 

Together  my  friend  and  I  plumbed  the 
depths  of  the  Latin  soul,  which  is  just  and 
generous  even  to  the  enemy  who  had  injured 
us. 

"The  new  generation,"  said  my  friend,  "will 
astonish  you  by  its  heroism  and  it  will  be  all 
the  more  beautiful  because  hatred  has  no  place 
in  its  heart." 

And  as  the  soul  of  the  conquered  was 
purged  of  all  evil  passions,  the  victor's  hatred 
of  France  and  the  French  increased  daily,  for 
in  Germany  they  resented  the  fact  that  France 
had  not  died  after  1870.  They  regretted  not 
having  bled  her  white,  not  having  seized  more 
territory  and  more  money,  and  they  watched 
for  the  moment  when  they  could  once  more 


226      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

hurl  themselves  upon  her,  this  time  to  destroy 
her  forever. 

When  war  broke  out,  a  great  friend  of  mine, 
Titulesco,  was  in  Stockholm.  In  order  to  get 
home  he  had  to  go  through  Berlin,  and  he 
stopped  there  ten  days  or  more.  From  Berlin 
he  wrote  me  a  letter,  which  I  have  kept,  as  it 
does  great  honor  to  Titulesco's  spirit  of  ob- 
servation and  the  depth  of  his  judgment.  He 
showed  himself  dumbfounded  by  what  he  saw, 
but  the  number  of  guns  and  the  wonderful 
organization  of  material  was  not  what  inter- 
ested him,  the  important  factor  to  him  was  the 
German  soul.  That  soul  astonished  and  ap- 
palled him  at  the  same  time.  He  witnessed 
its  manifestations.  He  saw  the  happy  ex- 
pression with  which  parents  and  friends  read 
the  names  of  their  dearest  in  the  lists  of  killed, 
and  he  wrote:  "It  is  perfectly  clear  to  me  that 
these  people  have  been  waiting  for  forty  years 
with  intense  impatience  for  this  day.  To  this 
people  the  war  has  brought  positive  happiness ; 
this  people  desired  war  with  all  its  strength, 
they  looked  upon  it  as  Christians  look  upon 
the  advent  of  the  Messiah,  and  in  the  joy  of 
striking  France  even  natural  feelings  disap- 
pear." 

I  pondered  over  the  two  mentalities,  the 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TEUTON         227 

sons  of  the  conquered  Latins  who  are  unable 
to  hate  their  conquerors,  and  the  sons  of  the 
German  conquerors  who  could  not  forego  their 
hatred  of  their  former  victims. 


ii 

Yesterday  evening  in  my  little  country 
library  I  took  down  UAnnee  Terrible  from 
the  poet's  shelf.  I  had  not  read  it  for  a  long 
while.  The  great  poet,  the  greatest  lyric  poet 
of  modern  times,  speaks  of  the  choice  between 
the  two  nations. 

He  begins  with  Germany,  to  whom  he  de- 
votes three  pages,  opening  with  this  verse: 

"Aucune  nation  n'est  plus   grande  que  toi/' 

and  which  ends : 

"L'Allemagne  est  puissante  et  superbe," 

and  for  France  he  adds  only  three  words: 

"O  ma  mere!" 

It  was  in  September,  1870,  that  Victor 
Hugo  wrote  like  this,  the  September  in  which 
Germany,  having  finished  her  war  with  the 
Austrian  Empire,  began  her  war  against 
France. 


228      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

How  can  Germans  ever  understand  the 
French  soul? 

How  can  they  fail  to  be  mistaken  as  to  the 
power  and  decision  of  France? 


A  Cousin  of  Tisza 


XXV 

A  COUSIN  OF  TISZA 

I  WAS  talking  in  Vienna  on  the  evening  of  the 
30th  of  July,  1914,  to  a  friend — an  intimate 
of  Count  Berchtold's.  This  friend  happened 
to  be  an  Englishman  who  did  not  believe  that 
England  would  fight. 

"They  are  keenly  anxious  for  war  here,"  he 
said,  "and  to  this  end  they  drafted  the  ulti- 
matum to  Serbia  in  such  a  way  that  it  could 
not  possibly  be  accepted.  They  were  greatly 
disappointed  when  the  report — which,  by  the 
way,  turned  out  to  be  false — got  about  that 
the  Serbs  had  accepted  it  without  modification, 
for  they  are  so  well  prepared  as  to  be  confi- 
dent of  victory.  The  present  Roumanian 
Government  does  not  count  for  much  here,  as 
it  does  not  appear  fully  to  realize  the  situa- 
tion. They  tell  me  if  only  you  were  in  power 
a  good  deal  could  be  done  with  Roumania. 
Not  only  could  the  whole  of  Bessarabia 
lost  in  1812  be  regained,  but  Odessa  also, 
and  ...  " 

231 


232      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

I  listened  to  my  friend's  words :  he  was  quite 
an  intelligent  person,  and  I  said  to  myself, 
"People  in  Vienna  are  up  to  the  neck  in 
ignorance  and  folly." 

ii 

On  the  morning  of  the  3rd  of  August,  1914, 
I  called  a  party  meeting  at  my  house  at 
Sinaia.  It  was  attended  by  MM.  Dissesco, 
Istrati,  Cantacuzene-Pashcano,  Badarau  and 
Cinco. 

To  them  I  explained  the  situation  and  the 
matters  to  be  discussed  and  settled  at  the 
Privy  Council  that  afternoon. 

I  asked  each  person  for  his  opinion  before 
giving  my  own.  Then  I  put  forward  my  own 
views,  and  added  that  I  was  happy  to  think 
nearly  all  were  of  the  same  opinion  as  I  was 
as  to  the  effect  on  our  country  of  a  German 
victory.  It  would  be  the  death  of  Roumania, 
and  it  was  morally  impossible  that  we  should 
assist  at  our  own  funeral. 

I  said  that  if  they  had  not  been  of  my 
opinion  I  should  have  retired  from  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Conservative  Democratic  Party. 
And  even  then  I  should  not  have  lost  faith  in 
my  country's  destiny,  but  should  have  worked 


A  COUSIN  OF  TISZA  233 

on  as  a  private  individual  in  complete  free- 
dom and  with  redoubled  energy. 

in 

I  was  still  at  my  little  villa  at  Sinaia  in 
September,  1914,  just  before  the  fall  of  Lem- 
berg,  when  a  Hungarian  friend,  a  cousin  of 
Count  Tisza,  came  to  see  me.  He  was  a 
charming  man,  and  as  a  rule  did  not  mix 
himself  up  in  politics. 

He  spoke  of  my  own  attitude  in  the  great 
European  crisis,  an  attitude  which,  he  said, 
might  provve  fatal  to  me.  He  gave  me  to 
understand  what  I  already  knew  well,  that 
Tisza  was  the  real  pilot  of  the  Dual  Empire, 
and  that  after  the  Peace  he  intended  to  be- 
come Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  a  post  he 
could  keep  for  life  if  it  pleased  him  to  do  so. 
With  the  utmost  civility  he  pointed  out  to  me 
the  difficulty,  not  to  say  impossibility,  of  my 
ever  coming  back  to  power  in  Roumania,  as  I 
could  never  have  any  decent  relations  with 
Count  Tisza's  Government  because  of  the 
attitude  I  was  taking.  He  insinuated  that 
there  was  still  time  for  me  to  retreat,  and  that 
the  Central  Powers  were  confident  of  victory. 

I  told  him  that  every  man  was  bound  to 
obey  the  call  of  duty  without  heeding  risk  or 


234      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

danger,  and  that  I  was  quite  well  aware  that 
in  the  event  of  the  Germans  being  victorious 
it  would  be  my  patriotic  duty  not  to  em- 
barrass the  policy  of  my  country  by  remain- 
ing in  public  life,  and  that  when  countless 
human  lives  were  being  sacrificed  on  countless 
battlefields  it  was  ridiculous  to  stop  at  the 
sacrifice  of  a  man's  political  career,  no  matter 
who  the  man  was. 

My  visitor  took  the  hint,  and  by  way  of 
excusing  himself,  assured  me  that  his  advice 
had  been  inspired  only  by  his  feelings  of  friend- 
ship. It  is,  however,  the  same  advice  which, 
since  then,  has  been  offered  me  on  several  oc- 
casions, and  by  quite  different  people. 


New  Italy 


XXVI 

NEW  ITALY 

A  FORTNIGHT  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  I  was  discussing  the 
chances  of  peace  with  King  Charles,  who  was 
not  only  a  statesman  but  a  great  soldier. 
Both  of  us  thought  war  certain,  in  spite  of 
the  peaceful  assurances  of  the  Embassies.  I 
told  him  of  my  profound  conviction  that  the 
Japanese  would  be  victorious  all  along  the 
line.  He  answered  me  with  the  usual  objec- 
tions, saying  that  there  would  be  ninety  Rus- 
sian divisions  against  thirteen  Japanese  di- 
visions, and  so  on. 

When  we  had  finished  arguing  he  asked  me 
on  what  I  based  my  conviction.  "I  believe," 
I  said,  "in  the  moral  factor.  History  teaches 
that  it  is  this  moral  factor  rather  than  the 
mere  number  of  battalions  which  gives  vic- 
tory. For  the  Russians  this  war  is  an  absurd 
colonial  affair,  which  they  do  not  understand; 
but  for  the  Japanese  victory  is  a  vital  neces- 
sity. They  know  quite  well  that  until  they 

237 


238      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

have  beaten  a  white  race  they  will  continue  to 
be  despised. 

"Now  for  the  Japanese  honor  is  the  su- 
preme good,  and  it  is  necesary  for  them  to 
win  in  order  to  make  themselves  our  equal." 

My  questioner  persisted  in  his  view.  "Look 
here,"  I  said,  "you  have  often  told  me  that  the 
Austrian  army  was  first  rate,  that  its  infantry 
was  better  than  the  German  infantry,  and  that 
the  higher  command,  since  they  had  admitted 
to  it  people  who  were  not  noble  by  birth,  had 
made  astonishing  progress ;  well,  I  am  perfect- 
ly certain  that,  given  equal  numbers  or  there- 
abouts, the  Austrian  army  could  be  beaten  by 
any  other  army  in  the  world.  It  has  not,  and 
never  can  have,  the  moral  factor."  He  ap- 
peared to  find  me  rather  ridiculous,  and  so  I 
added,  "I  know  that  you  have  a  pretty  moder- 
ate opinion  of  the  Italian  army,  but  I  am 
quite  certain  that,  given  equal  numbers,  the 
Italian  army  could  beat  the  Austrian  army 
into  a  cocked  hat." 

After  a  few  other  remarks  I  added,  "You 
do  not  know  new  Italy ;  our  misfortune  is  that 
we  preserve  the  opinions  of  our  first  youth 
and  we  do  not  adapt  ourselves  quickly  enough 
to  the  new  facts  around  us.  Italy,  for  example, 
is  passing  through  a  moral  revolution  of  which 


NEW  ITALY  239 

people  in  general  have  no  idea.  The  new  gen- 
eration which  has  grown  up  in  a  free  Italy  is 
filled  with  patriotism,  I  might  say  pride, 
which  the  extreme  politeness  of  Italians  does 
not  make  apparent.  Italy  will  no  longer  stand 
taking  the  part  of  Cinderella  among  the 
Great  Powers.  A  working  democracy  like 
Italy  will  never  trouble  the  peace  of  the 
world,  but  if  it  is  forced  to  go  to  war  it  will 
astonish  everyone  by  the  decision  of  its  action 
and  by  its  heroism." 

I  realized  that  I  had  not  convinced  King 
Charles  as  to  the  certainty  of  a  Japanese  vic- 
tory, nor  as  to  the  superiority  of  the  Italian 
army  over  the  Austrian  army.  Perhaps  he 
realized  later  that  I  had  observed  and  under- 
stood correctly. 

Now  that  the  Italians  have  astonished  the 
world  by  the  valor  of  their  troops,  I  call  to 
mind  this  conversation  which  took  place  in 
1904,  and  I  feel  very  pleased  with  myself  at 
having  foreseen  that  which  all  the  world  now 
realizes. 

In  the  month  of  August,  1901,  I  climbed 
Mount  Tabor,  which  is  celebrated  for  the  fine 
panorama  one  sees  from  the  summit.  The 
ascent  is  easy,  but  as  it  is  a  question  of  climb- 
ing 10,000  feet  it  is  a  lengthy  and  fatiguing 


24-0      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

business.  I  chatted  with  my  guide,  a  good 
chamois  hunter,  and  pointing  out  to  him  a 
steep  precipice,  which  appeared  to  me  quite 
unclimbable,  I  asked  him  if  it  were  possible  to 
get  up  it.  He  answered  it  was  very  difficult, 
and  he  advised  me  not  to  try,  and  then  added : 
"A  month  ago  some  Italian  Alpini  were  here. 
The  commandant  of  the  battalion  was  a  little 
fat  man,  who  was  not  much  to  look  at.  He 
asked  me  to  help  him  get  up  the  precipice 
which  you  are  now  pointing  out  to  me.  I  told 
him  that  only  chamois  could  pass  that  way. 
He  answered,  'Take  me  all  the  same;  where 
the  chamois  can  go  man  can  go,  and  where 
men  can  go  my  battalion  can  go.'  I  obeyed 
him,  and  the  battalion  went  that  way  just  as 
the  commandant  had  said." 

The  Italian  Alpini  have  since  won  for  them- 
selves immortal  fame. 


My  Four  Last  Germans 


XXVII 

MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS 

BEFORE  the  world  war  I  knew  plenty  of  Ger- 
mans; I  even  counted  some  of  them  among  my 
friends.  In  August,  1914,  my  relations  with 
Austrians  and  Germans  became  cooler  and 
cooler,  and  some  weeks  later  they  almost 
ceased  to  exist.  Later  on,  however,  circum- 
stances resulted  in  my  meeting  at  least  four 
Germans,  and  I  am  going  to  record  the  im- 
pressions they  made  on  me. 


One  is .  of  a  conversation  with  Herr  von 
Busche,  the  German  Minister  to  Roumania. 

Herr  von  Busche  belongs  to  the  new  diplo- 
macy. He  is  a  man  of  education  and  brains, 
but  absolutely  without  personality.  His  dar- 
ling ambition — and  the  one  he  will  never  realize 
—is  to  be  taken  for  a  grand  seigneur.  I  have 
only  had  one  conversation  with  him,  and  I 
recognized  him  at  once  as  base  metal.  Herr 
von  Busche  is  like  a  piece  of  cheap  furniture 

243 


244      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

— on  the  surface  a  thin  veneer  of  oak  or  wal- 
nut, but  the  substance  common  deal. 

Herr  von  Busche  was  sent  to  Roumania  just 
after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  when  Berlin 
had  made  the  discovery  that  its  Minister  at 
Bucharest,  quite  an  excellent  man  and  one  of 
prodigious  wealth,  was  altogether  inadequate. 
He  had  hardly  arrived  at  Sinaia  when,  before 
being  presented  either  to  the  Premier  or  the 
Foreign  Minister,  he  had  a  secret  interview 
with  King  Charles.  Thanks  to  a  private  po- 
lice of  my  own,  which  has  always  done  me  good 
service,  probably  because  I  have  never  paid 
for  it,  I  knew  of  this  visit  the  same  day.  After 
his  visit  to  the  King,  Herr  von  Busche  pro- 
ceeded to  Bucharest  to  introduce  himself  offi- 
cially to  the  Government.  Returning  to 
Sinaia,  he  sent  his  Councilor  of  Legation  to 
ask  for  an  appointment  with  me,  which  I 
fixed  for  the  same  day  (this,  as  I  say,  was  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war),  and  I  waited  for 
him  in  my  drawing-room,  where  there  hap- 
pened to  be  a  portrait  of  Kiderlen-Waechter 
with  a  very  cordial  inscription.  At  exactly 
six  o'clock  Herr  von  Busche  came  in,  but- 
toned tightly  up  in  a  frock  coat  which  was 
plainly  intended  to  suggest  London,  but  as 
evidently  hailed  from  Berlin — one  of  those  al- 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  245 

most  invisible  distinctions  which  make  a  world 
of  difference. 

Herr  Busche,  who  had  been  apprised  how 
completely  I  was  convinced  of  Germany's 
criminal  culpability,  affected  to  know  nothing 
of  this,  and  began  by  informing  me  that  he 
could  claim  a  double  introduction  to  me:  one 
was  from  Prince  Billow,  who  had  begged  him 
to  give  me  his  most  friendly  remembrances; 
the  other  was  the  memory  of  the  late  Kiderlen- 
Waechter,  whose  pupil  he  had  been  in  diplo- 
macy. I  replied  that  Prince  Bulow  had  often 
shown  me  his  friendly  feelings,  and  that  to 
know  the  terms  on  which  I  had  been  with 
Kiderlen  he  had  only  to  look  at  his  photograph 

-"the  photograph,"  I  added,  "of  a  man  who 
would  never  have  allowed  himself  to  be  as- 
sociated with  Germany's  recent  actions." 

Having  come  expressly  to  plead  Germany's 
innocence,  Herr  Busche  endeavored  to  con- 
vince me  that  Kiderlen's  successors  had  been 
as  much  in  favor  of  peace  as  himself,  and  that 
Germany  was  fighting  a  defensive  war.  I 
opposed  this  view  energetically,  and  in  the 
course  of  our  conversation  I  made  Herr  von 
Busche  understand  that  I  was  well  acquainted 
with  what  had  happened  at  Berlin,  since  I 
knew  the  circumstances  under  which  Kiderlen- 


Waechter  had  become  Foreign  Minister,  and  in 
particular  I  referred  to  the  famous  memo- 
randum on  the  world  situation  which  he  had 
presented  to  Bethmann-Hollweg,  after  read- 
ing which  the  Chancellor  had  told  the  Em- 
peror that  he  would  not  consent  to  stay  in 
office  unless  Kiderlen  had  charge  of  foreign 
affairs.  Herr  von  Busche  showed  considerable 
astonishment  at  my  knowledge  of  so  intimate 
an  incident  of  German  diplomacy,  and  he  took 
the  trouble  to  let  me  know  that  he  had  made 
the  copy  of  Kiderlen-Waechter's  memoran- 
dum with  his  own  hand. 

"Well,"  I  said,  "you  see  I  know  more  than 
you  expected  of  your  country's  policy ;"  and  I 
related  to  him  how  Kiderlen  had  failed  to  ob- 
tain the  Emperor's  consent  to  the  limitation 
of  naval  armaments,  which  would  have  se- 
cured peace,  because  von  Tirpitz  had  opposed 
it.  I  added  that  Kiderlen  had  made  no  secret 
of  his  absolute  conviction  that  France  would 
never  provoke  war.  "Any  attempt,"  I  added, 
"on  your  part  to  argue  that  France  is  morally 
the  author  of  this  catastrophe  is,  so  far  as  I 
am  concerned,  pure  waste  of  energy." 

Von  Busche  accordingly  shifted  the  ground 
from  France  and  fell  back  upon  England, 
repeating  like  a  gramophone  all  the  German 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  247 

absurdities  about  England's  bellicose  intentions 
and  intrigues.  I  cut  short  this  piece  of  mala- 
droit special  pleading  by  a  simple  statement 
which  completely  upset  my  visitor.  "You  are 
giving  yourself  perfectly  useless  trouble,"  I 
told  him.  "I  know  England  too  well  for  that. 
It  is  Hungary  and  Germany  who  have  started 
universal  war."  And  I  argued  this  so  vigor- 
ously that  von  Busche  persisted  no  further 
and  changed  the  subject.  But  before  doing  so 
he  was  at  pains  to  repeat  once  again  that  Ger- 
many was  waging  a  defensive  war,  and  that 
the  German  people  were  convinced  of  it. 

"There  you  are  right,"  I  replied.  "What 
astonishes  me  most  in  your  country  is  neither 
its  military  power,  formidable  as  it  is,  nor  its 
remarkable  organization,  but  your  success  in 
having  so  disciplined  your  people  that  you  can 
control  their  convictions,  as  if  by  police  regula- 
tion, however  contrary  they  are  to  the  facts. 
This  is  indeed  a  unique  and  unprecedented 
achievement." 

From  this  stage  the  conversation  began  to 
languish.  The  German  Minister  was  obviously 
looking  for  an  opportunity  to  escape,  but  the 
Councilor  of  Legation,  for  whom  he  was  wait- 
ing, had  not  yet  arrived.  When  at  length  he 
came  in  Herr  von  Busche — again  the  base 


248      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

metal  revealing  itself — felt  it  necessary  to  ex- 
cuse himself  for  leaving  so  soon.  "But,"  he 
said,  "I  have  an  audience  with  the  King  at  a 
quarter  past  seven." 

"I  congratulate  you,"  I  said,  "on  seeing  His 
Majesty  twice  in  three  days.  It  is  a  good 
augury  for  your  mission."  Von  Busche  turned 
pale  and  said  that  he  did  not  understand  me, 
as  in  a  few  minutes  he  was  going  to  see  the 
King  for  the  first  time.  He  added  that  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  see  the 
King  before  he  had  been  officially  presented 
to  his  Ministers. 

"Oh,"  said  I,  "in  that  case  it  is,  of  course, 
my  mistake."  And  these  were  the  last  words 
exchanged  between  Germany's  last  Minister  to 
Roumania  and  myself. 

This  attempt,  doomed  in  advance  to  failure, 
to  prove  that  the  author  of  the  world  war  was 
England,  and  the  lie  with  regard  to  his  hav- 
ing met  the  King,  may  be  fairly  regarded  as 
an  epitome  of  the  whole  German  diplomatic 
method. 

ii 

A  few  days  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne  I 
was  on  my  way  from  my  villa  at  Sinaia  to  the 
Palace  Hotel  when  a  motor  car  stopped  in 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  249 

front  of  me.  A  man  smothered  in  dust  got 
out  of  it  to  speak  to  me.  As  he  said  he  had 
come  from  Berlin  on  behalf  of  Herr  Zimmer- 
mann  solely  in  order  to  speak  to  me,  I  arranged 
to  see  him  at  once.  In  my  house  a  few  minutes 
later  he  withdrew  this,  and  explained  that 
Zimmermann  had  not  really  sent  him. 

My  visitor  from  Berlin  was,  in  fact,  a  Ger- 
man engineer  who  had  lived  many  years  in 
Roumania,  married  a  Roumanian  lady,  been 
appointed  a  teacher  in  one  of  our  higher-grade 
schools,  and,  in  fact,  had  become  so  completely 
one  of  ourselves  that  I  firmly  believed  he  had 
been  naturalized  as  a  Roumanian.  At  the  out- 
break of  war  Mr.  S.  happened  to  be  in  Berlin, 
and  before  Roumania  had  definitely  declined 
to  enter  the  war  at  the  side  of  Germany ,a  he 
had  made  it  his  business  to  assist  in  bringing 
this  about.  With  this  object  he  used  to 
send  us  from  Berlin  immense  telegrams,  some- 
times two  or  three  a  day,  containing  remark- 
ably biassed  information  on  the  progress  of 
the  war,  evidently  designed  to  work  upon  our 
fears.  This  reckless  outlay  made  it  clear  to 
me  that  Mr.  S.  was  doing  his  work  at 
Germany's  expense,  which  on  the  part  of  a 
naturalized  Roumanian  made  me  very  angry. 
Immediately  on  meeting  him  I  had  reproached 


250      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

him  vehemently  for  thus  allowing  himself  to 
forget  that  he  had  become  a  Roumanian  citi- 
zen, and  my  indignation  fairly  carried  me 
away.  Its  object  excused  himself  to  me  on 
the  ground  that  he  had  not,  in  fact,  ever  been 
naturalized,  but  the  violence  with  which  I  had 
spoken  to  him  had  made  its  impression,  and 
when  he  came  to  my  house  all  his  earlier 
audacity  had  disappeared. 

Mr.  S.'s  proposal  was  really  paralyzing.  He 
began  by  admitting  that  my  attitude  towards 
Germany  was  quite  naturally  explained  by 
my  affection  for  France;  "but,"  he  added, 
"we  Germans  are  also  very  fond  of  France 
and  have  no  complaint  to  make  of  her.  On 
the  contrary,  the  idea  of  being  at  war  with 
France  is  exceedingly  painful  to  us.  Such 
being  Germany's  feelings  for  France,  I  have 
come  to  you,  since  I  have  long  considered  you 
as  one  of  the  clearest-sighted  men  in  Europe 
— an  opinion  which  is  also  shared  by  the 
political  world  of  Berlin — to  give  you  the 
opportunity  of  rendering  to  Roumania, 
France,  and  humanity  alike  a  service  which 
will  ensure  your  name  being  forever  enshrined 
in  history. 

"Go  to  Paris,  where  everyone — very  rightly 
— trusts  you.  Propose  to  France  a  separate 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  251 

peace.  We  will  offer  her  terms  of  peace, 
magnificent  terms,  beyond  her  utmost  hopes: 
and,  after  that,  we  will  punish,  as  they  de- 
serve, the  Russians,  and  above  all  the  English, 
the  real  criminals  who  have  provoked  the  war 
and  are  responsible  for  this  catastrophe.  You 
have  more  chance  than  anyone  else  in  the 
world  of  being  listened  to." 

I  answered  my  German  as  any  other  man 
in  my  place  must  have  answered:  I  told  him 
that  he  had  no  shred  of  reason  to  believe  it 
possible  that  I  could  listen  to  such  a  sugges- 
tion. What  he  was  proposing  to  me  was  an 
infamy  of  which  he  should  have  known  I  was 
incapable.  If  France  ever  wished  to  be  guilty 
of  such  abominable  treachery  she  would  not 
require  any  intervention  on  my  part,  and  to 
suppose  anything  else  was  not  only  to  lose  all 
sense  of  proportion  but  to  be  quite  abnormally 
stupid.  I  then  dismissed  S.  as  he  deserved, 
but  not  without  first  telling  him  how  little 
I  thought  of  Germany  for  her  ignorance  of 
the  spirit  of  France  and  of  her  other  adver- 
saries. 

That   Berlin  should  have  thought  me   so 

foolish  as  to  suppose  myself  able  to  play  such 

a  part,  and  base  enough  to  wish  to  play  it,  is 

nothing:  it  is  merely  an  erroneous  estimate 


SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

of  an  individual.  But  that  Berlin  could  im- 
agine that  France  would  betray  England,  who 
had  come  to  her  help  without  any  obligation, 
made  it  perfectly  clear  to  me  that  people  at 
Berlin  had  completely  lost,  not  only  all  sense 
of  right,  but  what  is  sometimes  more  danger- 
ous, all  intelligence  as  well. 
I  have  not  seen  Mr.  S.  again. 

Ill 

In  November,  1914,  at  Bucharest,  I  re- 
ceived the  last  visit  of  a  German  friend  with 
whom  my  relations  had  been  very  close. 

Mr.  X.  is  a  man  of  business;  he  is  also  a 
man  of  brains,  one  of  those  singularly  clear 
intellects  which  impress  one  from  the  first  and 
in  the  presence  of  which  one  feels  that  here  is 
a  man  who  would  have  been  a  success  at  any 
period,  in  any  country  and  in  any  career. 
Mr.  X.  is  also  one  of  the  most  international 
of  Germans;  his  mother  was  a  Russian,  his 
wife  is  English,  he  has  one  sister  married  in 
Russia  and  another  in  the  United  States.  He 
has  passed  a  great  part  of  his  life  in  Russia, 
in  England  and  in  Roumania.  With  all  this 
he  is  highly  educated,  astute  and  witty.  I 
say  all  this,  because  in  November,  1914,  X. 
gave  me  an  unexpected  opportunity  of  seeing 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  253 

how  the  German  war  could  pervert  even  so 
cultivated  an  intelligence  as  his.  When  I 
record  what  X.  said  to  me  my  astonishment 
will  be  intelligible.  It  will  be  understood  also 
why,  when  after  three  hours'  conversation  he 
left  me,  I  said  to  some  friends  who  were  wait- 
ing for  me  to  dine  with  them,  "I  have  just 
been  spending  three  hours  in  a  lunatic 
asylum." 

X.  had  always  entertained  for  me  a  genuine 
friendship,  and  had  come  in  reality  to  see 
whether  he  could  do  nothing  to  make  me  less 
Germanophpbe.  Too  well  brought  up  to  re- 
veal his  plans  openly,  he  began  by  offering  me 
Herr  von  Busche's  excuses  for  no  longer 
visiting  me.  "If  it  was  only  Germany  you  at- 
tacked," he  said,  "it  would  always  be  a  pleas- 
ure to  Herr  Busche  to  call  upon  you,  but  you 
attacked  the  Kaiser,  and  that  he  cannot  ig- 
nore." 

I  replied  that  Herr  von  Busche  was  per- 
fectly right  not  to  call  on  me,  because  in  no 
case  should  I  return  his  visit.  I  added  that  if 
ever  Herr  von  Busche  met  me  I  begged  that 
he  would  not  bow  to  me,  since  I  had  quite 
made  up  my  mind  not  to  return  it. 

In  terms  most  nicely  calculated  not  to  of- 
fend me,  X.  then  said  how  profoundly  he  re- 


254      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

gretted,  not  only  on  my  account  but  on  that  of 
Roumania,  to  see  me  afloat  in  a  vessel  which 
was  bound  to  founder;  and  very  delicately  he 
alluded  to  certain  strokes  of  the  oar  which, 
taken  at  the  right  moment,  might  effect  a 
complete  change  of  course.  As  I  did  not  wish 
to  bandy  words  with  him,  I  pretended  not  to 
understand,  and  replied  that  I  had  not,  in- 
deed, any  boat  beneath  me,  but  that  I  was  a 
lone  swimmer  in  an  ocean  full  of  danger,  obey- 
ing simply  the  imperative  behests  of  my  con- 
science, and  without  ever  asking  myself 
whether  or  not  I  had  any  prospect  of  reach- 
ing land.  And  as  X.  insisted  on  Roumania's 
misfortune  in  losing  the  only  politician  who, 
according  to  him,  was  of  real  worth,  I  cut  him 
short  with  the  words,  which  I  have  so  often 
repeated,  "How  can  one  concern  oneself 
with  the  situation  of  an  individual  when  the 
fate  of  the  world  is  at  stake?"  Accordingly 
X.,  abandoning  all  hope  of  convincing  me, 
left  the  personal  question  and  began  a  mono- 
logue, like  a  man  thinking  aloud.  For  more 
than  two  hours  he  explained  to  me  why  Ger- 
many must  be  victorious,  why  it  was  impos- 
sible that  she  should  be  otherwise,  and  why  all 
those  who  placed  themselves  across  the  Ger- 
man path  would  be  crushed  to  the  earth  with- 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  255 

out  any  advantage  to  themselves  or  to  the 
cause  which  they  wished  to  serve.  According 
to  him,  Germany  was  at  least  half  a  century 
in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  because 
she  understood  what  organization  meant,  while 
all  other  countries  were  still  relying  on  the 
futilities  of  individual  initiative.  "For  that 
reason  more  than  any  other,"  he  said,  "Ger- 
many's victory,  which  is  just  as  much  beyond 
dispute  as  the  sun  in  the  sky,  will  be  an  ad- 
vantage to  the  whole  human  race,  since  even 
the  nations  she  conquers  will  feel  the  benefit 
of  her  supremacy. 

"Of  all  our  enemies  France  is  the  only  one 
with  whom  we  need  reckon.  Her  soldiers,  her 
officers,  her  General  Staff,  are  just  as  good  as 
ours,  but  thirty-eight  millions  of  men  can  do 
nothing  against  seventy  millions.  France  will 
be  ground  to  powder,  and  we  Germans  will  be 
sorry  for  it. 

"Russia  gives  us  no  anxiety.  Numbers  are 
not  the  main  factor  in  war.  Russia,  believe 
me,  will  go  from  collapse  to  collapse.  Each 
time  you  fancy  that  Russia  is  on  the  point 
of  an  achievement  you  will  have  a  repetition 
of  the  Mazurian  lakes.  Thanks  to  Russia's 
disorder,  Russia's  indifference,  her  absolute 
lack  of  organization  and  her  fundamental  in- 


ability  to  create  it,  the  famous  steam-roller  is 
a  perilous  illusion.  Believe  me,  the  Russians 
will  be  beaten  at  just  that  moment  when  their 
allies  will  have  special  need  of  them,  and  they 
will  be  first  to  quit  the  field. 

"There  remains  England.  Obviously  she 
might  have  been  formidable.  If  England  had 
begun  to  arm  herself  ten  years  ago  we  should 
never  have  dared  to  venture  on  war.  But 
England  wishes  to  do  in  a  few  months  what 
has  taken  Russia  a  hundred  years.  That  is 
asking  too  much  of  human  capacity,  and  it 
will  never  come  to  pass.  You  will  see  what 
will  be  the  course  of  events.  The  war  will 
last  a  few  months  more,  at  the  very  most  a 
year.  Then  the  Kaiser,  at  the  head  of  his 
troops,  will  enter  Paris,  Moscow  and  Lon- 
don." I  smiled  at  this,  and  X.  replied:  "Yes, 
London.  It  is  there,  at  Westminster,  that 
the  Emperor  will  dictate  the  world's  peace  and 
the  reorganization  of  the  human  race." 

Nothing  was  further  from  X.'s  mind  than 
bluff.  He  was  profoundly  convinced  of  his 
own  prophecy,  which,  indeed,  in  his  view, 
amounted  to  evidence.  Yet  I  repeat  that  X. 
is  a  man  of  education  and  brains,  who  has 
traveled,  who  is  at  home  all  the  world  over, 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  257 

and  having  lived  all  his  life  among  foreigners 
might  well  have  a  more  open  mind. 

He  gave  me  the  solution  himself  when  he 
said  that  since  the  war  no  one  could  feel  him- 
self more  of  the  German  Michael1  than  he  did. 

In  the  Spring  of  1915  a  friend  came  to  tell 
me  that  a  German  diplomatist  with  whom  I 
had  been  very  friendly,  but  to  whom  I  had  not 
bowed  for  some  months,  was  begging  to  meet 
me  at  any  cost.  It  was  suggested  to  me  that 
we  should  come  across  each  other,  as  if  by 
chance,  at  my  friend's  house.  After  much 
persuasian  I  agreed,  on  the  express  condition 
that  no  word  of  politics  should  be  mentioned. 
I  knew  perfectly  well  that  the  German  diplo- 
matist would  not  respect  this  undertaking, 
but  the  agreement  to  exclude  politics  was  in- 
dispensable if  I  were  to  be  able,  without  rude- 
ness, to  bring  our  conversation  to  an  end  at 
the  moment  of  my  choice. 

Next  afternoon,  at  half -past  five,  I  was  duly 
calling  on  my  friend  when  the  German  diplo- 
matist came  in.  He  told  me  that  he  realized 
that  Roumania  would  soon  be  at  war  with  Ger- 
many, that  consequently  he  would  have  to 
leave  Bucharest,  and  that  he  had  come  to  beg 
me,  when  the  occasion  arose,  to  take  charge 

1  Michael:  the  German  equivalent  of  "John  Bull." 


258      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

of  the  keys  of  his  flat,  feeling  sure  that  he 
could  count  upon  me  to  see  that  his  property 
was  respected.  It  is  quite  needless  to  say 
that  he  had  no  intention  of  doing  anything  of 
the  kind,  and  that  when  Roumania  declared 
war  on  Germany  in  August,  1916,  he  never 
even  thought  of  it.  It  is,  however,  a  pleasure 
to  me  to  recall  that  a  German  diplomat  reck- 
oned on  me  for  the  preservation  of  his  house 
and  furniture,  when  I  remember  that  in  De- 
cember, 1916,  when  the  German  armies  occu- 
pied Bucharest,  Field  Marshal  von  Macken- 
sen  not  only  gave  orders  for  my  house  to  be 
sacked,  with  the  most  complete  and  what  I 
may  be  forgiven  for  calling  the  most  Hunnish 
particularity,  but  came  in  person  a  few  days 
afterwards,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  to  ad- 
mire the  way  in  which  his  instructions  had 
been  carried  out.  There  are  things  that  the 
Germans  do  differently  from  other  people. 

My  German  diplomatist  asked  me  with 
irresistible  frankness  on  what  my  conviction 
that  Germany  would  be  defeated  was  based. 
I  answered  him  without  any  reserve.  I  ex- 
plained to  him  my  reasons,  which  were  those 
of  ordinary  common  sense,  and  we  passed,  step 
by  step,  from  one  point  to  another,  until  at 
length  he  reached  that  of  making  the  follow- 


MY  FOUR  LAST  GERMANS  259 

ing  remarkable  admission:  "All  you  say  is  per- 
fectly true.  The  militarism  of  Prussia,  the 
martinet  spirit  of  Prussia,  is  the  most  abomi- 
nable thing  on  the  face  of  the  earth.  But  it 
happens  to  be  invincible.  And  there  is  noth- 
ing for  us — for  any  of  us — to  do  but  bow  be- 
fore it  as  to  fate." 

My  only  reply  was  to  tell  my  German  dip- 
lomatist, who  happened  to  be  a  Saxon  by 
birth,  that  I  would  see  him  again  at  the  end 
of  the  war. 


Eleutherios  Venizelos 


XXVIII 

ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS 


ALL  greatness  is  rare,  and  human  greatness  is 
the  rarest  of  all.  By  human  greatness  I  mean 
a  harmonious  personality  made  up  of  high 
intelligence,  moral  beauty  and  inflexibility  of 
will.  Great  minds  are  not  so  scarce  as  men 
think,  moral  beauty  is  fortunately  fairly  com- 
mon, especially  amongst  humble  folk.  Tenac- 
ity of  will  is  often  combined  with  moral  per- 
versity. But  the  combination  of  these  quali- 
ties in  a  whole  which,  according  to  my  own 
idea,  alone  constitutes  true  human  greatness, 
is  so  rare  that  one  may  go  through  life  with- 
out meeting  it. 

Venizelos *  is  a  true  example  of  human 
greatness,  and  of  a  greatness  such  that  one 
may  unreservedly  admire  it.  It  should  not  be 
forgotten  that  in  sincere  profound  admiration 
we  may  find  one  of  those  rare  springs  of  joy 

1  This   appreciation   was   written   in   1915,  before  M.   Veni- 
zelos' recall  to  power. 

263 


264      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

which  from  time  to  time  create  an  illusion  as 
to  the  value  of  life. 

Shakespeare,  the  greatest  poet  humanity 
has  ever  produced,  presents  this  remarkable 
and  almost  unique  characteristic — that  we 
know  nothing  of  his  life.  Venizelos  is  rather 
like  him.  Until  recent  years  his  life  was  so 
devoid  of  incident  that  it  leaves  a  vast  field 
to  be  occupied  by  legend.  The  only  thing 
known  about  his  early  career  is  the  time  he 
spent  in  the  mountains  with  other  Cretans 
fighting  for  his  country's  independence.  This 
was  a  moral  education.  People  do  not  know, 
however,  that  this  Cretan  carried  books  about 
with  him  in  the  bush,  in  order  to  perfect  him- 
self in  the  study  of  French. 

ii 

Before  the  time  of  Venizelos,  Greece  had 
fallen  low,  as  we  know  only  too  well.  If  she 
had  not  since  then  risen  again  so  marvelously, 
I,  who  owe  an  eternal  debt  to  the  Hellenic 
people,  should  not  dare  to  speak  of  their  past. 
During  the  war  of  independence  Greece  had 
accomplished  marvels  of  heroism  and  moral 
beauty  which  in  the  end  drew  to  it  the  pro- 
tection of  the  three  Great  Powers,  France, 
England  and  Russia — the  three  Powers  that 


ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS  265 

are  always  associated  in  history  with  noble 
action,  whether  they  act  independently  or  to- 
gether. But  this  same  Greece  had  started  down 
a  real  incline  almost  immediately  after  her 
emancipation.  She  made  an  unhappy  choice 
in  her  first  king.  How  could  any  rigid  Ba- 
varian understand  the  Greek  soul?  Her  sec- 
ond king  made  a  rule  of  leaving  the  Greeks 
entirely  free,  he  did  not  so  much  as  guide  them 
through  difficult  moments,  and  there  resulted 
a  period  of  unchecked  quarreling  between  po- 
litical parties,  the  system  of  dividing  the  spoil 
pushed  to  its  utmost  limits,  and  in  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  another  great  man,  Tricoupis,  the 
Greek  people,  one  of  the  most  gifted  on  the 
earth,  knew  all  the  misery  of  defeat  and  bank- 
ruptcy. 

As  ever,  the  nation  was  saved  on  the  edge 
of  the  abyss  by  the  only  means  of  salvation 
that  history  knows — revolution,  and  by  the 
most  dangerous  form  of  revolution,  that 
known  as  the  military  coup  d'etat.  King 
George,  who  had  done  nothing  to  deserve  it, 
drank  the  full  cup  of  humiliation  to  the  dregs. 
With  his  own  hand  he  signed  the  order  cashier- 
ing his  own  sons  from  the  army,  including 
the  Crown  Prince,  whose  name  was  for  the 
Greeks  forever  associated  with  their  defeat 


266      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

at  Domokos  in  1897.  Whatever  his  faults 
may  have  been,  a  martyrdom  like  his  should 
have  expiated  them.  After  having  destroyed, 
it  was  necessary  to  rebuild.  But  military  rev- 
olution, unless  it  throws  up  a  Napoleon, 
though  very  effective  in  clearing  the  ground, 
finds  reconstruction  beyond  its  powers. 

Greece  was  in  a  state  of  veritable  chaos. 
The  new  Chamber  not  only  wanted  to  set 
about  revising  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
state,  but  it  also  wanted  to  proclaim  its  own 
supremacy,  though  the  exercise  of  such  su- 
premacy was  something  quite  beyond  its  pow- 
ers as  they  had  then  developed. 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  the  Cretan  ar- 
rived. 

He  came  alone ;  without  clansmen,  or  family, 
or  fortune;  without  past  or  party  or  support- 
ers. He  stood,  as  I  say,  alone. 

He  was  received  like  a  god — crowds  are 
occasionally  endowed  with  divine  intuition  of 
this  kind.  Received  as  a  god,  he  acted  from 
the  first  moment  as  a  man. 

There  are  few  finer  pages  in  history  than 
the  account  of  how  the  Cretan  faced  the  peo- 
ple of  Athens.  They  were  shouting  with  all 
their  might,  "Long  live  Venizelos!  Long  live 
the  Constitutional  Assembly!"  and  he  forced 


ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS  267 

upon  them  the  alternative  cry,  "Long  live  the 
revision  of  the  Constitution!" 

This  man  was  right  when  the  world  was 
wrong.  Like  all  creators,  he  began  by  smash- 
ing everything.  He  crushed  the  parties,  or 
rather  the  old  cliques  which  had  brought 
Greece  to  destruction.  He  made  another  na- 
tion. Amongst  an  excitable  people  he  dared 
to  insist  on  the  permanent  status  of  the  civil 
servant,  his  selection  by  competitive  examina- 
tion, and  his  promotion  on  the  recommenda- 
tion of  his  colleagues. 

He  cleaned  the  stable  out  better  even  than 
the  Hercules  of  legend.  An  astonished  Eu- 
rope could  indulge  itself  in  the  spectacle  of  a 
great  man  come  to  light. 

II 

After  having  remade  Greece  himself,  he 
turned  to  the  fate  of  Hellenism  in  the  world 
at  large. 

During  the  whole  Balkan  crisis — and  one 
can  say  this  quite  truthfully — it  was  Greece 
that,  thanks  to  the  genius  of  Venizelos,  with 
the  smallest  army  of  all  at  her  disposal,  con- 
trolled events. 

With  the  insight  of  a  great  man,  Venizelos 
realized  the  true  value  of  Serbia;  he  attached 


268      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Serbia  to  Greece,  and  at  all  times  and  in  all 
circumstances  dominated  M.  Pasitch  by  the 
power  of  his  personal  attraction.  When  it  was 
found  impossible  to  arrive  at  an  understand- 
ing with  Turkey  on  the  subject  of  Crete, 
owing  to  the  hopeless  incapacity  of  the  Turks, 
Venizelos  accomplished  the  miracle  of  con- 
cluding an  alliance  with  the  Bulgarians,  a 
race  that  the  Greek  people  traditionally  re- 
garded in  the  light  of  an  hereditary  and  un- 
compromising enemy.  In  concluding  this  al- 
liance he  saw  clearly  how  necessary  it  was  to 
keep  out  of  the  treaty  all  reference  to  the 
division  of  territories  that  might  be  conquered 
in  the  future.  King  George  and  the  Crown 
Prince  (afterwards  King  Constantine)  op- 
posed Venizelos  bitterly,  but  the  Cretan  once 
more  gained  his  point,  and  the  treaty  was 
silent  as  to  the  division  of  the  spoils.  Be- 
cause of  his  prevision,  Greece  escaped  the  im- 
putations and  difficulties  in  which  Serbia  is 
still  involved. 

In  London  Venizelos  imposed  his  person- 
ality on  all  political  and  diplomatic  circles, 
and  this  in  spite  of  his  reserve  and  modesty, 
which  was  such  a  contrast  to  the  foolish  ar- 
rogance of  Danef. 

It  was  just  at  that  time  that  I  had  the  hap- 


ELEUTHERIOS  VEN1ZELOS  269 

piness  of  getting  to  know  him,  and  of  forming 
one  of  those  friendships,  based  on  confidence 
and  sympathy,  which  death  alone  can  break. 

I  only  saw  Venizelos  twice  at  that  time,  but 
it  sufficed  for  me  to  know  that  I  had  before 
me  not  only  a  great  man  but  a  gentleman,  a 
man  in  whom  one  might  repose  unlimited  con- 
fidence without  running  the  risk  of  being  de- 
ceived. I  knew  he  was  in  profound  disagree- 
ment with  the  Bulgarians  at  the  Balkan  Con- 
ference which  was  then  sitting,  but  he  had  too 
much  delicacy  to  say  a  word  to  me  about  diffi- 
culties between  him  and  his  allies. 

The  first  time  I  saw  him  I  asked  him  the 
secret  of  his  extraordinary  success.  He  replied 
that  he  had  arrived  at  the  right  moment,  and 
that  he  had  adopted  two  rules  of  conduct:  to 
tell  his  people  the  whole  truth  in  all  circum- 
stances, and  to  be  ready  to  leave  office  at  any 
moment  without  regret. 

I  had  a  very  animated  conversation  with 
him  at  Bucharest.  He  became  very  angry 
when  I  told  him  it  was  a  mistake  to  insist 
upon  getting  Kavalla. 

From  his  anger  I  could  see — what  later  on 
I  found  to  be  true — that  he  was  not  the  only 
director  of  his  country's  policy.  At  the  time 
I  was  dreaming  of  completing  the  Treaty  of 


270      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

Bucharest  by  a  treaty  of  alliance  between  the 
four  kingdoms  of  Serbia,  Greece,  Bulgaria, 
and  Roumania. 

When  all  the  secrets  of  the  Balkan  crisis 
are  revealed,  when  men  know  all  that  Veni- 
zelos  did,  our  admiration  for  him  as  a  great 
man  will  be  enhanced.  Here,  at  least,  we  have 
an  individual  who  need  not  fear  that  all  his 
actions  and  even  his  secret  thoughts  should  be 
revealed. 

After  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  Venizelos 
found  he  had  to  fight  Austrian  intrigues  at 
Constantinople.  I  do  not  want  to  tell  the 
history  of  the  Treaty  of  Athens  now,  nor  to 
insist  on  the  fact  that  on  several  occasions  a 
new  war  between  Turkey  and  Greece  was  on 
the  point  of  breaking  out  and  that  Venizelos 
was  prepared  for  all  eventualities.  All  I  want 
to  do  at  the  moment  is  to  render  public  hom- 
age to  the  moral  beauty  of  Venizelos,  who, 
far  from  wishing  to  ignore  the  services  I  was 
able  at  that  time  to  do  Greece  and  the  cause 
of  peace,  insisted  on  giving  them  the  widest 
publicity. 

At  the  end  of  October,  1913,  he  wrote  me 
a  letter  of  generous  appreciation,  in  which  he 
said:  "Our  recent  friendship  has  been  rich  in 
practical  results  for  my  country,  and  I  rejoice 


ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS  271 

that  Roumania  has  again  so  well  played  the 
part  of  arbiter  in  the  conclusion  of  peace  in 
the  Balkans.  It  is  a  new  bond  between  our 
two  nations ;  we  who  are  already  bound  by 
the  same  interests  are  destined  to  advance  to- 
gether on  the  path  of  civilization."  Magna- 
nimity is  always  the  mark  of  greatness. 

Venizelos  had  the  question  of  Epirus  on  his 
hands  at  the  time.  He  knew  quite  well  that 
it  was  impossible  for  Greece  to  oppose  the 
unanimous  wish  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  that 
it  would  be  unworthy  of  him  to  be  the  cause 
of  a  general^  war.  He  sacrificed  himself  to  his 
duty,  knowing  well  that  the  day  would  come 
when  he  would  be  able  to  obtain  Epirus  with- 
out provoking  Europe.  But  in  making  good 
this  policy  he  spent  himself,  just  as  he  spent 
himself  at  Bucharest  when  he  failed  in  ob- 
taining for  the  Greeks  the  sun,  the  moon  and 
the  constellations.  His  actions  were  closely 
watched  at  Athens.  Every  concession  this 
great  man  made  for  the  peace  of  Europe  and 
the  security  of  his  country  was  made  the  oc- 
casion of  attacking  him  as  a  coward  soul  who, 
having  no  faith  in  the  force  of  Hellenism,  did 
not  dare  show  himself  implacable. 

Nothing  is  easier  than  to  obtain  vulgar  pop- 
ularity by  siding  with  those  who  shout  loudest 


272       SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

at  a  time  when,  at  the  risk  of  unpopularity, 
another  man  takes  upon  himself  to  defend 
his  country. 

It  is  to  this  incident  that  Venizelos  owes  the 
enmity  of  M.  Zographos,  just  as  later  on,  as  a 
reward  for  his  efforts  over  the  Islands,  he  had 
to  submit  to  all  the  epithets  coined  by  the 
envious  and  the  disappointed. 

in 

Everyone  who  has  studied  history  suffi- 
ciently to  know  that  great  men  are  sometimes 
rather  a  burden  on  their  country,  will  under- 
stand that  Venizelos  could  not  remain  long 
in  power. 

After  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  had  been 
signed  M.  Pasitch  invited  us  all  to  luncheon 
at  the  Palace  Hotel.  Speaking  to  my  right- 
hand  neighbor,  I  told  him  of  a  wish  I  had 
cherished  for  many  years  of  visiting  Japan  in 
the  summer  of  1914.  Venizelos  heard  me, 
and  asked  me  if  I  would  take  him  as  a  travel- 
ing companion.  Then  he  went  on  to  ask  with 
a  smile  whether  I  was  sure  I  should  be  free 
in  the  first  half  of  the  year  1914.  He  was 
alluding  to  the  opinion  generally  held  that  the 
men  who  had  accomplished  the  work  of  1913 
would  be  retained  in  office  by  their  peoples. 


ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS  273 

I  told  him,  and  the  other  guests  were  greatly 
surprised  at  it,  that  I  was  sure  of  this  free- 
dom, not  only  for  myself,  but  also  for  him. 
As  far  as  Venizelos  was  concerned,  I  was 
wrong  by  a  year.  But  for  the  Island  ques- 
tion and  the  surprise  of  the  European  war, 
he  would  have  been  out  of  office  at  the 
period  I  predicted.  His  greatness  offended 
people  in  a  way  one  could  hardly  imagine. 
The  man  who  created  modern  Greece  had  at 
all  costs  to  disappear  from  the  scene  in  order 
that  certain  personages  might  emerge  from 
their  obscurity.  I  felt  it  first  in  July,  1913, 
and  I  became  firmly  convinced  of  it  in  the 
months  that  followed. 

When  European  war  broke  out  I  had 
no  doubts  as  to  Venizelos'  thoughts.  I  knew 
that  he  wanted  a  serious  and  lasting  alliance 
amongst  the  little  nations,  and  I  could  not 
believe  that  such  a  genius  would  not  realize 
that  the  independence,  the  liberty,  the  very 
existence  of  Greece  was  indissolubly  bound  up, 
as  indeed  were  the  independence  and  liberty 
of  Roumania,  with  the  defeat  of  Austria  and 
Germany.  I  have  learned  since  that  he  thought 
as  I  did,  and  as  a  consequence  that  he  realized 
from  the  beginning  that  our  highest  moral 
duty,  not  only  to  civilization,  but  also  in  re- 


274      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

spect  of  our  interests  as  nations,  was  to  do  all 
in  our  power  to  bring  about  the  victory  of  the 
Triple  Entente. 

With  the  fixed  idea  in  my  head  of  bring- 
ing over  all  the  Balkan  nations  to  the  side  of 
the  Triple  Entente,  and  in  spite  of  Austro- 
German  affirmations  concerning  their  hold  on 
Bulgaria,  I  allowed  myself  to  telegraph  and 
write  to  Venizelos,  begging  him  to  help  us  to 
show,  in  this  European  crisis,  that  we  were 
broad-minded  Europeans.  I  said  it  would  be 
the  worse  for  us  if  we  showed  ourselves  petty 
and  provincial.  A  victorious  Germany  would 
spell  moral  and  material  death.  A  Triple 
Entente  victorious  without  our  help  would 
spell  our  moral  undoing. 

I  told  him  that  just  as  I  was  advising  my 
country  to  make  territorial  concessions  to  the 
Bulgarians,  and  advising  the  Serbs  to  do  the 
same  thing  on  a  substantial  scale,  as  the  war 
would  give  them  a  magnificent  territory  ex- 
tending up  to  the  frontiers  of  Italy,  so  Greece, 
in  a  lesser  degree,  should  also  set  an  example, 
more  especially  as  splendid  compensation 
awaited  her  in  Asia  Minor.  It  was  in  Au- 
gust and  September,  1914,  that  I  ventured  to 
write  in  this  strain  to  my  friend  at  Athens.  I 
will  come  back  to  it  later.  For  the  sake  of 


ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS  275 

truth  I  ought  to  say  that  Venizelos  replied 
to  me  in  the  autumn  that  Greece  could  not 
make  any  territorial  concessions,  and  I  felt 
rather  bitter  about  it.  Bitter  because,  al- 
though I  did  not  think  that  I  could  influence 
the  decisions  of  a  Venizelos,  I  saw  that  Veni- 
zelos was  even  more  than  I  had  guessed  the 
victim  of  difficulties  originating  in  people 
without  foresight,  and  who,  therefore,  cannot 
understand  those  who  have  this  divine  gift. 
The  revelations  Venizelos  has  recently  made 
have  completely  cleared  this  matter  up. 

Never  did.  he  appear  to  me  greater  than 
after  I  had  read  the  two  memoranda  he  ad- 
dressed to  King  Constantine. 

I  am  one  of  those  who  have  read  and  re- 
read Bismarck's  Memoirs.  There  is  nothing  in 
them  which  approaches  the  greatness  of  soul 
revealed  in  the  two  documents  penned  by 
Venizelos.  How  could  a  man  like  myself  fail 
to  resent  the  ironic  fate  of  these  two  papers, 
addressed  as  they  were  to  people  incapable  of 
using  them. 

The  publication  of  the  documents  not  only 
exalts  Venizelos  higher  than  ever,  but  is  an 
inestimable  service  to  Greece. 

To  prove  to  the  Bulgarians  that  a  Greek 
existed,  the  greatest  Greek  of  all,  who  con- 


276      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

ceived  the  possibility  of  sacrifice  in  order  to 
secure  peace  with  his  neighbors,  that  is  a  finer 
work  than  striking  medals  with  the  effigy  of 
King  Constantine  on  them,  entitled  the 
"Slayer  of  Bulgars." 

IV 

And  now  we  come  to  Venizelos'  last  act. 
At  fifty  he  retired  from  political  life,  an- 
nouncing that  if  ever  his  country  found  her- 
self faced  with  a  great  foreign  crisis  he  would 
return  to  the  fray,  as  would  be  his  right  and  his 
duty.  And  after  having  affirmed  with  all  his 
strength  his  right  as  a  free  man  to  fight  no 
matter  whom,  he  retires  as  a  free  man,  an- 
nouncing to  his  people  that  it  is  the  last  serv- 
ice he  can  render  the  Crown. 

This  resignation  of  Venizelos,  however  dis- 
tracting for  all  the  friends  of  Greece,  presents 
one  with  the  spectacle  of  almost  superhuman 
greatness.  This  man  would  only  have  to 
march  straight  ahead  and  everything  would  go 
down  before  him.  But  afraid  of  wounding 
Greece,  he  performed  an  act  of  sacrifice  that 
was  harder  than  dying  itself,  and  exiled  him- 
self from  the  company  of  the  living. 

Compare  the  fall  of  Venizelos  with  that  of 
Bismarck,  and  the  superiority  of  our  Graeco- 


ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS  277 

Latin  race  over  the  Germans  will  stand  out  in 
all  its  sublimity.  Dismissed  by  a  young  Em- 
peror, Bismarck  knows  neither  how  to  fight 
as  a  man  or  be  silent  as  a  man.  He  scolds 
like  a  discharged  cook.  Why  this  difference? 
Was  Bismarck  of  inferior  metal  to  Venizelos? 
It  was  not  this,  but  that  Bismarck  belonged 
to  a  nation  which  for  centuries  has  held  the 
notion  that  the  statesman  is  not  the  servant 
of  his  country  but  the  servant  of  his  king,  and 
that  the  king  himself  is  not  the  highest  ex- 
pression of  the  national  will,  but  another  will 
superimposed  -  on  that  of  the  nation. 

Bismarck  was  heavily  weighted  by  medieval 
institutions  and  a  life  of  obedience,  and,  when 
dismissed  like  a  servant,  like  a  servant  he  cried 
aloud.  The  Greek,  true  son  of  the  French 
revolution,  knows  that  he  is  the  servant  of  the 
people,  and  when  he  surrenders  everything  it 
is  to  the  people  that  he  makes  his  sacrifice. 
He  withdraws  as  a  free  man  without  recrimi- 
nation. 


And  now  for  a  final  recollection! 

The  last  time  Venizelos  came  to  Roumania 
I  had  a  talk  with  him  in  the  embrasure  of  one 
of  the  windows  of  the  Palace.  We  spoke  of 


that  political  philosophy  to  which  men  con- 
cerned with  the  business  of  Government  al- 
ways hark  back.  Amongst  other  things,  we 
spoke  of  the  relations  between  the  statesman 
and  his  Sovereign  in  countries  where  mon- 
archy is  still  an  institution.  And  the  Cretan 
said  to  me:  "It  is  our  duty  to  devote  our 
heart,  our  brain,  our  life  to  strengthening  and 
supporting  our  sovereigns.  We  know  well 
enough  that,  in  their  turn,  they  will  only  dis- 
miss us  if  they  cannot  destroy  us.  All  the 
same,  we  must  do  our  duty,  because  it  is  our 
duty." 

Venizelos  has  done  his. 


The  Kaiser 


XXIX 

THE  KAISER 

I  HAVE  only  seen  the  Kaiser  once.  To  speak 
of  him  after  this  single  interview  would  be 
rash,  if  the  Kaiser  were  not  one  of  those  fig- 
ures which  are  always  posed  for  the  camera 
and  whose  characteristics  can  be  almost  in- 
stantaneously caught.  Pope  Leo  XIII  had 
also  only  seen  him  once,  at  the  outset  of  his 
reign,  when  he  said  of  him,  "This  man  will 
end  in  a  catastrophe." 

It  was  in  January,  1907,  at  Berlin,  that  I 
was  received  in  audience  by  the  Kaiser.  There 
was  luncheon  afterwards,  to  which,  apart  from 
the  Court,  no  one  else  was  asked  except  Herr 
Tchirsky,  then  Foreign  Minister,  and  the 
Roumanian  Minister  to  Germany,  on  whose 
unfortunate  behaviour  during  our  war  it  is  be- 
yond me  to  express  an  opinion.  I  was  waiting 
and  chatting  with  the  Empress  in  a  little  room 
opening  into  the  dining-room,  when  the  Kaiser 
came  in.  I  was  at  once  struck  by  his  machine- 
made  stride,  and  when  he  planted  himself  less 

281 


282      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

than  two  paces  in  front  of  me,  his  steely  eyes 
looking  straight  into  mine,  the  impression  of 
something  mechanical  became  still  stronger. 
The  Kaiser's  stare  is  like  nothing  I  have  ever 
seen  before,  quite  abnormal  in  its  intensity, 
and  distinctly  suggestive  of  madness.  For 
perhaps  ten  minutes  he  talked  to  me  in 
the  anteroom.  Question  followed  question 
breathlessly,  giving  me  scarcely  time  to  frame 
an  answer  to  one  before  it  was  followed  by 
another. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Emperor  meant  to 
make  himself  pleasant.  The  evening  before 
he  had  taken  the  trouble  to  inquire  whether 
I  would  rather  be  talked  to  in  French  or 
English.  I  had  said  I  would  prefer  French. 
Needless  to  say,  I  was  surprised  at  so  obvious 
an  intention  of  ingratiating  himself:  a  Rou- 
manian Minister  of  Finance  was  hardly  so 
important  that  the  Emperor  of  all-powerful 
Germany  should  be  at  such  pains  to  please 
him.  I  naturally  concluded  that  the  Kaiser 
was  a  master  of  the  art  of  seduction,  and 
later  on  my  impression  of  this  resemblance  to 
Nero  was  confirmed. 

The  Kaiser  started  by  telling  me  that  he 
knew  me  very  well  already  from  the  reports 
of  Kiderlen-Waechter,  his  Minister  in  Rou- 


THE  KAISER  283 

mania,  who  had  told  him  all  about  me.  "I 
don't  know,"  he  said,  "if  your  brothers  are 
fond  of  you,  but  my  Minister's  appreciation 
and  affection  for  you  were  more  than  broth- 
erly." He  went  on  to  talk  to  me  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  a  Minister  of  Finance  in  our  time; 
then  leading  the  conversation — if  an  avalanche 
of  interjections  can  be  called  a  conversation — 
to  the  question  of  petroleum  in  Roumania,  he 
said  to  me  in  a  cutting  tone  that  he  did  not 
propose  to  have  any  interference  from  Amer- 
ica in  European  affairs,  and  that  he  looked 
upon  the  full  exploitation  of  our  petroleum  as 
one  of  the  bulwarks  against  her  encroach- 
ments. 

Of  this  preliminary  conversation  this  was 
the  one  point  clearly  impressed  on  me.  It 
was  plain  that  the  Kaiser,  as  the  world  has 
since  had  ample  reason  to  know,  detested 
America. 

During  lunch — I  was  seated  on  the  Em- 
peror's left,  his  daughter  being  on  his  right 
hand — and  afterwards  for  more  than  an  hour 
in  the  smoking-room,  William  II  talked  to 
me  without  ceasing,  skipping  from  one  sub- 
ject to  another  with  an  inconsequence  and  a 
feverish  impatience  which  I  had  never  pre- 
viously encountered.  He  was  bent  on  show- 


284      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

ing  me  that  he  was  little  short  of  omniscient; 
he  even  talked  to  me  of  the  Roumanian  monu- 
ment in  the  Dobrudja — the  so-called  Tropeum 
by  Adam  Ceissi — and  he  was  evidently  pleased 
and  surprised  when  I  told  him  that  Moltke 
had  spoken  of  it  in  his  book  on  his  early 
travels. 

Among  a  thousand  other  things,  the  Kaiser 
asked  me  how  King  Charles  had  always  man- 
aged to  get  his  own  way,  in  spite  of  our  par- 
liamentary system.  I  told  him  in  reply  that 
the  King  had  always  had  the  wisdom  to  let 
matters  take  their  course,  except  in  special 
questions  which  he  thought  of  particular  im- 
portance, and  that  in  these  his  influence  was 
consequently  decisive.  The  Emperor  then 
asked  me  why  his  brother-in-law,  King  George 
of  Greece,  was  not  similarly  successful,  and  I 
gave  him  my  explanation.  During  this  part 
of  the  conversation  I  realized  again  how  pro- 
found was  the  Kaiser's  contempt  for  liberal 
ideas  and  the  constitutional  system.  It  was 
plain  that  he  was  sincere  when  he  declared 
that  Providence  had  chosen  him  as  its  instru- 
ment to  insure  the  happiness  of  this  poor 
world,  just  as  Nero  was  sincere  when  he  be- 
lieved himself  a  great  artist. 

After  that  we  were  talking  of  sport,  espe- 


THE  KAISER  286 

cially  in  Roumania,  when  the  Kaiser  brusquely 
asked  me  if  King  Charles  was  popular.  I 
said  that  popularity  was  hardly  the  word,  but 
that  the  King  enjoyed  something  better,  since 
he  was  much  esteemed.  "That  does  not  sur- 
prise me,"  said  the  Kaiser;  "it  is  thanks  to  his 
reserved  temperament."  Unfortunately  it 
was  in  reserve  that  the  Kaiser  was  de- 
ficient. .  .  . 

Here  I  had  had  this  man,  master  of  the 
most  formidable  organization  in  the  world, 
talking  to  me  for  three  hours  with  the  obvious 
desire  of  pleasing  me  and  of  overwhelming 
me  with  his  omniscience  and  his  genius,  and 
yet  when  I  left  the  Palace  I  felt  like  an  escaped 
prisoner.  Next  day  Prince  Billow  asked  me 
how  I  had  been  impressed.  I  told  him  that 
the  Kaiser  was  an  extraordinary  man,  but 
that  I  would  not  be  his  Minister  for  anything 
in  the  world.  Prince  Billow  smiled — a  rather 
bitter  smile,  which  showed  quite  clearly  that 
he  knew  exactly  what  I  meant. 

The  Kaiser,  I  repeat,  had  been  more  than 
kind.  He  even  had  the  delicacy  not  to  give 
me  my  cordon  of  the  Red  Eagle — a  decora- 
tion which  I  was  destined  to  return  to  him  in 
the  Spring  of  1916 — on  the  occasion  of  our 
lunch,  but  to  send  it  to  me  three  days  later 


by  Monsieur  Tchirsky,  as  "a  souvenir  of  my 
visit  to  Berlin." 

I  have  never  seen  the  Kaiser  since,  but  some 
years  later,  in  conversation  at  Potsdam  with  a 
Roumanian  lady,  a  musician,  married  to  a 
German,  the  Emperor  asked  her  if  she  was 
German  by  birth,  and  when  she  answered  that 
she  was  a  Roumanian  the  Kaiser  said  in  reply : 
"Well,  and  how  is  our  good  Take  Jonescu?" 
and  my  musical  friend,  who  was  tempera- 
mentally a  courtier,  told  me  of  this  Imperial 
apostrophe  as  if  it  were  almost  a  divine  honor. 

Of  my  single  interview  with  the  German 
autocrat  I  retain  a  disquieting  recollection.  It 
was  plain  to  me  that  he  was  a  man  out  of 
the  ordinary  run,  and  yet  there  was  some- 
thing abnormal,  almost  unhealthy,  about  him 
which  kept  me  perpetually  asking  myself  what 
he  would  ultimately  do.  The  contemplation 
of  real  greatness  provokes  a  serene  sense  of 
admiration.  That  was  not  the  impression  left 
on  me  by  the  Kaiser.  On  the  other  hand,  he 
did  not  strike  me  as  a  man  of  commonplace 
qualities,  whom  the  accident  of  birth  had 
placed  in  a  situation  out  of  all  proportion 
to  his  natural  capacity.  Rather,  there  was 
something  exceptional  about  him,  but  it  was 
something  incalculable  and  alarming. 


THE  KAISER  287 

From  Kiderlen-Waechter  I  knew  already 
the  Kaiser's  methods  of  work,  which  were  at 
once  comic  and  full  of  danger.  Every  morn- 
ing he  went  to  the  Foreign  Ministry,  where 
he  had  all  the  telegrams  read  to  him  and  de- 
manded immediate  replies.  Then  he  drank  a 
glass  of  port,  ate  two  biscuits  and  departed. 
To  prevent  his  monarch's  impulsiveness  re- 
sulting in  complications,  Kiderlen  had  re- 
course to  a  plan  of  his  own.  He  only  showed 
the  Kaiser  such  telegrams  as  had  been  received 
up  to  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  those,  that 
is,  which  he  had  himself  had  time  to  consider, 
so  that  he  was  in  a  position,  if  necessary,  to 
withstand  the  Emperor's  impetuosity. 

The  great  question  which  remains,  and  will 
always  remain,  to  be  answered  is  how  the 
Kaiser,  whom  a  German  once  described  to 
me  as  a  lath  painted  to  look  like  steel,  brought 
himself  to  the  point  of  launching  universal 
war,  and  when  he  actually  chose  the  date  of 
August,  1914.  The  oftener  I  recall  the  im- 
pressions left  on  me  by  my  interview  with 
him,  the  more  firmly  I  believe  that  the  war 
had  long  been  part  of  his  deliberate  policy, 
but  that  the  choice  of  the  moment  and  the 
form  of  its  declaration  were  due  to  impulse. 
It  would  otherwise  be  incomprehensible  that 


the  Kaiser,  who  certainly  did  not  lack  brains 
(like  his  son,  whom  Kiderlen-Waechter 
frankly  treated  as  deficient),  should  have 
risked  all  the  hopes  of  his  country  and  his 
house  at  that  particular  moment,  and  for  the 
sake  of  a  question  which  exclusively  concerned 
Austria-Hungary.  For  in  the  future  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary William  II  had  no  confidence. 
So  long  ago  as  the  autumn  of  1912  Herr  von 
Jagow,  a  favorite  of  the  Kaiser,  and  then  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  Rome,  said  to  the  Rou- 
manian Minister  that  the  great  question  of  the 
hour  was  to  discover  how  the  inevitable  dis- 
solution of  Austria-Hungary  could  take  place 
without  the  destruction  of  the  European 
fabric.  Again,  in  the  early  days  of  Novem- 
ber, 1913,  on  my  way  back  from  Athens, 
where  I  had  succeeded  in  making  peace  be- 
tween Turkey  and  Greece,  I  was  dining  with 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
During  the  evening  the  German  Ambassador, 
von  Wangenheim,  now  dead,  who  was  also  a 
favorite  of  the  Kaiser,  and  whom  I  then  met 
for  the  first  time,  carried  me  off  into  the  bay 
of  a  window,  and  after  first  congratulating 
me  on  what  I  had  done  at  Athens,  said  to  me, 
in  so  many  words,  "You  will  see  that  the  sick 
man  of  Europe,  the  Turk,  will  still  be  here 


THE  KAISER  289 

when  Austria-Hungary  is  no  more  than  a  his- 
torical recollection."  So  the  Kaiser  could 
have  been  under  no  illusion  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  giving  the  Hapsburg  Empire  a  new 
lease  of  life. 

How  then  can  we  explain  his  policy?  Per- 
haps the  key  can  be  found  in  a  confidential 
statement  he  made  at  Potsdam  in  the  early 
days  of  August,  1914,  to  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Roumania.  The  Emperor  told  him  that  it 
was  in  the  interest  of  Roumania  to  place  her- 
self at  the  side  of  Germany,  whose  victory 
was  beyond-  question,  because  Austria-Hun- 
gary could  not  last  for  more  than  twenty 
years,  and  Germany  would  then  give  Transyl- 
vania to  Roumania.  The  Kaiser's  crime 
against  the  peace  of  the  world  is  therefore  all 
the  more  unpardonable,  because  in  his  inmost 
heart  he  could  not  believe  that  it  would  bring 
the  era  of  great  European  upheavals  to  a 
close.  He  drew  the  sword,  not  to  preserve 
Austria,  but  in  order  to  dispose  of  her  ulti- 
mately in  his  own  fashion  and  at  his  own  time. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  because  I  have 
only  spoken  to  the  Kaiser  once,  that  this  con- 
versation is  my  only  material  for  the  estimate 
I  have  framed  of  him.  An  essential  timorous- 
ness  is  the  explanation  of  his  character,  and. 


290      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

like  all  men  who  are  not  really  courageous, 
when  the  Kaiser  decided  to  make  daring  the 
keynote  of  his  policy,  he  overdid  it.  An  inci- 
dent of  the  early  years  of  his  reign  with  which 
I  am  acquainted  reveals  him  precisely.  Bis- 
marck had  no  love  for  him,  and  lost  no  occa- 
sion to  make  the  Kaiser  understand  that  he 
was  a  figurehead,  and  that  the  real  authority 
rested  with  his  Chancellor.  He  went  so  far  in 
this  that  one  day,  when  the  Emperor  asked 
him  to  promote  a  diplomatist  of  minor  rank 
for  whom  he  had  a  liking,  Bismarck  curtly 
refused.  In  spite  of  this  the  Emperor  stuck 
to  his  point  and  returned  to  it  several  times. 
Bismarck  remained  immovable.  Faced  with 
this  situation,  the  Emperor  had  neither  the 
strength  of  mind  to  abandon  his  demand  nor 
to  give  his  instructions  as  an  order.  The  ten- 
sion became  so  great  that  someone  in  the 
Kaiser's  immediate  circle  went  to  Holstein 
and  asked  him  to  use  his  well-known  influence 
with  Bismarck  to  bring  an  impossible  situa- 
tion to  an  end.  Bismarck  would  not  hear  a 
word  of  it.  Holstein  at  length  decided  to 
make  a  fresh  attempt  the  day  before  the 
Kaiser  was  starting  on  a  cruise  in  the  North 
Sea.  Just  as  he  was  embarking  he  was  told 
that  there  were  indications  of  Bismarck  giv- 


THE  KAISER  291 

ing  way.  During  the  whole  voyage  the  Em- 
peror was  restless,  nervous,  and  irritable,  and 
yet  never  dared  to  say  a  word  against  his 
Chancellor.  At  the  first  point  at  which  he 
touched  in  Norway  he  learned  the  news  that 
Bismarck  had  at  last  yielded.  His  delight 
was  overwhelming.  He  was  as  extravagantly 
pleased  as  a  child.  Kiderlen-Waechter,  who 
accompanied  him,  and  had  told  Holstein  how 
necessary  it  was  that  this  small  satisfaction 
should  be  given  to  the  Emperor,  was  more 
than  astonished  at  the  spectacle  of  the  master 
of  all  Germany  literally  jumping  with  joy  at 
having  been  able  to  promote  a  civil  servant. 
This  is  the  same  man  who,  when  the  day  came 
on  which  he  decided  to  destroy  the  builder  of 
modern  Germany,  acted  with  reckless  audac- 
ity and  an  absolute  want  of  proportion  or 
delicacy — once  again  the  weak  man  over- 
doing it.  It  was  probably  in  the  same  fashion 
that  he  brought  about  the  world  war.  For 
years  he  had  wished  for  it,  but  he  shrank  from 
making  the  election.  As  soon  as  he  had  made 
a  step  forward  he  recoiled  from  the  decisive 
measure — the  essentially  timorous  man  again, 
willing  to  wound  but  yet  afraid  to  strike. 

But  on  the  day  when  he  had  screwed  his 
courage  to  the  sticking  point  his  impetuosity 


292      SOME  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS 

became  nearly  insane,  for  it  was  insanity  on 
the  part  of  the  Kaiser  to  declare  war  himself 
in  place  of  provoking  his  adversaries  and 
forcing  them  to  declare  it  on  him. 

The  complex  personality  of  the  Emperor 
William  and  the  dreadful  penalty  which  hu- 
manity has  paid  because  the  last  Hohenzollern, 
instead  of  being  the  traditional  Prussian  sov- 
ereign, not  too  intellectual  but  full  of  com- 
mon-sense, was  half  a  madman  and  half  a 
genius,  must  confirm  us  all  in  the  profound 
conviction  that  the  well-being  of  a  country 
and  of  the  world  is  a  charge  too  serious  to 
depend  on  the  accidents  of  absolutism. 


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